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ABSTRACT 
 
NATASHA S. NAUJOKS: Between Memory and History: Political Uses of the 
Napoleonic Past in France, 1815-1840 
(Under the direction of Dr. Jay M. Smith) 
 
 
This dissertation examines the political uses of historical memory in France 
between 1815 and 1848 through the lens of the Napoleonic myth.  Reflections on the 
recent Napoleonic past permeated opposition discourse throughout the Restoration 
despite the regime’s attempts to enforce collective amnesia, while Louis-Philippe’s more 
favorable attitudes towards the Napoleonic legacy secured it a vital role in the July 
Monarchy’s political culture as well.  Whereas historians have long accepted the thesis 
that the myth originated in Napoleon’s efforts to impose a carefully constructed public 
image through propaganda, this dissertation argues that it is better understood as part of 
the nineteenth-century obsession with the past as a mode of explanation.  Long 
recognized in studies of Romanticism, this dissertation attempts to locate the same 
historicism in popular political discourse and examines the work of largely unknown or 
anonymous writers who flooded the increasingly popular market for literary novelties in 
early-nineteenth-century France.  Drawing on published sources such as political 
pamphlets, poems, songs, and other ephemera, as well as police and judicial records, this 
study analyzes how this community of politically engaged writers fashioned multiple and 
 iv 
often contradictory narratives of the Napoleonic past in order to make arguments about 
France’s present and future. 
This dissertation argues that the Napoleonic myth exemplified the power of the 
past to both divide and unite the post-Revolutionary nation.  The myth took shape as a 
political discourse against the Restoration regime, and carefully woven narratives of 
Napoleonic history gave liberal opposition writers a potent means of condemning the 
Bourbon regime as anti-national for undermining its commitment to “unite and forget,” 
succumbing to political factionalism, and perpetuating fractures in the French polity.  
Napoleon’s death in 1821 made it even easier for liberals and republicans to make use of 
the myth for their own purposes, while also freeing his apologists to reframe their 
narratives as a path towards reconciliation.  The ultimate act of national reconciliation 
with the past came with the triumphant return of Napoleon’s ashes to France in 1840, and 
the attendant celebrations of a spectacular military legacy formed a useful proxy for 
reasserting French importance in international diplomacy. 
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Introduction 
 
In Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis, Richard Terdiman argues that 
“the ‘long nineteenth-century’ became a present whose self-conception was framed by a 
disciplined obsession with the past.”1  Nowhere was this more evident than in France, 
where the momentous upheavals of 1789-1815 produced a profound sense of temporal 
dislocation and intensified the uncertainty of the nation’s relationship with its past.  The 
revolutionaries of 1789 self-consciously identified their mission as one of national 
regeneration by explicitly positing a radical break with the past, which contributed 
heavily to this sense of dislocation.  By 1815, it seemed clear to many in France and 
across Europe that the great revolutionary experiment had failed, and questions raised by 
the largely new and unfamiliar terrain of constitutional monarchy further encouraged 
people to seek answers and an often illusory security in the safe refuge of History.  Thus, 
the period of 1815 to 1848 in particular was deeply impressed by the presence of the past.  
For republicans, liberals, and socialists alike, it was necessary to construct both a new 
national history and a new political system that accounted for the principles of 1789.2  As 
the era’s chief cultural and intellectual paradigm, Romanticism also fueled this obsession 
with the past.  Born of the revolutionary disruption of 1789-1815, it was a movement that 
                                                
1 Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), 5. 
2 Jean-Claude Caron, La France de 1815 à 1848 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993), 181. 
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was heavily shaped by the search for “bearings in a world that had lost its ‘fixities’ and 
‘definities.’”3 History was the medium through which French Romantics articulated their 
sense of alienation from contemporary society, and the aesthetics of Romantic historicism 
viewed the past, deliberately embellished by tragedy, as a way of understanding the 
fractured and uncertain nature of present society.4  History thus became inseparable from 
political concerns, and a willingness to confront the contentious legacy of the recent past 
in contemporary life came to saturate the political culture of the Restoration and the July 
Monarchy.   
This dissertation situates the Napoleonic myth squarely within this nineteenth-
century enterprise of attempting to understand the present through the lens of the past.  
Nostalgia for the golden age of the Empire was especially appealing to the French 
Romantics, dubbed by the poet Lamartine as the “bored” generation.  Their particular 
brand of mal du siècle – the fashionable and at times genuine sense of melancholy and 
despair that characterized the Romantic sensibility – was partly derived from a sense of 
having been cheated out of their rightful share of glory and excitement by the collapse of 
the Empire, which coincided with their coming of age.  Napoleon became their perfect 
hero, a Romantic poet turned man of action, transcending the limits of ordinary human 
action through a fierce and superhuman assertion of his individual will.5  But above all, 
                                                
3 J. L. Talmon, Romanticism and Revolt, Europe, 1815-1848 (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1967), 136. 
4 J.H.M. Salmon, “The Historical Novel and the French Romantics,” History Today 28 
(1978): 1. 
5 R. Ben Jones, Napoleon: Man and Myth (London, 1977), 35-36; D.G. Wright, Napoleon 
and Europe (London, 1984), 92; Alan Spitzer, The French Generation of 1820 
(Princeton, 1987), 9-11. 
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the Napoleonic myth emerged during this period because it provided a space for working 
out pressing problems facing the French polity under the Restoration and July Monarchy.  
As one of the first truly modern myths, the Napoleonic myth was an expression of the 
political culture in which it formed.  Unlike classical myths, understood as timeless and 
universal forms whose value rested in their connection to a largely ancient past, modern 
myths derive their legitimacy from their ability to express the social and political realities 
of the contemporary world. 6  Largely oriented towards the future, modern myths look to 
the past not as a source of authority in and of itself, but for its ability to inform their 
understanding of cultural changes in the present.   
The obsession with the past that permeated French consciousness after 1815 has 
long been recognized as a defining feature of the Romantic movement, manifest not only 
in art and literature but also in the burgeoning popularity of historical writing.7  
Nonetheless, it has yet to be fully explored in the political discourse of the early 
nineteenth century, especially with regard to the popular press.  The singular exception is 
of course Stanley Mellon’s classic analysis of the Restoration, which he characterizes as a 
                                                
6 This definition of modern myth informs the essays in “Myth and Modernity,” Yale 
French Studies no. 111 (June 2007). 
7 On Romantic historicism in France, see especially Douglas Johnson, “Historians,” in 
D.G. Charlton, ed., The French Romantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 274-307; Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative 
Histories of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and 
Imperfect Histories: The Elusive Past and the Legacy of Romantic Historicism (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Stephen Bann, Romanticism and the Rise of History 
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995); Maurice Samuels, The Spectacular Past: Popular 
History and the Novel in Nineteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2004).   
 4 
period in which “history was the language of politics.”8  However, Mellon largely defines 
the genre as that practiced by the more or less “professional” historians long recognized 
as part of the Romantic canon – Thierry, Guizot, and the like – leaving unanswered 
questions about how lesser known political writers and journalists, for the most part 
without a formal part to play in government, similarly appropriated the past in their 
efforts to carve out a space for themselves in the sphere of public opinion.  In part, this 
neglect of the role of the past in political discourse stems from the fact that, as Sheryl 
Kroen has noted, the methodological shift towards an understanding of politics as 
political culture that transformed historical approaches to the Old Regime and the 
Revolution of 1789 has largely passed over the era of the Restoration.  To a large extent, 
this observation can be applied to the July Monarchy as well, and with a few notable 
exceptions, historical studies of both periods continue to focus almost exclusively on 
political theory and institutional politics.9  This dissertation thus attempts to address a 
critical lacuna in the history of nineteenth-century French political culture during a 
crucial period in the development of constitutional government and parliamentary 
politics. 
 The Napoleonic myth or legend, on the other hand, has enjoyed considerable 
attention from historians, and there is a vast historiography on the subject covering the 
                                                
8 Stanley Mellon, The Political Uses of History: A Study of Historians in the French 
Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 1. 
9 Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 
1815-1830 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 14-15.  In addition to 
Kroen’s study, other notable exceptions include R.S. Alexander, Re-Writing the French 
Revolutionary Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Jean-Yves 
Mollier, Martine Reid, and Jean-Claude Yon, eds., Repenser la Restauration (Paris: 
Nouveau Monde , 2005). 
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various political, literary, and artistic aspects of its creation both in France and abroad 
over the course of more than two centuries.  One of the first critical studies was Philippe 
Gonnard’s Origins of the Napoleonic Legend, which established the main terms on which 
historians would debate the origins and form taken by the myth throughout the twentieth 
century.  According to Gonnard, the legend was born of the memoirs produced by 
Napoleon and his fellow exiles at St. Helena between 1815 and 1821, through which the 
fallen emperor represented himself as the true ‘Son of the Revolution,’ committed to the 
revolutionary principles of 1789 and the self-appointed protector of the principle of 
national self-determination against the rest of Europe’s monarchs.10  The first substantial 
challenge to Gonnard’s argument concerning the legend’s origins was put forth by Jules 
Deschamps, who defined the legend as the sentimental effects produced by Napoleon’s 
history.  Deschamps located the roots of the legend not in the St. Helena memoirs, but in 
the official propaganda methods that Napoleon developed during the Italian campaign of 
1796 and perfected over the course of his reign as emperor.11  Throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century, these two competing interpretations of the legend’s origins 
remained influential in historical interpretations of Napoleon’s legacy.12 
The bicentennial of Napoleon’s birth in 1969 occasioned a spate of new 
biographical, political, social, economic, military, and diplomatic studies of the First 
Empire in the 1960s and 70s, and the legend formed a focal point both for 
                                                
10   Philippe Gonnard, Les origines de la légende napoléonienne; l’oeuvre historique de 
Napoléon à St. Hélène (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1906). 
11 Jules Deschamps, Sur la légende de Napoléon (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1931). 
12 See, for example the articles in issues no. 107 and 109 of Miroir de l’histoire (1957, 
1959), which echo to varying degrees Gonnard’s and Deschamps’ arguments concerning 
the legend’s origins. 
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commemorative celebrations of the event in France and for historical reappraisals of 
Napoleon’s legacy.13  Jean Lucas-Dubreton rekindled the debate regarding the myth’s 
origins in Le Culte de Napoléon, 1815-1848, arguing that it emerged principally in 
accounts of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo.  According to Lucas-Dubreton, the Mémorial 
de Sainte-Hélène did not invent the legend, but simply served to establish it more 
concretely.14  But by far the most influential studies of the Napoleonic myth/legend 
dating from this period are those by Jean Tulard, who established his central thesis in Le 
mythe de Napoléon.15  Like Deschamps, Tulard argued that the legend’s defining 
characteristics took shape in Napoleon’s strategic use of propaganda, beginning with the 
artfully-crafted bulletins of the first Italian campaign in 1796, to present himself as the 
savior of France, forming the basis of an “imperial catechism” that he could usefully 
employ during various crises throughout his reign to win the support of different 
elements of French society.16  In Tulard’s estimation, then, the legend is best defined as 
Napoleon’s deliberate promotion of a particular self-image, which continued to fascinate 
the French national consciousness well after his death.  By 1914, he argued, the legend 
                                                
13 “The Myth of Napoleon,” Yale French Studies no. 26 (Fall-Winter 1960-61); Jean 
Adhémar and Nicole Villa, eds., La Légende napoléonienne, 1796-1900 (Paris: 
Bibliothèque nationale, 1969); Kerimel de Garczynska, Le culte de Napoléon: collection 
de gravures et d’objets d’art du Château du Blois (Blois: Château-Musée du Blois, 
1969) ; Jean Bruhat, Napoléon, les mythes et la réalité (Paris: Cercle parisian de la Ligue 
française de l’enseignement, 1969). 
14 Jean Lucas-Dubreton, Le culte de Napoléon, 1815-1848 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1960). 
15 Jean Tulard, Le Mythe de Napoléon (Paris: A. Colin, 1971).  See also Tulard’s study of 
the “black legend,” L’Anti-Napoléon: La Légende noire de l’empereur (Paris: R. Julliard, 
1964), and Napoléon: ou, Le mythe du sauveur (Paris: Fayard, 1977).   
16 Tulard’s thesis concerning the legend’s origins in the Italian campaign has proven 
enormously influential on recent scholarship.  See for example Philip Dwyer, “Napoleon 
Bonaparte as Hero and Savior: Image, Rhetoric and Behavior in the Construction of a 
Legend,” French History 18.4 (December 2004): 379-403. 
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was transformed into myth, insofar as it had become both international and universal, 
proving itself adaptable to different interpretations. 
Despite the vast amount of ink spilled on the subject, there has been a marked 
revival of historical interest in the Napoleonic myth/legend over the past few years.17  
Sudhir Hazareesingh’s The Legend of Napoleon surveys its evolution in nineteenth-
century France, with a particular emphasis on its popular manifestations.  Proceeding 
from categories drawn by Frédéric Bluche in his classic analysis of Bonapartist political 
ideology, Hazareesingh draws a distinction between the Napoleonic myth and the 
Napoleonic legend, defining the former as the emperor’s deliberate attempt to control his 
public image during his lifetime, while the latter refers to the more spontaneous and 
popular ways in which Napoleon was remembered and idealized after he lost power in 
1815.18  Rejecting the distinction between Bonapartism as a political ideology on the one 
hand and “Napoleonism,” understood as a more sentimental attachment to the Napoleonic 
cult on the other, he argues that politics and mythology are inextricably linked.19  In 
emphasizing the popular roots of the Napoleonic legend, especially in the period after 
                                                
17 Recent reevaluations of the myth include Natalie Petiteau, Napoléon, de la mythologie 
à l’histoire (Paris: Seuil, 1999); Napoléon de l’histoire à la légende: Actes du colloque 
des 30 novembre et 1er décembre 1999 à l’auditorium Austerlitz du musée de l’Armée, 
Hôtel national des Invalides (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2000).  In 2004-2005, the 
French National Archives also featured a six-month long exhibition on the Napoleonic 
legend.   
18 Frédéric Bluche, Le Bonapartisme: aux origines de la droit autoritaire (1800-1850) 
(Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1980), 168-169.   
19 In this, Hazareesingh’s approach is diametrically opposed to that taken by Bernard 
Ménager in Les Napoléon du peuple (Paris: Aubier, 1988). 
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1815, Hazareesingh challenges Tulard’s thesis that it was largely a product of Napoleon’s 
manipulative use of propaganda to shape his public image.20  
Historical debate on the Napoleonic myth has thus been shaped by two main 
questions.  The first concerns the historical origins of the myth/legend, and whether they 
are more accurately ascribed to the engines of propaganda developed by Napoleon as 
early as 1796, to the “evangelists” of the St. Helena period, or to the popular politics of 
post-1815 France.  The second point of contention, or more precisely, ambiguity, stems 
partly from the first, and concerns the meanings of the terms ‘myth’ and ‘legend.’  While 
often used interchangeably, few historians would disagree with the basic distinction, 
recapitulated most recently by Hazareesingh, between an official myth propagated by 
Napoleon and his missionaries, which informed but did not control the popular legend, 
which took on a life of its own as the nineteenth century unfolded.  There is, moreover, a 
persistently pejorative sense attached to the word “myth;” despite scholarly sensitivity to 
anthropological and literary understandings of myth, the appellation is still plagued by its 
more colloquial usage and conveys a certain sense of falsehood, or at least willfully 
deceitful manipulation, concerning the narratives propagated by Napoleon and cultural 
elites.  (Described as “an object lesson in the reinterpretation of a career to deceive future 
generations,” this description of the St. Helena memoirs gives a pretty clear indication of 
how the myth has been perceived by many historians.21)   
                                                
20 Sudhir Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon (London: Granta Books, 2004), 4-5.  
While Annie Jourdan adheres to roughly the same distinction between myth and legend, 
she largely echoes Tulard’s emphasis on Napoleon’s own influence in the creation of 
both.  Mythes et légendes de Napoléon (Toulouse: Privat, 2004). 
21 Jones, Napoleon: Man and Myth, 213. 
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This dissertation intervenes in these debates in two key respects.  Eschewing the 
traditional distinctions between ‘myth’ and ‘legend,’ I instead choose to define the myth 
by the terms established by the myth-makers themselves.  Whereas modern scholarship 
has often been criticized of late for maintaining a too-rigid dichotomy between memory 
and history, both those who constructed the myth and those who tried to repress it saw 
the myth as occupying a tense space between the two.22  Far from viewing memory in the 
way that many modern scholars do, as a sort of organic and spontaneous process as 
opposed to the more consciously constructed nature of historicizing the past, the myth-
makers viewed memory as conscious acts of recall, designed to keep Napoleon from 
becoming falling prey to the oblivion imposed by History.  Those responsible for 
enforcing the Restoration’s injunctions against remembering the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic past, on the other hand, defined the crime as one of recalling to memory 
someone who should be left alone to become “une personnage historique.”  The 
relationship that they suggested as existing between memory and history is something 
akin to the distinction that Pierre Nora draws between milieux de mémoire, the “settings 
in which memory is a real part of everyday experience,” and lieux de mémoire, the sites 
of reconstructed history that render the past “not quite alive but not yet entirely dead.”23  
They believed that history had the power to sweep away memory, draining it of its 
relevance or power to inform and shape social, cultural, and political discourse.  Thus, 
                                                
22 See for example Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical 
Discourse,” Representations (Winter 2000), 128-29. 
23 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History,” in Realms of Memory: The Construction 
of the French Past, vol 1., trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York : Columbia University 
Press, 1996), 2-7. 
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they constantly invoked their memories of the Napoleonic past in order to inject it into 
the present.  
Secondly, this dissertation locates the myth’s origins in the years 1814-15 for 
several reasons.  First, because I view the myth as an expression of memory, I begin with 
the period when Napoleon began his transition from an immediate to a remembered 
presence in French national consciousness.  Secondly, whereas the St. Helena memoirs 
are still often viewed as the source of nineteenth-century ideas about Napoleon, the 
mythic narrative laid out in those memoirs, which didn’t see print until 1823, was to a 
large extent an echo of the same narrative that had been steadily evolving in ephemeral 
literature since the end of the Empire.  While indeed shaped in large part by the image 
that Napoleon disseminated of himself through deft use of propaganda, I argue that this 
narrative should be considered a distinct phenomenon precisely because of its ability to 
refer not only to past events but to respond to contemporary concerns.  Thus, this 
dissertation locates the origins of the Napoleonic myth not in propaganda or memoirs, but 
in the post-revolutionary, Romantic obsession with the past as a mode of explanation.  
The role played by the literary and artistic giants of the Romantic age in forming 
the Napoleonic myth has long been acknowledged by scholars.24  This dissertation looks 
                                                
24 On the Napoleonic myth in nineteenth-century literature, see especially Jules Garsou, 
Les créateurs de la légende napoléonienne: Barthélemy et Méry (Paris: Fischbacher, 
1899); Jean Savant, Napoléon dans Balzac (Paris: Éditions Napoléon, November 1950); 
Maurice Descotes, La légende de Napoléon et les écrivains français du XIXe siècle 
(Paris: Lettres modernes, Minard, 1967); Marcel Heisler, Stendhal et Napoléon (Paris: 
A.G. Nizet, 1969); Gita May, Stendhal and the Age of Napoleon (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977); and Saint-Paulien, Napoléon, Balzac et l’empire de la Comédie 
humaine (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979).  The interdisciplinary journal Europe also marked 
the bicentennial of Napoleon’s birth with a special issue (no. 481) on the subject in 1969.  
On the role of historians and the making of the legend, the standard text remains Peter 
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instead to the largely unknown or anonymous writers who flooded the increasingly 
popular market for literary novelties in early-nineteenth-century France with mythic texts 
ranging in form from classical elegies to heroic poems to political essays.  These oeuvres 
de circonstance have rarely merited attention as a coherent body of historical source 
material for the study of the Napoleonic myth, in part because they are overshadowed by 
the Romantic lights of greater reputation (and admittedly greater literary talent).  With an 
average length of under twenty pages and, for the most part, extremely limited press runs 
of between a few hundred and one thousand copies, they arguably played only a modest 
and short-lived role in disseminating the myth.25 Nonetheless, written with more 
consciously utilitarian objectives in terms of politics, these works are essential to 
understanding how the myth functioned during the Restoration and July Monarchy 
periods. 
 Romanticism contributed heavily to the creation of the Napoleonic myth, not only 
because of its intellectual and aesthetic preoccupations with the past and human heroics, 
but also because its role in transforming the nineteenth-century literary market.  Its 
development corresponded with decreasing productions costs, rising literacy rates, and 
the politicization of the reading public, all of which combined to both increase and 
diversify the audience for these texts.26  Considered a radically new movement largely 
                                                                                                                                            
Geyl’s Napoleon: For and Against, trans. Olive Renier (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1949).   
25 Keeping these texts brief helped to ensure a broader appeal among popular audiences, 
while smaller press runs were thought less likely to arouse suspicion on the part of 
censors.   
26 James Smith Allen, Popular French Romanticism: Authors, Readers, and Books in the 
19th Century (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 8. 
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because of its innovations in form rather than content – ranging from the rejection of 
alexandrine meter to a mania for  “local color” – it freed writers, and readers, from the 
shackles of classical conventions and constraints.  Romanticism thus opened the market 
to new genres, from songs to melodramas to gothic romances to popular history, 
producing the age of the literary nouveauté. 27  In an age for which few reliable statistics 
exist, it is notoriously difficult to characterize this market with any amount of precision 
or detail, but it is nonetheless reasonable to conclude that literary novelties attracted a 
significant segment of the reading public, at least in the capital.  According to the best 
estimates for the early Restoration period, roughly 85% of men and 60% of women in 
Paris could at least sign their name, a skill that literacy scholars argue indicated a 
reasonable level of reading competency.  Coupled with a significant population 
expansion and increased government expenditure on public instruction, these changes 
translated into a significant increase in the number of potential readers.28  Moreover, the 
growth of cabinets de lecture, along with the ever popular figure of the provincial 
colporteur, ensured that newspapers, journals, and literary nouveautés reached a much 
larger audience.  By 1830 there were 460 reading rooms in Paris alone, with admission as 
low as 10 centimes.29  Finally, the nineteenth century also witnessed the 
                                                
27 In fact, argues Allen, Romanticism owed its success to innovations in form rather than 
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28 Ibid., 154-63. 
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commercialization of the literary market.  The erosion of pre-revolutionary patronage 
systems meant that more and more writers wrote for the market, in response to popular 
demand.  What proved to be in popular demand was Napoleon, reflecting the 
politicization of the nineteenth-century reading public.  
The authors of these ephemera are somewhat more difficult to characterize, 
having left little mark on the immediately recognizable literary culture of nineteenth-
century France.  Moreover, because of the seditious nature of their subject matter, at least 
under the Restoration, many of them chose to publish either anonymously or under 
pseudonyms.  Nonetheless, it is possible to offer a few general remarks about their 
collective socio-professional profile.  While almost all of them dabbled in the literary 
arts, whether poetry, drama, or journalism, few of them relied on writing alone to make a 
living and ranged in profession from lawyers and professors to administrators and 
hommes politiques.  A remarkable number of militaires also took up the pen after the 
conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, seeing themselves as uniquely situated to narrate the 
momentous events in which they took part.  In so doing, they participated in the genre of 
popular Romanticism that viewed history less as a literary exercise than as an 
intervention in time.  As two soldiers who fled France for the Americas in the wake of the 
Second Restoration royalist reaction put it, “We are not so pretentious as to place 
ourselves among the ranks of writers; simple actors in all that has passed, we are thus 
loyal historians.”30  For another, writing was simply another way of serving Napoleon, 
                                                
30 Millard and L. Hartmann, Le Texas, ou notice historique sur le Champ d’Asile (Paris: 
Béguin, 1819), viii. 
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now that the opportunity to take up arms had passed: “Poëte j’ai chanté, soldat j’ai 
combattu.”31  
 Generational patterns, which have sparked much historical interest among 
historians of nineteenth-century France, especially with regard to the great culture war 
initiated by the rise of Romanticism, also reveal themselves in this corpus of texts.32  The 
oldest generation of myth-makers, born within a few years of the emperor and, in the case 
of militaires, rose up through much the same ranks, dominated the production of the 
Napoleonic myth in the first few years.  The revolutionary generation, aged forty-five and 
older in 1815, had become by that time a largely cynical and wary group, having 
witnessed three major regime changes in the past twenty-five years.  Most were willing to 
offer only conditional support to Napoleon during the Hundred Days, remembering his 
transgressions against the revolutionary heritage but still preferring a “liberal” emperor to 
a resurrection of the old regime.  Their immediate juniors, aged twenty to forty-four at 
the time of the Second Restoration, came of age amidst the turbulent events of the 
Revolution and the glorious campaigns of the Empire.  Authors falling into this middle 
generation, most of whom had directly benefited from the Empire’s prosperity and 
contributed to its glory, were usually more unqualified in their devotion to the 
Napoleon’s memory.  Musset’s famous remark about the “bored generation” was echoed 
by the nameless authors of this ephemeral literature.  “Still too young, I couldn’t follow 
                                                
31 Auguste Gondeville de Mont-Riché, À l’Empereur, à l’armée, aux amis de la patrie et 
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32 On the post-revolutionary generations in France, see especially Robert Brown, “The 
Generation of 1820 during the Bourbon Restoration in France: A Biographical and 
Intellectual Portrait of the First Wave, 1814-1824,” Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1979; 
Spitzer, French Generation of 1820; and Robert Gildea, Children of the Revolution: The 
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him on the field of victory.  All that is left for me is to shed a tear over his ashes, to 
donner un souvenir à sa mémoire.”33  Finally, les jeunes gens, many of whom jumped on 
the Napoleonic bandwagon in or after 1830, true to their independent spirit, claimed the 
virtues of impartiality in their assessments of Napoleon and the imperial era.  The true 
“children” of the nineteenth century, the generation of 1830 was marked by a profound 
skepticism and seriousness, rejecting received wisdom in favor of their own judgments.34 
Finally, the myth-making enterprise and popular press furnished these writers 
(and their audiences) with a crucial method of participation in the political life of the 
nation in a period of restricted franchise, which under both regimes was limited to the 
very wealthiest landowners.  Before the passage of the Law of the Double Vote in 1820, 
the Restoration’s electoral law restricted voting to men over the age of thirty who paid at 
least 300 francs in taxes each year.  The qualifications to stand for election were more 
stringent still, restricted to men over the age of forty who paid more than 1000 francs a 
year in taxes.  Out of a total population of around 30 million, this equated to roughly 
16,000 eligible candidates and 90-110,000 potential voters.  Even with the liberalization 
that accompanied the transition to the “bourgeois” regime of Louis-Philippe, which 
lowered tax requirements for voters to 200 francs and those for deputies to 500 francs, the 
electorate expanded only modestly to roughly 200,000 out of the 32.5 million population 
figure returned by the census of 1831.  (By comparison, 429,000 had the right to vote in 
                                                
33 [Amédée Vibaille], Il n’est pas mort!!! Par un citoyen, ami de la patrie (Paris: 1821), 
7-8. 
34 André Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 70-71. 
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1791, out of a much smaller total population.)35  Much like the more elite world of letters, 
which remained intimate throughout the nineteenth century despite the expansion and 
commercialization of the reading market, many of these writers can be said to have 
formed something of definable reading and writing community.36  Most of them were 
exceptionally well-informed as to what was going on in the Chambers, as it was reported 
to them in the periodical press, and they peppered their texts with excerpts from speeches 
and debates as well as references to one another’s writings.  Especially for those writers 
who would go on to become hommes politiques after 1848, elected as deputies or 
appointed to office under the Second Republic or Napoleon III’s empire, myth-making 
provided an important apprenticeship in political participation. 
 The dissertation proceeds chronologically in order to effectively trace changes in 
both the mythic narrative and the function of the past in French political culture.  Chapter 
1, “A Revolution Unfinished,” explores the emergence of the Napoleonic myth around 
the period of the Hundred Days.  Despite the relatively moderate nature of the First 
Restoration, guided by Louis XVIII’s commitment to privileging the pursuit of national 
reconciliation over retribution for the Revolution, the return of the Bourbons signaled to 
many on both sides of the spectrum a return to 1789 and generated the revival of a 
revolutionary rhetoric in which the reactionary émigré and the foreigner again took center 
stage as puppet-masters of the Restoration regime.  Held almost solely responsible for the 
humiliating experience of foreign occupation and the sacrifice of France’s “natural 
                                                
35 Jean Lucas-Dubreton, The Restoration and the July Monarchy (New York: Putnam, 
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frontiers,” the Bourbons were branded as “anti-national” for subordinating France’s best 
interests to those of her enemies and reintroducing old regime divisions in French society.  
Coupled with Napoleon’s self-conscious posture as a reformed despot during the 
Hundred Days, this discourse laid the groundwork for the Napoleonic myth by draping 
the “liberal” emperor in revolutionary clothing.  The chapter concludes by exploring 
Napoleon’s ability to speak the language of “nation-talk” as the basis for his 
reconciliation with the vieux républicains during the Hundred Days. 
 By convincing many royalists that Louis XVIII’s moderation was to blame for the 
ease with which Napoleon was able to oust the Bourbons in March 1815, the Hundred 
Days severely hampered the king’s pursuit of national reconciliation through forgiving 
and forgetting past transgressions.  The ultraroyalists, who enjoyed an overwhelming 
majority in the Chambre Introuvable as well as considerable influence at court, 
succeeded in making the Second Restoration of the Bourbons far more reactionary in 
character than the first.  The impetus to punish those responsible for the Hundred Days 
manifested itself not only in proscription orders and purges of the administration and 
military, but also in the popular royalist violence that raged across the south of France in 
the summer of 1815, which revealed desires to settle much older scores dating back to 
1789.  The result was a widespread sense that Restoration France was irreparably divided 
by the revolutionary experience.  Chapter 2, “King of Two Peoples,” explores this sense 
of division by focusing on the “diaspora” of Napoleonic war veterans in the Americas 
and the failed experiment to found “une nouvelle patrie” in the Champ d’Asile.  I argue 
that idealized stories about Napoleonic veterans in the American wilderness appealed to 
the French public, and to the liberal opposition in particular, primarily because they 
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starkly represented the consequences of factionalism and esprit de parti that undermined 
national unity, for which they held the ultraroyalists responsible.   
 Chapter 3, “Bonaparte n’est plus,” focuses on the year 1821 as a watershed moment 
in the evolution of the Napoleonic myth.  The emperor’s death prompted many writers to 
engage in the quest for impartial judgment of the Napoleonic past, resulting in the 
evolution of a meta-narrative defined around multiple and often competing images of 
Napoleon as a liberal and nationalist revolutionary, a benevolent but fearsome conqueror, 
a savior, and a martyr. This narrative proved to be easily adapted to many items on the 
liberal opposition’s agenda, from impassioned protests against the erosion of 
constitutional liberties to support for the Greek War of Independence.  In furnishing a list 
of Napoleonic bienfaits for which the nation ought to give thanks, the meta-narrative also 
prompted demands to reclaim Napoleon’s mortal remains from the English and give it a 
fitting burial on French soil.  While predicated on the idea of remembering as an act of 
reconnaissance and proposed as a means of reconciling the nation to its past, the more 
wily political writers also deftly used these demands to criticize Louis XVIII for giving in 
to the reactionary impulses of the extreme right and abandoning the regime’s policy of 
union et oubli. 
 The Revolution of 1830 and early years of the July Monarchy marked another 
crucial turning point in the evolution of the Napoleonic myth.  Louis-Philippe’s accession 
introduced a remarkable change in the relationship between the “official memory” of the 
French state and the revolutionary past, which the king actively but selectively 
appropriated as part of his efforts to distance himself from his discredited Bourbon 
predecessors and establish new foundations for his reign.  Chapter 4, “Reconciliation and 
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a New National Past,” explores the ambiguities present in his tentative approach to the 
Napoleonic past.  The challenge in appropriating the Napoleonic myth, as Louis-Philippe 
saw it, was how to keep memory separate from ideology, or, how to keep the past from 
reincarnating itself in the present.  He responded to this challenge by encouraging 
remembering of one specific aspect of the Napoleonic legacy, that of military glory, in 
order to depoliticize Napoleonic memory and insulate himself from the threat of 
Bonapartist political machinations.  Moreover, the new regime’s favorable attitudes 
towards the Napoleonic past also produced an optimistic public discourse about the 
potential of the past as an avenue towards national reconciliation, reviving demands for 
the return of Napoleon’s ashes.  While Louis-Philippe managed to consistently dodge the 
question of repatriating Napoleon’s remains throughout the first decade of his reign, his 
commitment to reconciliation was tested by proxy in the campaign for the posthumous 
rehabilitation of Marshal Ney, victim of the White Terror and martyr to the Napoleonic 
cause. 
 The fifth and final chapter focuses on the year 1840, one in which the Napoleonic 
past was again most emphatically rendered present by two distinct but related incidents.  
Provoked by the pretensions of the Egyptian pasha Mehmet Ali, the Eastern Question 
prompted the most dramatic foreign policy crisis France had yet faced since her 
humiliation in 1815.  Formed in the summer of 1840, the Quadruple Alliance pitted Great 
Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia in support of the Ottomans against France and 
Mehmet Ali, raising specters of coalitions past that had ranged themselves against France 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  Thwarted in its foreign policy objectives 
with regard to the East, the French left, egged on by Thiers, demanded compensation in 
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the form of the left bank of the Rhine and nearly reignited war on the continent.  Thus, 
the return of Napoleon’s ashes in December 1840, originally intended by the Orléans 
regime as a measure that might help heal the breach both between the nation and its past 
and between France and England, assumed unforeseen significance as a symbolic act of 
defiance against France’s foreign enemies.  Meanwhile, Louis-Napoleon, Bonapartist 
pretender since the death of l’Aiglon in 1832, tested the potential of Napoleonic 
memories, which arguably enjoyed the height of their popularity with the impending 
return of the ashes, to drum up support for a coup d’état.  His efforts were unsuccessful 
until 1848, the reasons for which are briefly reconsidered in the conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1 – A Revolution Unfinished 
 
 
On the night of 13 February 1820, the duc and duchesse de Berry celebrated the 
end of the pre-Lenten season by attending a performance at the Paris Opéra.  The 
duchesse, probably fatigued by the unremitting demands of their crowded social calendar, 
decided to take an early leave.  Near 11:00, Berry escorted his wife to her carriage, 
stationed outside the royal entrance to the Opéra on the rue Rameau.  He bid her farewell, 
and, promising to return home after the final act, turned to reenter the building.  
Suddenly, a stranger darted in between the duke and his companions, grabbed Berry by 
the shoulder, and plunged a dagger into his back.  Unaware at first that he had been 
stabbed, Berry and his entourage mistook the assassin for merely “un curieux indiscrèt.”  
The comte de Choiseul, the duke’s aide-de-camp, pushed the man away, giving him an 
opportunity to flee the scene.  Within seconds, Berry discovered the dagger in his back 
and cried out, “I’ve been murdered!”  Berry’s entourage carried the duke back into the 
Opéra and installed him in an office upstairs, where doctors and members of the royal 
family gathered anxiously by his side over the next several hours.  In his final agony, he 
heroically pleaded with the king to pardon his assassin, remarking how cruel it was “to 
die at the hand of a Frenchman.”37  He died at 6:30 the following morning. 
                                                
37 David Skuy, Assassination, Politics, and Miracles: France and the Royalist Reaction 
of 1820 (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), 10. 
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The assassin, meanwhile, was pursued and apprehended within minutes of the 
attack near the arcade Colbert, about four blocks away from the Opéra, tackled by an 
employee of a nearby café.  The duke’s guards conducted him to the police, where he was 
interrogated for nearly twenty-four hours.38  Louis-Pierre Louvel, a thirty-six-year-old 
saddler in the royal stables, freely confessed to his crime.  He prided himself on having 
planned the assassination since 1814, when he resolved to rid France of her “cruelest 
enemies,” the royal family.  Louvel held the Bourbons guilty of conspiring with 
foreigners against their own country, having returned to power under Allied protection 
and consenting to peace terms that humiliated France by shrinking her borders.39  
Moreover, Louvel reasoned that the Bourbons were really to blame for the shocking 
French defeat at Waterloo; by sowing the seeds of discontent among the army and aiding 
and abetting the coalition against Napoleon, they ensured the triumph of France’s 
enemies.40   
Louvel had chosen his target well.  The youngest son of the comte d’Artois, the 
forty-two-year-old duc de Berry was the only hope for the family’s future.  Neither his 
uncle, Louis XVIII, nor his elder brother, the duc d’Angoulême, had any male heirs of 
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their own, and it seemed unlikely that his father, now in his sixties, would father any 
more children.  It was thus up to Berry and his wife, Marie-Caroline of Naples, to 
perpetuate the Bourbon dynasty, but after four years of marriage, the couple had only one 
child who survived infancy, a daughter.  By murdering the only Bourbon capable of 
producing heirs to the throne and extinguishing the dynasty, Louvel sought to precipitate 
the demise of a regime he despised.  Fate, however, decreed otherwise.  On his deathbed, 
the duc de Berry revealed the real reason for his wife’s fatigue that evening – she was 
pregnant.  The news stunned both the royal family and the French public, and many 
suspected that it was a ruse to rally the royalists in the wake of Berry’s death.41  Seven 
months after her husband’s death, the duchesse de Berry gave birth to a son, Henri, duc 
de Bordeaux, and the birth of the “miracle child” renewed hope in the future of the 
Bourbon dynasty. 
Throughout his interrogation and trial, Louvel refused to name any accomplices, 
insisting that he acted alone and on behalf of France’s “national interest.”  The 
prosecution went to great lengths to prove his “fanaticism for Buonaparte,” diligently 
retracing Louvel’s every movement and interviewing anyone he may have been in 
contact with in an effort to establish the existence of a grand conspiratorial network, but 
he repeatedly denied these charges.  Relentlessly questioned about his motives, Louvel 
reiterated that he was inspired solely by “an abstract sentiment: national honor.”42  
Ignoring the counsel of his lawyer, who argued that his client was insane and thus could 
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not be convicted of having the intention to commit treason, Louvel insisted on justifying 
his crime as an act of patriotism: “I am but a Frenchman willing to sacrifice myself in 
order to destroy a party of men who took up arms against their patrie.” 43  Arguing that 
the “national interest excuses all [crimes],” Louvel defended his actions as a service to 
his country.44  The Chamber of Peers preferred to interpret his crime as the violent act of 
fanatic, and he was guillotined on 7 June 1820. 
Louvel’s protests to the contrary notwithstanding, many people were willing to 
believe that he was simply the tool of a “Berry conspiracy,” orchestrated by a vast 
European network of liberals and republicans.45  His crime was widely interpreted as the 
product of dangerous liberal ideas unleashed by the Revolution of 1789.46  In the opinion 
of Bellart, the procureur-général who prosecuted the case, Louvel’s errors could be 
traced back to the revolutionary catechism of 1793.  For Louvel was a member of the 
revolutionary generation, “children formed by the school of atheism, by contempt for 
laws and religious beliefs…taught that crime is virtue and virtue is crime.”  Nourished on 
the Rights of Man and Jacobin morality, he was the inevitable fruit of a poisoned tree.47  
Even more alarming was Louvel’s evident admiration for Napoleon, especially in the 
troubled years of 1814-15, when he followed the exiled emperor to Elba.  Images of 
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Louvel as a fanatic fed on dangerous revolutionary and Bonapartist ideas furnished the 
political right with powerful ammunition against their opponents.  Charles Nodier, editor 
of the royalist newspaper Le Drapeau blanc, blamed the electoral reform ordinance of 
September 5, 1817, which had abolished the system of indirect elections and resulted in 
parliamentary gains for the left.  “I have seen the dagger that killed the duc de Berry,” he 
famously declared, “it was a liberal idea.”48   
 
Although few were willing to go so far as Louvel, his resentment against the 
Bourbons was shared by a great many members of the politically engaged French public.  
As Bellart argued, it was no wonder that Louvel developed his idée fixe, exposed as he 
was to the ceaseless flow of seditious ideas spread by the liberal opposition.  The 
prosecutor saw him as a dupe of the regime’s numerous enemies, who succeeded in 
implanting in his feeble brain the misguided conviction “that the time of France’s glory 
has passed, that liberty is under threat, that the Bourbon government has betrayed the 
interests of the patrie.”49  These charges against Louis XVIII’s regime dated back to the 
First Restoration, when the euphoria that greeted the return of the Bourbons in April 1814 
quickly dissipated as old tensions resurfaced and France confronted her much reduced 
status in the international arena.  Complicating the relationship between France and her 
king was the unresolved legacy of the French Revolution, itself a legacy bequeathed by 
the Empire. 
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The image of Napoleon as l’homme de la Révolution became a commonplace 
after his fall from power, being useful not only to Napoleon himself and his supporters 
but also to his detractors.  Throughout his reign, however, Napoleon maintained a more 
complicated relationship with the revolutionary heritage.50  He was able to catapult 
himself to power largely by posing as the Revolution’s savior at the time of 18 Brumaire, 
cloaking the coup as an attempt to rescue the Republic from a corrupt, weak, and 
ineffectual Directory government that was incapable of containing factional threats from 
both the right and left.  As First Consul, he quickly made peace with the Republic’s 
enemies – a peace that proved no more than a truce in the case of France’s foreign 
enemies, but more durable in the case of the émigrés, counter-revolutionaries in the 
Vendée, and the Catholic Church.  But although as emperor he would continue to style 
himself as the “crowned representative of the Revolution triumphant,” his need for 
legitimacy in the eyes of his fellow European sovereigns demanded that he distance 
himself from the revolutionary heritage.  The eclipse signaled itself in a variety of ways – 
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social hierarchy was restored, albeit in a modified form that accommodated the new post-
revolutionary elite, essential public liberties such as freedom of the press were drastically 
curtailed, and the pursuit of liberty, equality, and fraternity was displaced by an emphasis 
on order and unity.   There were mutations in revolutionary symbolism, too; the 
Marseillaise was banned in 1805, while the tricolor came to represent France’s 
triumphant militarism as much as, and even more than, the spirit of 1789.  On the other 
hand, Napoleon could legitimately claim to have consolidated many of the Revolution’s 
gains, most notably through the Civil Code, which confirmed civil equality and property 
rights.  All of this allowed Napoleon to declare, as he often did, that “the Revolution is 
over.”51 
In 1814, the Empire’s collapse undermined the validity of this assertion and 
reopened the revolutionary wound.  Although modern historians have revised the image 
of the Restoration as entirely reactionary, emphasizing Louis XVIII’s willingness to 
concede many of the changes wrought by the Revolution and Napoleon, the fact remains 
that his best efforts at reconciliation were continually undermined by ultraroyalist 
extremism.  Critics then and ever since have characterized the Restoration as an attempt 
to turn the clock back to 1789 and restore the Old Regime.  The return of the Bourbons 
introduced a sort of wrinkle in time, and the history of the past twenty-five years was 
suddenly and radically destabilized, bringing the revolutionary legacy back to the center 
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of political discourse.  Two issues in particular that were clearly rooted in revolutionary 
memories – the return of the émigrés, and the sacrifice of France’s “natural frontiers” – 
fueled anti-Bourbon invective and surfaced in the political press during the Hundred 
Days.  This discourse also articulated a post-revolutionary model of political legitimacy 
in which the exercise of power depended on fluency in what Steven Englund calls 
“nation-talk” – the language of national sovereignty, of national independence, and of a 
trampled but still proud national glory.52  Above all, it was Napoleon’s ability to speak 
this language that facilitated his return to power in March 1815, and earned him the 
support of his once staunchest opponents. 
 
Louis XVIII: the Anti-National King 
Perhaps the most obvious sign of renascent revolutionary memories was the 
revival of anti-noble and anti-clerical sentiment prompted by the return of the émigrés, a 
phenomenon that was much exaggerated in the contemporary consciousness.  The 
political discourse of the Hundred Days reveals that the revolutionary exodus, largely 
royalist, was every bit as divisive as it had been in the 1790s, despite Napoleon’s efforts 
to heal the rift.  In fact, most of the roughly 150,000 émigrés who fled during the 
Revolution had returned to France by the fall of 1800.53  Napoleon’s general amnesty of 
April 26, 1802, which removed all but 1,000 names from the list of proscription, tempted 
back moderate royalists, constitutionnels, and others of politically center-right leanings 
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who found the Consular regime tolerable.  Those who returned were by and large 
reintegrated into imperial society; many became public officials and some were even able 
to reacquire properties nationalized under the Revolution.  Only a few thousand who 
were intractably committed to the ancien régime – the Bourbon princes and their exile 
court, clerics who refused to accept the Concordat, and a handful of royalist political 
journalists centered in London – remained in exile until the fall of the Empire in 1814.54   
Nonetheless, the perception that Restoration politics were orchestrated by hordes 
of reactionary émigrés persisted throughout the regime, in part because most of those 
who returned with the Bourbons in 1814 did represent the upper crust of the Old Regime 
aristocracy.  They formed the heart of the ultraroyalist party that coalesced around the 
comte d’Artois, “more royalist than the king,” and made no attempt to hide their 
intentions to turn the clock back to 1789.  Thus, a small but vociferous minority of 
reactionaries colored the public’s perception of émigrés as a whole, stirring up decades-
old resentment against “enemies of the Revolution.”  Despite Louis’ moderation, many 
believed that the regime was intent on restoring a feudal order.  The purchasers of biens 
nationaux were especially anxious, fearing that their rights to those properties, confirmed 
by Napoleon, would be revoked in favor of old nobles seeking to reclaim their patrimony. 
The most conspicuous émigrés of all were, of course, the members of the royal 
family.  It has often been said that the Bourbons were forgotten in France at the time of 
their restoration, a claim that is difficult to validate given the vagaries of public opinion 
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as reported by contemporaries.55  Nonetheless, the fact remains that the royal family 
appeared tainted by all things foreign upon their return in 1814.  The comte d’Artois fled 
France in 1789, followed by the comte de Provence in 1791; neither had set foot in their 
native land in roughly a quarter of a century.  The younger generation – the duc 
d’Angoulême and his wife Marie-Thérèse, daughter of Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette, 
and his younger brother the duc de Berry – had all come of age while living abroad.  
Worse still, they had long enjoyed the hospitality of France’s mortal enemy, England, 
which had become the nexus of the French expatriate community after 1792 as more and 
more émigrés found it prudent to leave their continental boltholes at Koblenz, Hamburg, 
and Turin to avoid the advancing armies of the First Republic.56  But even more injurious 
to their public image than their many years in exile was the manner in which they 
returned.  In 1814, and again in 1815, the Bourbons were given safe conduct by the 
Allied armies, earning themselves eternal shame for returning “in the baggage carts of 
foreigners” and cementing a disastrous association between the Restoration regime and 
French defeat. 
Louis XVIII’s close personal ties with England did nothing to alleviate suspicions 
that the nation’s enemies were heavily directing French affairs.  Louis, like many 
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émigrés, doubtless had good reason to feel gratitude towards those who hosted him 
during his time in exile.  But it was certainly tactless to publicly declare that he owed his 
restoration, “after Providence,” to the Prince Regent, personally inviting him to Paris for 
the peace celebrations.  Louis committed an even more egregious public relations blunder 
by his open fondness for the Duke of Wellington, going so far as to congratulate him on 
his victory at Waterloo.  According to the peculiar logic of the royalists, this solicitude 
accorded to a victorious enemy constituted no breach of honor because the Allies had 
fought and defeated not France but Napoleon alone.  For most French citizens, however, 
Wellington was the most conspicuous representative of the Allied coalition whose recent 
victory left a humiliating stain on French national honor.  Louis rubbed salt in the wound 
by lavishing extremely valuable gifts on Wellington, including priceless Sevrès plate and 
a plaque of the Order of St. Louis set in diamonds and worth over 600,000 francs.57  To 
those who were willing to believe that England was the puppet-master of the Bourbon 
regime, such gifts could easily be seen as tribute rendered to a lord by his obedient vassal.  
The Bourbons also suffered for their willingness to sacrifice the territorial gains 
won by the revolutionary and imperial armies.  In public opinion, the relinquishment of 
France’s “natural frontiers,” formed by the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, an 
ideology consecrated by the Revolution, was tantamount to treason.  The doctrine of 
natural frontiers, although it had antecedents in the administrative rationalization of the 
Old Regime, was rarely invoked until the First Republic’s declaration of war against the 
“despots” of Europe in April 1792.  The Rhine frontier in particular first assumed its 
momentous importance during the Revolution, suiting both the more aggressively 
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expansionist aims of the Girondins and their Montagnard opponents, who assimilated the 
idea of the Rhine as a defensive barrier against foreign aggressors within the totalizing 
rhetoric of “la patrie en danger.”58  The doctrine of natural frontiers provided a crucial 
ideological justification for annexation under the First Republic, although it was 
frequently subordinated rhetorically to the more benign mission of promoting a universal 
revolution to liberate neighboring peoples from the shackles of tyranny. 
The Treaty of Campo-Formio, signed in October 1797, confirmed the First 
Republic’s territorial acquisitions of Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Nice, and 
Savoy, amounting to a tacit recognition of France’s right to her natural frontiers.  
Although the idea of natural limits was largely obviated by the creation of the Empire, it 
once again assumed paramount importance after the crushing defeat inflicted by the 
Allies at the Battle of Leipzig.  In fact, the sanctity attached to France’s natural frontiers 
played a critical role in prolonging the Empire’s collapse, for Napoleon’s intransigence 
on this matter precluded peace with the Allies and precipitated the ill-fated Campaign of 
France.  On 19 January 1814, Napoleon wrote to Caulaincourt, his representative at the 
Congress of Châtillon:  
The point on which the Emperor most urgently insists is the necessity of France 
retaining her natural limits: this is my sine qua non… France, if reduced to her old 
limits, would not now possess two thirds of the relative power that she had twenty 
years ago.  The territory she has acquired in the direction of the Rhine does not 
balance what Russia, Prussia, and Austria, have acquired merely by the 
dismemberment of Poland; all these states have increased in magnitude.  To 
restore France to her old limits would be to humble and degrade her.  France, 
without the departments of the Rhine, without Belgium, Ostend, and Antwerp, 
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would be nothing….Neither the Emperor nor the Republic (should revolution 
again restore it), would ever subscribe to such a condition.  As far as regards his 
Majesty, his determination is irrevocably fixed; he will not leave France less than 
he found her.59   
 
Faced with the reality of his increasingly hopeless position, the emperor gave way to the 
revolutionary general.  Willing to concede defeat in the Iberian peninsula, the loss of Italy 
and Germany, and the failure of the Continental System, he insisted only on the foreign 
policy aims of the First Republic, which was to achieve a more favorable balance of 
power with its European rivals by extending France’s territorial boundaries to her natural 
frontiers.  
Although Napoleon was much blamed for exposing France to the horrors of a 
foreign invasion by his intransigence, his dogged insistence on preserving the territorial 
gains of the First Republic later worked to his advantage.  Throughout Louis XVIII’s 
reign, French foreign policy was guided by his pacifist intentions.  In stark contrast to the 
attitudes of Napoleon and his revolutionary predecessors, Louis and his ministers 
renounced territorial ambitions and subordinated nationalist aims to the general interests 
of the “Concert of Europe.”  At first this policy appeared to accord with the 
overwhelming desire for peace that characterized French public opinion during the final 
act of the imperial drama.  Historians and contemporaries alike have remarked upon the 
widespread lack of patriotic response to the invasion of 1814; the French by and large 
exhibited a general sense of war-weariness and apathy, and popular uprisings were 
mostly confined to the eastern provinces where the advance of the Allied armies took its 
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toll on local populations.60  But the Bourbons’ policy of moderation and conciliation in 
foreign affairs soon rankled national pride, fueling a spirit of resentment and a desire for 
revenge, and paving the way for Napoleon’s return to power.61   
The locus of this resentment was the First Treaty of Paris, signed on 30 May 
1814.  Its terms were comparatively lenient; astonishingly, the Allies neither demanded 
an indemnity nor imposed an occupation, but did insist on fixing French borders as they 
existed in January 1792.62  In acquiescing to the loss of France’s “natural frontiers” along 
the Rhine and the Alps, the Bourbons sacrificed a point of national honor in the eyes of 
many.  Napoleon owed much of his popularity during the Hundred Days to a widespread 
desire to repudiate the humiliating peace signed by the Bourbons; ironically, having 
himself pushed the Allies towards an uncompromising position by his diplomatic 
equivocation, he managed to avoid blame for France’s loss of territory by simple virtue 
of the fact that he was forced to abdicate before the peace negotiations were concluded.  
His decision to pursue hostilities in 1814, once seen as the product of his unbridled 
ambition and myopic self-interest, was later recast as an act of supreme patriotism.  The 
war-weariness and desire for peace that impelled French public opinion towards the 
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Bourbon cause in 1814 seems to have rapidly evaporated in the wake of the settlements, 
and Napoleon appeared to be the only one who could restore national dignity.  As one 
anonymous commentator put it, “We had peace under the Bourbons, and we will have it 
all the same under Napoleon; but under the Bourbons we were degraded and despised, 
while under the Emperor we will be honored and feared.”63 
The émigré and the foreigner, familiar bogeymen since the time of the 
Revolution, thus resurfaced in Restoration political culture and informed much of the 
anti-Bourbon literature published during the Hundred Days.  Napoleon, still adept at 
measuring which way the winds of public opinion were blowing, himself recognized the 
revival of anti-noble and anti-clerical sentiment upon his return from Elba in March 1815.  
“Nothing has surprised me more on returning to France than this hatred of priests and the 
nobility which I find as universal and as violent as it was at the beginning of the 
Revolution.  The Bourbons have restored their lost force to their ideas of the 
Revolution.”64  Although wary of inciting popular violence, Napoleon decided to tap into 
this recrudescence of revolutionary passions and harness it to his own purposes.  In the 
proclamations issued immediately after landing at Golfe Juan on 1 March, he appealed to 
popular resentment of privilège in order to underscore the ideological gulf existing not 
only between the royal family and the French people, but between the Old Regime past 
and the post-revolutionary present.  “Seated upon my throne by the force of the same 
armies who ravaged our territories, seeking in vain to shore up the principles of feudal 
rights, [Louis XVIII] can only assure the honor and rights of small number of individuals, 
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enemies of the people.”65  The Bourbons represented not the French nation, but a handful 
of elites who for twenty-five years had fomented public opinion in Europe against their 
homeland, and took up arms with foreigners against their own compatriots.  In contrast to 
this anti-national regime, Napoleon himself was motivated only by the “interests of the 
patrie;” “his interests, honor, and glory are nothing but your interests, honor, and 
glory.”66  The very same Bourbon king to whom Napoleon encouraged obedience in his 
farewell at Fontainebleau in April 1814, he now exhorted the French to repudiate in the 
name of national honor: “Every nation, no matter how small, has rights, and need not 
subject itself to the dishonor of obeying a prince imposed by a victorious enemy.”  
Napoleon, by contrast, was France’s truly legitimate sovereign because he was 
established on the imperial throne by the will of the nation.67 
In an essay published in May 1815, C.-F. Réal echoed the emperor’s own rhetoric 
in posing the question, “who is to blame for the Bourbons’ reverse of fortune?”  The 
answer was simple: themselves.  They isolated themselves by defining as “vrai Français” 
all those who followed them into exile, reestablishing the rights of the “privilégiés,” who, 
in taking up arms against their own country, had relinquished their rights as French 
citizens and been rightfully condemned to civil death by the revolutionary government. 
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The vast majority of French citizens, by contrast, were consigned to the category of 
rebels.  Restored by the force of bayonets rather than by the will of the nation, the 
Bourbons had to flatter the pride of the Allied powers at the expense of their own subjects 
in order to maintain their authority.  In Réal’s view, the Bourbons could not possibly 
claim to defend “our interests and our glory” with any amount of dignity, having placed 
themselves in the debt of, and France at the mercy of, foreign enemies.68 
Louis XVIII had trusted his promises of peace to cement his popularity among a 
population wearied by war and Napoleon’s incessant demands on the nation’s resources.  
But to many observing the situation at the beginning of 1815, the Bourbon regime made 
peace impossible.  Victor Verger, a product of Napoleon’s imperial university system and 
later a prolific bibliographer and translator at the Bibliothèque de Paris, raised the specter 
of a foreign menace in an essay published in March 1815.  He presented his argument as 
the “duty of a true Frenchman,” for whom national glory is dearer than life itself. Under 
the circumstances of the Restoration, he argued, war with one or more of France’s foreign 
enemies was inevitable because the weak and abject nature of the Bourbon regime 
allowed the Allies to run roughshod over France.   Verger reproached the Bourbons for 
promoting foreign interests over those of their own country.  Instead of encouraging 
French manufacture and commerce, he said, the Bourbons created unfavorable legislation 
that forced the French to buy imported goods at exorbitant prices.  But above all they 
were guilty of disguising France’s humiliation under the guise of peace, “in sacrificing all 
that territory that became French by right of conquest, in sacrificing those lands bought 
by our courage and our blood, and which together formed the greatest empire in the 
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world, in sacrificing too a piece of l’ancienne France, this sacred soil never before 
defiled by the stain of foreign domination.”  For Verger, this was too high a price to pay 
for peace.69 
Only a “noble and generous effort” was capable of restoring France to her rightful 
place in the political equilibrium of Europe.  For Verger, the choice between Napoleon 
and Louis XVIII thus boiled down to a choice between “taking up arms, or bending 
beneath the yoke of the foreigner.  Since this latter option is revolting to every true 
Frenchman, there isn’t a single person in France who doesn’t prefer war to ignominy.” 
Napoleon alone was capable of inspiring the pride and courage necessary to reclaim 
France’s rightful place through resounding victories on the battlefield, and he alone was 
capable of instilling fear in the hearts of their enemies and dashing their well-laid plans to 
crush France once and for all.  “France has been like a body without a soul.  Now more 
than ever we sense the truth of this maxim: Napoleon can do without France, but France 
cannot do without Napoleon.”70  Verger, then, welcomed Napoleon’s return in 1815 and 
with the prospect for renewed hostilities against the Allies, this time not a war of 
conquest but war of honor.  
Auguste Gondeville de Mont-Riché was another commentator for whom peace 
was not worth the price of national honor.  Assistant to the Minister of War under the 
Empire, he distinguished himself by his bravery as lieutenant of the 10th legion of the 
National Guard in a skirmish with Allied troops during the siege of Paris on 30 March 
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1814.  A year later he proved himself to be one of Napoleon’s most zealous partisans in a 
poem dedicated “to the Emperor, to the Army, to the Friends of the Patrie and Glory.”  
Casting patriotism in the mold of religious piety, he called upon his compatriots, for 
whom France is the “cherished idol of a generous cult,” to consecrate the alliance of 
patrie and honneur “in the sacred name of this avenging hero.”  Napoleon, having played 
the role of savior in the past, now assumed the mantle of avenger and protector.  Who 
else, he asked, could restore the balance of power in Europe?  (By balance of power, 
Gondeville, like others accustomed to more than a decade of French ascendancy in 
international affairs, meant restoring French dominance on the continent.)  Gondeville 
argued that the humiliation France suffered in 1814 would never have happened had the 
French remained united and loyal to the emperor.  Those who were cowardly enough to 
buy peace at the price of honor, “although born among us, are not French at all.”  Fate 
was granting France a chance to atone for that treason and once again put its faith in 
Napoleon, whose triumphant return would erase the tragic errors of the previous year.  
After all, the French people should be dictating the terms of peace, not suffering the 
shame of having those terms imposed upon them:  “Victorious, the lion pardons those 
who attack him; vanquished, he seeks revenge for his wounds.” 71 
 Thus, Louis XVIII was held responsible for the revenge exacted by Napoleon’s 
enemies.  His conciliatory attitudes towards the Allies, coupled with the reactionary 
sentiments of the ultra-royalist émigrés who returned to France with him, eroded his 
popularity and earned him the label of an “anti-national” monarch.  When Napoleon 
returned to France in March 1815, he met little resistance from a populace that demanded 
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an end to the vestiges of feudalism once and for all and a resounding victory on the 
battlefield to restore France to both her proper dimensions and her proper place within the 
ranks of nations.  But the revival of revolutionary passions that helped dislodge Louis 
from his throne were not confined to resentment against reactionary feudal lords and 
vengeful foreign masters.  Behind the charge of “anti-national” lay more substantial 
questions about the definition of political legitimacy in post-revolutionary France. 
 
The Liberal Emperor   
Jean-Antoine Lebrun-Tossa, a career bureaucrat in the imperial administration 
who also dabbled in the literary arts, was another commentator who took the Hundred 
Days as an opportunity to criticize the fallen Bourbon regime as “anti-national.”  He 
began by offering what was by now a familiar argument.  Europe was once again 
prepared to invade France, he argued, and France had to choose between either the 
Bourbons or Napoleon to lead them in the impending crisis.  To be fair, he conceded, 
Napoleon himself put France in this difficult position, for if he had never abused his 
power, the Bourbons would never have had the opportunity to regain the throne.  
Nonetheless, in choosing to rally around the emperor, France could assure itself of 
“unanimous resistance” to further degradations, while the Bourbon way could only lead 
to further shame and humiliation in the eyes of Europe.  But the real substance of his 
argument against the Restoration regime lay in his long denunciation of the king’s 
pretensions to reign as a constitutional monarch.  One need only look to the preamble of 
the Charter, he suggested, couched in the language of royal prerogative, for proof that 
Louis never intended to suffer circumscriptions upon his authority.  Subjects, civilians 
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and soldiers alike, he reasoned, are considered guilty of treason when they violate that 
bilateral contract that exists between them and their king.  Inversely, when the king 
reneges on his promises, it is he who is guilty of treason; “a contract cannot be obligatory 
for only one of the contracting parties.”  Thus, he argued, the army’s defection in March 
1815 was not treason but a just reprisal for countless violations of the Charter committed 
by an “anti-French monarch.”72  
Napoleon’s cause, by contrast, was a worthy one because it was the cause of the 
entire French nation.  “What does Napoleon mean to me?  It’s not him we have to defend 
but France, ourselves, our wives, our children.  In preferring him to all others, I am 
motivated by nothing but the common interest of all.  Our interests are his, our cause is 
his.  Born of our ranks, son of liberty, he can no longer exist except by her leave.  Who 
cares if he is not descended from Henri IV?  His victories, his service to the nation – 
those are his ancestors; our choice, our confidence in him – those are his titles.”73  In 
making a case for Napoleon, Lebrun-Tossa went far beyond mere resentment over the 
revolutionary past and France’s recent humiliation at the hands of the Allies.  His 
argument underscored the radical inconsistency between the Bourbons’ insistence on 
dynastic legitimacy and a post-revolutionary political culture that defined legitimacy in 
terms of national sovereignty and patriotic action.  Many doubted the sincerity of Louis’ 
commitment to a constitutional regime because he failed to court public opinion by at 
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least paying lip-service to the revolutionary notion that “thrones are made for nations, and 
not nations for thrones.”74 
The prospect of renewed hostilities against the crowned heads of Europe actually 
prompted a few voices to advocate the return of full-blown Napoleonic despotism.  The 
Bourbons, argued one anonymous Breton pamphleteer, unable to execute their plan of 
subduing the nation by fomenting civil war, were now intent on inciting foreigners to war 
against France.  They were, he warned, fully prepared to “reestablish their throne on the 
bodies of dead Frenchmen.”  Should France once again find victory on the battlefield, its 
honor and independence will be assured; otherwise, “we will become slaves, feed for the 
émigrés and monks, and the laughingstock of all Europe.”  Paris and the more prosperous 
departments will be spared for the sake for the Bourbons, “but the rest of France will 
suffer the sad fate of Poland,” dismembered at will by the great powers.  The only way to 
avoid this fate, he suggested, was to invest Napoleon with a sort of limited dictatorship 
modeled on examples furnished by ancient history.  When the Roman Republic was 
threatened, its citizens recognized the necessity of naming a dictator wielding unique and 
absolute power to govern the state in the name of his own authority, but solely for the 
duration of the crisis.  “Napoleon,” he optimistically predicted, “after having saved 
France, will divest himself of this unlimited power.”  The pamphlet’s title, The People 
and a Dictator Will Save Honor and the Patrie; The Constitution Can Wait, implied yet 
another example from ancient history, that of the Athenians, who sealed their own fate by 
occupying themselves with fruitless political abstractions instead of defending their city 
against the Spartans.  For readers well-versed in a cultural lexicon saturated with classical 
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referents, the lesson would have been clear.  Only after establishing peace abroad and at 
home should the nation turn its attention to “these constitutional systems that we have 
tried to achieve for twenty-five years without success.”75  
Yet even this rosy view of the future was accompanied by a grave warning to the 
Emperor: should he fail to relinquish his dictatorial license after the crisis had passed, he 
would instantly render himself an “enemy of the patrie.”76  By and large, political 
discourse during the Hundred Days was characterized by this sort of conditional 
acceptance of the imperial restoration, challenging Napoleon to either accept a 
constitution or “the irrevocable order for his downfall.”77  Although the charter granted 
by Louis XVIII in 1814 was hardly liberal enough for many citizens, they were 
understandably concerned about the fate of even these limited concessions to 
constitutional monarchy now that Napoleon had returned to power.  Napoleon, for his 
part, appreciated the utility of posing in liberal clothing and went to great lengths to 
portray himself as a reformed despot during the Hundred Days.  Despite his misgivings 
about the wisdom of feeding the revolutionary fire, he fully recognized he could not hope 
to reclaim the unbridled exercise of power he had enjoyed in the past.  Upon his return 
from Elba, he announced his intention to reign, in the manner of Caesar Augustus, “less 
as the sovereign of France than its first citizen.”78  Napoleon hoped to convince France 
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and the rest of Europe that he would henceforth rule as a liberal and constitutional 
monarch.  For all that contemporaries and historians alike have doubted the sincerity of 
his intentions, the fact remains that the Napoleonic regime in 1815 looked very different 
from its predecessor – the Additional Act substantially curtailed his executive authority, 
established a more powerful and more independent legislature, and abolished press 
censorship.  Political writers, taking full advantage of this considerably more tolerant 
publishing culture while also capitalizing on Napoleon’s need to court public opinion, 
inserted themselves into these efforts to redefine the limits of imperial power during the 
Hundred Days.  In the process, they restored revolutionary principles of national 
sovereignty and unity to the center of political discourse.   
As one anonymous essayist boldly reminded Napoleon, he owed his legitimacy to 
his revolutionary heritage: “You are the child of the patrie, and a man of the Revolution.”  
The pamphlet was laced with not-so-subtle reminders to Napoleon that his power derived 
from the will and consent of the nation, a consent that could easily be withdrawn should 
he fail to honor his promises to reform his despotic abuses of imperial power.  “Rest 
assured on that throne that you established on the ruins of revolutionary anarchy,” but 
remember that it is a throne on which “the recognition of a nation placed you.”  Napoleon 
could not hope to rest on his laurels as he had in the past; this time he would have to 
prove himself worthy by concessions to the national will – namely, a constitution 
proposed by representatives of the people.  “All French citizens want to see you on your 
throne again, Sire, but in a manner which, by guaranteeing their rights, banishes all fear 
of falling again into that abyss in which you found them upon both your first and second 
accession to power.”  As the author perceptively remarked, the immediate threat of 
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renewed hostilities against Europe provided the centripetal force impelling public opinion 
towards Napoleon; “at the moment, you are the center around everything revolves.”  But 
at the very moment when that danger ceases to exist, those bonds will surely disintegrate 
unless the emperor is able to effect a union between his interests and those of the nation, 
cemented by a common spirit of patriotism.  Only such a harmony of interests, suggested 
the author, will prevent national unity from again disintegrating into a mass of anti-
egalitarian distinctions.79  
Other writers adopted a more optimistic tone, whether out of genuine faith or in 
order to curry favor: “Of somber despotism/he abjures his error,/Felicitous 
patriotism/Alone reigns in his heart.”80  They interpreted Napoleon’s promises of reform 
as the dawning of a new era in France’s political history, one that would finally cement 
the gains of the Revolution by establishing the esprit public as the guiding principle of 
French politics.  One anonymous writer flattered Napoleon with “a genius too vast not to 
appreciate both our needs and his own; he saw that for our happiness and his security, he 
must return to us that esprit public that the Revolution gave us, and which waned during 
the last years of his reign.”  The essayist seemed to suggest that the Empire was 
something of an aberration, a deviation from the natural development of a free and 
patriotic nation set in motion by the Revolution.  Having learned from his past errors, he 
implied, Napoleon would now return to his revolutionary roots.  Upon returning to 
France in March 1815, “his first order of business was to return to our ideals, to bind us 
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to the patrie, and thus to himself.  These institutions are no longer vain promises, since 
we enjoyed them before, and gave up some of our rights for them….Henceforth, we will 
be invincible, and foreigners will never again violate the sacred soil of our cherished 
patrie.”81  
Writers during the Hundred Days thus also resurrected the revolutionary principle 
of fraternity, predicating France’s ability to defend itself against the foreign menace on 
the strength of national unity.  They attributed the Bourbon regime’s weakness vis-à-vis 
the rest of Europe above all on its divisiveness, its tendency to fracture the nation by 
representing the interests of only a small minority of the French people.  A “chant 
national” circulating in March 1815 triumphantly bid the Bourbons farewell, declaring 
France’s independence from their double yoke of feudalism and foreign influence.  
Taking as its refrain, “Napoleon is with us,” the song’s lyrics celebrated his return as a 
renaissance of revolutionary fraternity and patriotism: 
Napoleon is with us! 
We embrace each other like fools: 
We are brothers, you see! 
’89 shines! 
The great family 
Finally pure, marches to the rendezvous. 
Napoleon is with us!82   
 
Another songwriter put it more simply: “Forget parties,/We are invincible/When we are 
united.”83   
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On the surface, this “nation-talk” that permeated so much political commentary 
during the Hundred Days appears to be empty rhetoric, an instinctual repetition of 
hackneyed ideas and phrases drawn from the revolutionary catechism.  What did it really 
mean to be a “national” monarch?  Napoleon might take a lesson from the Bourbons, 
suggested Réal, who cared only for the profit and aggrandizement of themselves and the 
parasitic class of Old Regime aristocrats.  “Since their return, public works have 
everywhere ceased.  Laborers find themselves without resources.  Domestic commerce is 
less active than ever before, and foodstuffs are at such a low price that farmers are 
entirely unable to meet their requisite production levels while tending to their own needs.  
Such is the happy state of affairs produced by the return of the Bourbons.”  In fact, he 
argued, Napoleon need only look to his own history for instruction as to the importance 
of aligning himself with the national will.  For Réal attributed the triumph of the 
Bourbons and their foreign Allies not to their own strength but to an error on the part of 
Napoleon, who, intoxicated by his own victories and prosperity, “in imprudently 
separating his interests from ours, himself extinguished the sacred fire of patriotism.”  
This discord polarized opinion in France; the army, although it remained loyal, was too 
devastated by recent losses to be of much use.  The people, on the other hand, remained 
largely indifferent;  “but if in 1814, he had been the man of the patrie, as he is in 1815,” 
they would doubtless have rallied to his cause and spared him a humiliating defeat.  
Nonetheless, suggested Réal, all that is behind us now.  Now the issue is not the security 
of one man but the rights of the people; “it is a purely constitutional power that the 
government claims today; in a word, Napoleon’s cause is that of all Frenchmen.”  What 
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France needs is not a family who have proven themselves opposed to the national will, 
but a leader who, “convinced of the imprescriptible right of peoples, in allying his 
interests to ours, also attaches his fortunes to ours.  We need a leader who sees no greater 
grandeur than the glory and prosperity of those who have placed him at their head.”84  
Réal also eloquently underscored the fundamental anachronism that was the 
Bourbon Restoration.  “The Frenchman of today is not a man of the twelfth century,” he 
wrote; “he has other mores and requires different laws.”  To Réal and other political 
commentators in 1815, the Bourbons represented an ancient French past that was 
irreconcilable with the post-revolutionary reality.  “Offended by a glorious past in which 
they had taken no part, they banished everything that could recall that past to memory.  
Guided by this odious motive, they relinquished all of our conquests and tried to destroy 
those noble sentiments that placed us with pride at the head of all nations.  Unable to 
raise themselves up to the level of the French people, they sought to debase them in order 
to erase the humiliating contrast between the nation’s glory and their own baseness.”85  
Thus, Réal seemed to imply, the conflict between the Bourbons and their opponents was 
really a contest over memory and the rewriting of French history, a contest that ended 
with Napoleon’s return to power.  By publicly abandoning his former reluctance to 
embrace his revolutionary heritage, Napoleon resolved the tension between a “glorious 
past” and the present.  In sanctioning the revival of revolutionary rhetoric, he may have 
also paved the way for a reconciliation with some of those men who had most 
vociferously opposed the creation of the Empire. 
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“A Harmony of Interests” 
The unlikely alliance between liberals, republicans, and Bonapartists that 
developed after 1814 and persisted up through the Revolution of 1830 has been much 
remarked upon by historians, and it remains a matter of debate whether this alliance was 
simply a pragmatic measure or based on a more substantial common ideology.  What is 
certain, however, is that the Hundred Days was the crucial moment in forging this 
alliance.  One of its earliest manifestations was the federative movement, formed in the 
spring of 1815 in response to the growing threat of both foreign invasion and royalist 
uprisings.  Seeking to unite all enemies of the Bourbons under a common banner by 
finding the lowest common denominator among discontents from various political and 
social milieux, the fédérés created what R.S. Alexander calls “Revolutionary 
Bonapartism,” a fusion ideology that emphasized continuity between the principles of 
1789 and the Empire.86  Napoleon enjoyed the support of many different political groups, 
among whom anti-Bourbon sentiment was coupled with a shared commitment to the 
principle of national sovereignty, a rejection of social privileges and distinctions, and 
French independence from foreign influence.87  This fusion ideology permeated the 
political discourse of the Hundred Days, and owed much of its architecture to men of 
republican leanings. 
The personal history of Pierre-François Giraud, a man with a considerable 
revolutionary pedigree, illustrates one path that led former republicans down the 
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Napoleonic road in March 1815.  Born at Baequeville in Normandy in 1764, Giraud was 
originally intended for an ecclesiastical career and joined the Cistercians at a young age.  
After the suppression of religious orders in 1790, Giraud threw himself into the 
revolutionary fray and allied himself with the Montagnards, employed in the offices of 
the Committee of General Security and later as a government censor under the Directory.  
He vigorously opposed the coup of 18 Brumaire, for which he was sentenced to 
deportation along with roughly seventy former Terrorists and other Jacobin stalwarts who 
resisted Napoleon’s seizure of power.  Although the order was later revoked, Giraud now 
found his employment prospects in civil service rather dim and turned instead to the 
literary arts for a career.  By 1811, he appears to have come to some sort of terms with 
the imperial regime, using the birth of Napoleon II as an occasion to advertise his literary 
talents in a sugary ode to the King of Rome.88  But it wasn’t until 1815 that Giraud seems 
to have fully embraced Napoleon’s cause, less because of any evident Bonapartism, but 
rather because of his persistent faith in the revolutionary principle of representative 
government.  Specifically, he questioned the validity of the Senate’s actions during the 
first week of April 1814, when it arbitrarily deposed the emperor, established a 
Provisional Government, and refused to accept Napoleon’s abdication in favor of his son, 
instead restoring Louis XVIII to the throne.  These actions, argued Giraud, lacked 
national consent, for “no other segment of the French people, constitutionally assembled 
– neither the legislative corps, which was incomplete and whose representative 
prerogatives were too obscure and too restricted by the imperial constitutions anyway, 
nor still less the army and the national guard mobilized in defense of the patrie – none of 
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these parties who are integral to the nation assented to either the deposition of Napoleon 
and his descendants or the new social pact by which the French people were supposed to 
have given the throne to the Bourbon family.”89  Sharing the opinions of both his 
contemporaries and later historians, Giraud appeared to believe that the Senate, long 
accustomed to being told what to do, was simply carrying out the wishes of its new 
puppet-master, Talleyrand. 
Giraud also marshaled the well-worn argument that the Restoration regime served 
only the interests of the émigrés.  Not only was this an odious resurrection of feudal 
privileges, but it also threatened to excise the vast majority of French citizens from their 
place within the nation.  “One minister, M. Ferrand, declared before the nation’s 
representatives that the émigrés were the only ones who had followed the right path.  By 
these words alone, 20 million Frenchmen became nothing more than rebels.  The entire 
nation is reduced to nothing but a factional party, and 20 or 30,000 émigrés have taken 
their place.”  Intent on erasing the revolutionary past, the Bourbons delivered over to 
France’s enemies the very soil paid for by French blood.  The same regime that stripped 
France’s proud soldiers of both their pensions and their decorations had the audacity to 
publicly commemorate those royalist rebels who had tried to overthrow the revolutionary 
government in 1795.  “A pyramid, erected on the lugubrious beach at Quiberon, will 
become the pillory where France will eternally hang the memory of what they dare call 
their rebellion, those who promised to forget everything.”  Thus did the Bourbons make 
use of memory to divide the nation.  Napoleon, by contrast, constituted a rallying point 
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for “the friends of liberty,” and thus guaranteed France’s safety against her foreign 
enemies.90 
Louis Dubroca was a self-identified “vieux Républicain” who lent his support to 
Napoleon during the Hundred Days.  Born in the Aquitainian town of Saint-Séver in 
1757, Dubroca played no conspicuous role in the Revolution of 1789 and quietly pursued 
a life dedicated to various literary arts.  A professor of elocution and diction in Paris, 
Dubroca was also a bookseller and authored on a wide variety of subjects, including 
pedagogy and history, as well as minor verse and drama.  His work took a marked 
political turn in 1814 and especially in 1815; during the Hundred Days alone he 
published a series of five “discourses” that vehemently condemned the “anti-national” 
Restoration regime and welcomed the emperor’s return to power in the guise of a 
reformed despot.91  Claiming a sort of disinterested patriotism, Dubroca announced his 
impartiality: “I am neither the instrument of any party nor the blind partisan of any 
individual.  I support anyone who sincerely grants liberty to my country.”  He argued 
vigorously that the ease with which Napoleon was able to regain the throne in March 
1815 should not be mistaken for evidence of the nation’s blind faith in him.  “France 
                                                
90 Ibid., 37-38, 45. 
91 Louis Dubroca, Un vieux républicain à Napoléon, sur la puissance de l’opinion 
publique dans les gouvernement des États; Deuxième Discours.  Un vieux républicain 
aux Français, sur les progrès effrayans du fanatisme religieux sous le régime des 
Bourbons et sur les moyens de l’extirper radicalement en France; Troisième discours.  
Un vieux Républicain aux Royalistes, sur les vaines et cruelles espérances dont ils se 
bercent; et aux amis de la patrie, sur les motifs qu’ils ont de se rassurer contre les 
alarmes dont on les entoure; Quatrième discours.  Un vieux Républicain aux Français 
qui sentent les noms de Patrie et de Liberté, sur l’Honneur national à venger et 
l’Indépendance politique à conserver: suivi des Réflexions libres sur l’Acte Additionnel 
aux Constitutions de l’Empire; Cinquième Cahier.  Catéchisme politique d’un peuple 
libre qui veut solidement fonder sa liberté, et d’un prince qui veut régner par la 
puissance de l’opinion publique (Paris: Imprimerie de P.N. Rougeron, [1815]). 
 53 
would have opposed Napoleon with a bronze barrier in favor of the Bourbons” if they 
had been willing to accept the “new order of things.”  Discouraged and abused by the 
reign of this “degenerate family,” France put its faith in Napoleon and his promises to 
respect personal liberties, to maintain national honor, and to guarantee their rights by 
force of law.  To those who doubted Napoleon’s good intentions, Dubroca suggested that 
the emperor must surely have been humbled by his fall in 1814, recognizing that there 
was little more to be gained from abuse of power.  “We believe him because the fortunes 
of his throne and of his dynasty are essentially linked to the maintenance of our 
liberties…he is no stranger to our institutions, our mores, our civilization.”92  
Acknowledging the apparent incongruity of simultaneously laying claim to both 
republican and Napoleonic allegiances, Dubroca explained how he was able to reconcile 
the two, proving himself capable of the sort of ideological flexibility that this alliance 
demanded.  For he defined republicanism rather expansively as “the courageous 
profession of virtue,” pledging its adherents to uphold “invariable principles of justice, 
devotion and fidelity to the patrie, hatred towards all forms of oppression, and the 
courage to defend liberty against despotism” while maintaining a healthy respect for the 
lawful exercise of a justly constituted power.  Although he had hoped to one day see a 
republic reestablished in France, he recognized that it was far too soon to attempt such a 
thing, since the vast majority of French people believed that form of government to be 
incompatible with the national temperament.  But for Dubroca, Napoleon’s promises of 
reform during the Hundred Days constituted an acceptable alternative.  “I believed in the 
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wedding between republican principles and institutions of monarchy, and I feared not to 
call myself the Old Republican.”93   
The Old Republican sketched his project for a constitutional Napoleonic regime 
in a “political catechism,” which echoed both the spirit of 1789 in its impetus to reform 
abuses of power as well as the more aggressively nationalist stance of the Revolution’s 
later years.  Drawing heavily on the Constitution of 1791 and cloaking his propositions in 
the familiar language of national sovereignty and the general will, Dubroca envisioned a 
system in which legislative power would be exercised by duly elected representatives of 
the people – “the most noble, most honorable, and most holy that man can possibly hope 
to be” – under the benevolent aegis of Napoleon as the nation’s “premier magistrate.”  
The Restoration’s attempt at constitutional monarchy was a failure, he implied, because 
its tripartite division of legislative power, a system “which took root in England when 
feudalism still existed in force,” reversed the natural order.  Laws in and of themselves 
being insufficient to guarantee France’s prosperity and security, Dubroca called on his 
compatriots in good Jacobin fashion to sacrifice their self-interests and banish “l’esprit de 
parti” in favor of national unity, which alone could render the patrie formidable in the 
face of both foreign invasion and civil dissensions.94   
Dubroca also wedded this “nation-talk” to the defensive reflex gripping the 
French nation in fear of an imminent invasion, transforming the war to defend France’s 
natural frontiers to one for independence.  “Should war begin again, it will be terrible and 
decisive because it will be national; no force in the world can break the resistance of a 
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people who fight on their own ground for their independence and their liberty.”95  
Attempting to justify what many perceived to be France’s shameful lack of patriotic 
resistance to the invasion of 1814, he made recourse to the common and convenient 
explanation that France had been “sold” by traitors.  Napoleon, so often victorious in 
battle, found no one he could depend on; “the nation was unaware that in defending its 
borders it was also defending its liberty, and this incertitude froze our hearts.  Today all 
this has changed…certain of fighting at one and the same time for its honor and its rights, 
the French nation is deploying all of its might.”  Dubroca strategically appealed to those 
who had reason to feel themselves wronged by the Restoration regime – to soldiers who 
saw their forced inactivity and degradations in rank and pay as a deliberate affront to the 
their honor; to the purchasers of biens nationaux, who saw their property rights 
threatened by returning émigrés intent on recovering their ancestral lands; to the “friends 
of liberal ideas,” who feared the revival of religious fanaticism; to peasants and 
agricultural laborers whose livelihood was threatened not only by the “passage of the 
barbarian hordes from the North” but by the feudal impulses of old nobles.96   
Dubroca elaborated on the theme of independence in his Fourth Discourse.  To be 
sure, he, like many others, demanded first and foremost a violent revenge for France’s 
humiliation.  “If the battle to which you have been so imprudently provoked should come 
to pass, the first thing the patrie asks of you is to wash clean our national honor in the 
blood of your aggressors.”  But the impending war was not just about exacting vengeance 
for the outrages committed against French honor, he warned.  Rather, it promised to be a 
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fight for France’s very existence.  For France faced a grand conspiracy hatched by her 
enemies, both domestic and foreign, to wipe her from the ranks of sovereign nations, a 
plot dating back more than twenty years to the time when France first declared itself free 
from the chains of Old Regime tyranny.  The émigrés were, in fact, the instigators of the 
conspiracy, dispatching their agents throughout Europe and exhorting the crowned 
representatives of the old order to arm themselves against the French Republic.  The First 
Restoration, with its attendant fanaticism, was the rotten fruit of this “odious system.”  
By fanning the flames of old hatreds and reinstituting a feudal regime of privilege, the 
Bourbons sought to weaken France by instigating civil war and thus prepare her for the 
final blow, which would be dealt by the Allies.  The Congress of Vienna, where French 
interests were deliberately ignored, furnished proof of these nefarious intentions.  But 
Napoleon’s miraculous return from Elba, “applauded by all friends of the patrie and of 
liberty,” threw a wrench into their plans to strip France of her status as an independent 
nation.  Above all, they feared that a renascent France would awaken the desire for 
liberty across all of Europe.97   
Dubroca thus also revived the idea of a universal struggle against despotism, an 
idea that became especially pronounced in revolutionary discourse after the French 
Republic embarked on a more aggressively expansionist policy vis-à-vis its neighbors.  
Although Napoleon had also made use of this rhetoric in his early campaigns, it became 
more muted as he distanced himself publicly more and more from his revolutionary 
heritage.  But the Hundred Days provided him the opportunity and the incentive to pose 
on the right side of history and assume the mantle of liberator of peoples.  For as Dubroca 
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suggested, the settlements reached at the Congress of Vienna threatened to set the clock 
back by a half century and restore the Old Regime. 
Look at the whole of Europe, and everywhere you see the seeds of national 
dissension, spread by these same kings who seem to have wanted to halt 
Napoleon’s encroachments upon the peoples of the continent only in order to 
exercise all the more freely their resurgent personal ambitions.  These great 
reformers of Europe, who, in their congress, should have established the basis for 
a universal peace and reestablished equilibrium, have instead sacrificed their 
commitments and their promises to the aggrandizement of their own respective 
states and personal power.  They have divided up peoples like beasts of burden, 
counting them by head…Colossal powers have erected themselves upon this 
debris left by the rights of peoples, and threaten Europe with inevitable 
servitude.98   
 
Europe is a volcano, he announced; already in Italy, Spain, Norway, Saxony, Poland, 
Belgium, and elsewhere one can hear the rumblings that herald future political 
revolutions.  Everywhere people who suffer the shame of partition and foreign 
domination are awaiting France’s example.  “All oppressed nations are auxiliaries of one 
another, a secret league unites them against tyrants, and victory will surely crown their 
efforts sooner or later.”99  Dubroca thus linked France’s struggle against Bourbon tyranny 
with liberal and nationalist stirrings throughout Europe, ignoring the obvious paradox that 
it was the depredations of Napoleonic conquest that had unleashed those very 
movements.  
While Dubroca peppered his rhetoric with implicit references to the revolutionary 
past, another “old liberal,” Marc-Antoine Jullien, explicitly marshaled the force of history 
to build his case for Napoleon.  Jullien secured a bureaucratic position in the service of 
the Commissioner of War in 1792 at the tender age of seventeen, thanks to his excellent 
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performance in school and the influence of his father, a deputy to the National 
Convention.  Later appointed a commissioner of the Committee of Public Safety, he 
distinguished himself by his great revolutionary fervor, frequently arguing that it was 
necessary to “make the Revolution loveable in order to make people love it.”  He had the 
courage to protest the atrocities committed at Nantes during the Reign of Terror by 
Carrier, who returned the favor by denouncing Jullien as Robespierre’s protégé in the 
aftermath of Thermidor.  Jullien again found himself in hot water with the powers-that-be 
when Napoleon asked him to author a piece justifying the Brumaire coup.  The result, 
Political Inquiry into the Views and Interests of the New Government, in which he 
advised the First Consul to conserve liberal institutions, displeased Napoleon and Jullien 
was forced to remove himself from Paris.  Nonetheless, he continued to find employment 
in the Department of War under the imperial regime.  Denounced by the restored 
Bourbon regime as a Bonapartist, he retired to Switzerland in 1814 and later failed to get 
himself elected to the legislative chamber during the Hundred Days.  The beginning of 
the Second Restoration marked the end of his political career, and the beginning of a 
prolific journalistic career.  He went on to become a founder of the influential liberal 
opposition journal l’Indépendent, the Constitutionnel, as well as the Revue 
encylopédique. 
In May 1815, Jullien authored a pamphlet entitled, The Conciliator, or, the 
Seventh Epoch; call to Frenchmen.  Impartial considerations on the political situation 
and the true interests of France, choosing to remain anonymous and identifying himself 
only as “a Frenchman, friend of the patrie and of peace, member of an electoral college.”  
Claiming absolute impartiality, he wrote, “I find it superfluous to place my name at the 
 59 
head of this text; I represent no party and no man, but France and all of humanity.”  
Jullien recapitulated the familiar idiom of a nation united before a common enemy.  
There is at present, he wrote, a single goal that unites all French citizens, and that is “to 
finish the Revolution once and for all, to escape this vicious cycle in which anarchy and 
despotism seek to enclose us.  Above all else to defend the sacred soil of the patrie, to 
repulse those foreign bayonets that spell death for all Frenchmen, regardless of political 
opinion or party.”100  
 Jullien’s treatise was permeated by a cyclical view of history and the sense of a 
revolution unfinished.  Jullien divided the history of the French Revolution into “six great 
failed epochs.”  The hopes raised by the First Epoch, from the convocation of the Estates 
General to the National Convention, so full of promise and patriotic fervor, were 
promptly dashed by the chaos of the Second Epoch of 1793-94, when factionalism and 
tyrannical impulses unleashed the desire for vengeance among all quarters.  The Third 
Epoch, marked by the Constitution of Year V, “offered a rallying point and safe harbor.”  
But the Directory proved itself weak and corrupt, prompting the failure of yet another 
revolutionary epoch.  Then, “a man of genius appeared, preceded by an immense military 
glory.  He anchored the confidence of the people and army, and the phantom of the 
Directory disappeared before him.”  How can we account for this historical phenomenon, 
asked Jullien; how did this general achieve such a meteoric rise to power in 1799, 
virtually uncontested and with what appeared to be the unanimous consent of the nation?  
In order to fully appreciate the historical circumstances surrounding the coup of 18 
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Brumaire, he said, we might well imagine the following dialogue between Napoleon and 
the French people: 
1. “Have we not been ill-governed?”  And all France responded, “Yes.” 
2. “Is it not necessary then to change the government?”  An affirmative response 
was the general cry. 
3. “Given the factional struggles and vicissitudes of the Revolution, isn’t a sort of 
dictatorship indispensable to reassure the destinies of France, and provide a stable 
foundation for public liberty?  All Frenchmen, republicans and the more austere 
alike, responded, “That is true.” 
4. “This dictatorship, of which you grasp the necessity, shouldn’t it be entrusted to 
a man of great character, of French and republican ranks, who has already given 
proof of his talents and his genius, who enjoys great confidence in French public 
opinion as well as a great reputation among foreign nations, who has given 
positive guarantees of defending with honor the flags of the Republic, who, even 
if he is not entirely a stranger to these internal crises, only by virtue of his glory 
and brilliant triumphs over our enemies abroad?”  A unanimous assent served as 
response. 
 
Buried in a footnote to this dialogue lies the force of Jullien’s rhetoric.  These same four 
questions, he explained, if posed to the French people in March 1815, would garner the 
exact same responses.  Therein lies the explanation for Napoleon’s seemingly miraculous 
return to power, which was only accomplished with the help of the French people, “who 
need a dynasty resolved to sanction in good faith all the principal results of the 
Revolution.  The same national will demands in 1815, as it did in 1789 and in 1800, a 
free constitution, a constitutional leader, a representative government, liberty, security, 
and tranquility, guaranteed by force of law.”101  In essence, then, the Hundred Days 
provided Napoleon with a unique opportunity to do it all over again, and get it right. 
 Returning to his analysis of the Revolution’s history, Jullien characterized the 
Fourth Epoch, ushered in by the Consulate and the Constitution of Year VIII, as almost 
perfect.  But revolutionary passions, as yet inextinguished, still threatened to undermine 
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the government’s authority, leading to demands for an even more stable regime in place 
of this “precarious and absolute dictatorship.”  Thus, the Fourth Epoch gave way to the 
Fifth, that of the Empire, which could have been a “decisive and reparative” era.  The 
prolonged unrest of the Revolution had succeeded in uniting disparate elements of the 
French polity, convincing everyone of their common and unanimous need for peace and 
repose.  Napoleon had the best intentions of guaranteeing this security, but provoked to 
war constantly by foreign enemies, especially by perfidious Albion, and led astray by vile 
flatterers, he fell prey to self-interested and despotic impulses.  He tragically allowed 
himself to forget the inimitable truth that “power is but a means, never an end, in the 
hands of the head of state: the end is the prosperity of the patrie,” thus himself depriving 
his regime of its raison d’etre.  Recognizing that his reign could only prolong a war in 
which the odds were heavily stacked against France, Napoleon abdicated, ushering in the 
Sixth Epoch, “the recall of Louis XVIII, reinstalled by England,” not, Jullien implied, by 
the will of the French people.102 
The reasons for Sixth Epoch’s failure were so numerous that Jullien felt 
compelled to devote an entire chapter, nearly thirty pages, to the “numerous faults” of the 
Bourbons and their “ephemeral reign.”  The Restoration, in Jullien’s opinion, might very 
well have succeeded.  If Louis XVIII had devoted himself to serving the needs of the 
majority of the French people, instead of sacrificing their interests to those of a “feeble 
faction, composed of old nobles, priests, émigrés, Vendéens, and Chouans, protected 
exclusively by his family and his ministers,” he could have established a stable and 
enduring regime on the basis of a “national pact, debated and consented to by two 
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legislative chambers legally constituted.”  Instead, he issued his “pretend charter” in the 
guise of a royal ordinance, making a mockery of constitutional principles, respected, 
moreover, by neither the king nor his ministers.  Jullien went on to enumerate the 
regime’s violations of specific articles of the Charter and other mistakes, most of which, 
in his mind, betrayed the government’s intention to launch a full-fledged Counter-
Revolution.  Jullien, like many of his contemporaries who prided themselves on the 
Revolution’s achievements in the realm of national sovereignty, was outraged by Louis’ 
insistence on dating 1814 as the nineteenth year of his reign and styling himself King of 
France and Navarre rather than of the French.  The regime proved itself reactionary by 
trampling freedom of the press and of religion, restoring clerical influence in public 
instruction, and refusing to guarantee the rights of purchasers of biens nationaux.  The 
spirit of Counter-Revolution also revealed itself in the purges conducted in bureaucratic 
and military personnel, which appeared to privilege émigrés and old nobles.103   
But above all, Louis XVIII was guilty of rendering France a vassal to foreign 
powers by signing a humiliating treaty that sacrificed France’s “natural and necessary 
frontiers” of the Rhine and the Alps.  In so doing, he “foreswore the conquests made in 
his absence as null and void; he wanted nothing but ancient France, which he believed 
himself to be re-entering, like a landlord in his domain.  The Bourbons returned chez eux, 
and not chez nous: that is the true cause for their expulsion.  All Frenchmen, soldiers and 
civilians alike, viewed with profound humiliation and an indignation they could scarce 
contain this abandonment of provinces conquered with the price of their blood, obtained 
with the greatest sacrifices, and necessary to counter-balance to expansion of so many 
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other states.”104  In perpetuating so many injuries against French honor and self-esteem, 
the Bourbons proved themselves enemies of the people and precipitated their own 
downfall.   
Jullien was confident that the Seventh Epoch, initiated by Napoleon’s return to 
power in March 1815, would profit from the lessons provided by the previous “six great 
failed epochs.”  Unlike the First Epoch, failed because of an imperfect union between the 
king and his people, “today, the Nation and its leader have the same goal and the same 
view: the independence and prosperity of the patrie.”  Whereas freedom of opinion was 
brutally repressed under the Reign of Terror, a reformed Napoleon will henceforth 
temper his own prerogatives with “sage moderation,” and “leave opinion to its own free 
development.”  In contrast to the feeble and vacillating government of the Directory, the 
new imperial politics will find strength in national unity that transcends factional 
differences.  The Consulate was brought low by the persistence of revolutionary passions 
and hatreds; today we are wiser, Jullien suggested, the protracted revolutionary troubles 
have instructed us in the need for unanimity and mutual confidence.  Similarly, “the 
errors and misfortunes of [the Empire] are a guarantee against their return.”  The political 
principles of the Seventh Epoch are to renounce wars of conquest, defend French 
territory, respect the independence of other nations, “if they respect ours,” and to refrain 
from meddling in the affairs of foreign governments.  In short, Jullien renounced, on 
behalf of Napoleon, the whole of the imperial enterprise.105  
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Jullien viewed the present as a unique historical moment.  The Seventh Epoch, in 
essence, had the potential to both bring to a close and transcend the “vicious circle” of the 
Revolution’s history by reclaiming its “primitive direction, to reform the abuses of the 
old regime.”  The Revolution could only come to an end by achieving its grand aim of 
establishing a national and constitutional government, which is precisely how Jullien 
characterized Napoleon’s reformed regime.  In the penultimate chapter, titled “Of the 
Revolution’s Definitive Result.  Common View of Good Frenchmen,” Jullien argued that 
France needed someone who could finish the Revolution by healing the rift produced in 
1789.  On one side of the rift were those citizens who “took an active and direct part in 
the Revolution and War of Liberation,” anxious to preserve their hard-fought rights and 
glory.  On the other were those who remembered the Revolution as a period of suffering, 
and who feared the renewal of proscription and dispossession unleashed twice by 
revolutionary terror and royalist reaction.  The first group of citizens tended towards 
ideas grounded in political liberty and equality and the fundamental principle of national 
sovereignty, the second towards ideas, “no less necessary,” of proprietary rights, security, 
and centralized government.  Thus, a reconciliation could be achieved by fusing together 
two apparently contradictory principles – Order and Liberty – an idea that would become 
central to the Bonapartist creed by the time of the Second Empire.106 
Later that same year, after Louis XVIII was reinstalled on his throne for a second 
time, another piece by Jullien appeared in print, throwing into question his enthusiastic 
response to the Hundred Days as the “Seventh Epoch” of the Revolution.  Penned in 
October 1813 and titled The Conservator of Europe, it was intended for Tsar Alexander 
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and “a grand prince, his ally, whom the author of this memoir long predicted would be 
the liberators of France and of Europe.”  Suspected of spreading sedition against the 
emperor, Jullien was interrogated by the police and his treatise never reached its intended 
destination.  If only the author had succeeded in making his ideas known in October 
1813, the editor lamented, Europe would have been spared “the convulsive agony 
prolonged by the tyrannical reign of Buonaparte [sic].”  Now, from the perspective of the 
Second Restoration, the memoir served as “a sort of historic monument,” proof of the 
desire of the vast majority of French people for peace in 1813.107  The Conciliator thus 
appears at first glance as a dramatic volte-face from the opinions that Jullien espoused in 
the waning years of the Empire, and presumably still held after Napoleon’s final fall at 
Waterloo.  But there was a common thread in Jullien’s political thought, from the 
Brumaire coup to the Hundred Days, and that was his insistence on national sovereignty 
and representative government.  He was willing to accept Napoleon’s authority in May 
1815 precisely because he believed, or wanted to believe, Napoleon’s promises to uphold 
those principles.   
Giraud, Dubroca, and Jullien might all well have been just another handful of the 
many girouettes who populated the political landscape during the turbulent years of 
1789-1815, men of malleable opinions who were able to mold their allegiances in 
accordance with the ever-shifting winds of public opinion and political power.108  
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Nonetheless, their rhetoric demonstrates the profound influence that “nation-talk” 
exercised in forging alliances among unlikely bedfellows.  Thus, in the words of Jullien’s 
editor, their work might also be seen as “a sort of historic monument” to the Hundred 
Days, to the period in which liberals, republicans, and Bonapartists first learned to 
collaborate with one another.  Their discourse testifies to the flexibility of political 
ideology, especially in times of crisis; united by their opposition to what was perceived as 
a common enemy – the Bourbons, they found creative ways to reconcile their republican 
and revolutionary heritage with the prospect of a restored, and reformed, Empire. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout Napoleon’s reign, his opponents on both the right and the left 
challenged his political legitimacy by virtue of his Corsican heritage.109  Despite the fact 
that Napoleon was indeed born a French citizen, Genoa having ceded Corsica to France 
in 1768, his detractors found a means of invalidating his qualité de Français in 
eighteenth-century ideas about the relationship between national character and political 
institutions.  Philosophical interest in the phenomenon of national “genius” or “character” 
figured prominently in Enlightenment thought, Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and 
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Montesquieu being among the earliest to devote their attention to this issue.  But the 
voices of the philosophes, although the most audible, were not the only ones to be heard 
contributing to the discussion; concern with national character generated a remarkable 
quantity of writing in the eighteenth century, from treatises to travelogues.110  The eager 
investigation of national character led to the articulation of national differences, the 
identification of unique cultural or ethnic characteristics that were believed to be unique 
to each national culture.111  Influenced first and foremost by Montesquieu, conventional 
eighteenth-century wisdom viewed the inhabitants of each nation as stamped with an 
indelible character shaped by the climate and geography of the land they inhabit.   
But it was Rousseau who fully politicized the notion of national character, by 
making it central to the political life of a community and using it as the basis of programs 
for national regeneration.112  Unlike some of his more cosmopolitan-minded 
contemporaries, Rousseau insisted on the cultivation of unique national, rather than 
European, characters.  In both the Constitutional Project for Corsica (1765) and the 
Considerations on the Government of Poland (1772), Rousseau emphasized the 
importance of national individuality as the first rule of nation-building.  He viewed 
cosmopolitanism as profoundly flawed, insofar as it attempted to sublimate national 
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differences into a uniform European culture.113  Thus, Peter the Great’s fundamental error 
was that “he wanted to make Germans and Englishmen, when he should have made 
Russians.”114  Instead, the ideal legislator ought to create national laws and institutions 
that not only reflect national character, but also have the power to reinforce and mold the 
“genius, the character, the tastes and manners of a people.”115  This criticism of imitation 
as artificial and unnatural was also a crucial element in the nationalist philosophy of the 
German post-Kantian writers, including Herder and Fichte, who argued that the existence 
of nations was predicated on the maintenance of unique, original, and inviolable national 
character, or Volksgeist.116   
Germaine de Staël, for many years one of Napoleon’s most implacable foes, 
frequently made recourse to this rhetoric in Ten Years of Exile.  Ostensibly a memoir, it 
was in reality an impassioned protest against her proscription and one of the most 
eloquent and informed pieces of contemporary anti-Napoleonic propaganda.  She argued 
that her forced exile was unjust because it was decreed “by order of a man less French 
than I, for I was born on the banks of the Seine where he is naturalized by his tyranny 
alone.  He saw the light of day on the isle of Corsica, where the brutal temperature of 
Africa already makes itself felt… the air of [France] is not his native air.”  For Staël, 
Napoleon was a foreigner not only by virtue of his heritage, but in his character as well.  
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“You might have thought that Providence, to punish the French for misusing their 
splendid qualities, was subjecting the nation most remarkable for its grace and sense of 
chivalry to the man most alien to that charm and that quality.”117   
Chateaubriand likewise denounced Napoleon as a foreigner in his 1814 diatribe, De 
Buonaparte, des Bourbons, et de la nécessité de se rallier à nos princes légitimes.  
Chateaubriand devoted the bulk of this polemic to arguments that Napoleon, falsely 
credited with enhancing the glory and prestige of France, actually did nothing but harm.  
Time and again Napoleon proved himself to be of a nature antithetical to that of the 
nation by exhibiting the vices of treason and ingratitude, which were unknown to a true 
Frenchman.  “The time has come, I hope, for free Frenchmen declare by a solemn act that 
they took no part in these crimes of tyranny; that the murder of the duc d’Enghien, the 
captivity of the pope, and the war in Spain were impious, sacrilegious, odious, and above 
all anti-French acts, the shame of which falls on the head of that foreigner alone.”  His 
“Oriental” style of despotism was wholly unsuited to the government of a free people.  
Moreover, Napoleon was French in neither his character nor his manners; his accent, his 
name, and even his “visage” betrayed his foreign origins.  Chateaubriand demanded that 
the French renounce their foolish loyalty to this foreigner, and recognize the legitimacy 
of Louis XVIII, a prince “born of our blood, raised among us, who we know and who 
knows us, who shares our manners, tastes, and habits.”118 
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Opposition literature of the early Restoration period turned these rhetorical tables 
against the Bourbons themselves.  Even before Louis XVIII and his court made their 
second return to Paris “in the baggage train of foreigners,” anti-Bourbon invective 
vehemently condemned the regime as anti-French and anti-national.  By concluding a 
humiliating peace with the Allies and pursuing a policy of peace with Europe, the 
Bourbons were excoriated in France as pawns of the nation’s foreign enemies.  The small 
but vocal minority of ultra-royalist émigrés who loudly demanded retribution for the 
wrongs did to them during the Revolution did nothing to help Louis XVIII’s popularity.  
But perhaps most detrimental of all was his failure to convincingly speak in the language 
of “nation-talk.”  For all his attempts at reconciliation with the great mass of French 
people alienated from the Bourbons by the great revolutionary divide, Louis frustrated his 
own efforts by persisting in cloaking his authority in the pre-revolutionary trappings of 
dynastic legitimacy and royal prerogative. 
The discourse of the Hundred Days established the main terms of pro-Napoleonic 
literature for the next several decades.  The sacred doctrine of France’s natural frontiers 
would remain a central tenet of the Napoleonic creed, and in fact gained a great deal of 
momentum in the aftermath of the debacle at Waterloo.  The Second Treaty of Paris, 
signed on November 20, 1815, was far more exacting than the 1814 settlement.  French 
territorial boundaries were reduced to those of January 1790, and a war indemnity of 700 
million francs was imposed, to be paid over the next five years.  Moreover, France would 
bear the cost of supporting 150,000 foreign troops that were to occupy territory along the 
northern and eastern frontiers for up to five years.  By the beginning of September 1815, 
there were already over 1,200,000 foreign troops occupying French territory in nearly 
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sixty departments, at a cost estimated by Castlereaugh at 1,750,000 francs per day.119  
Although most of these troops would leave France by the end of 1815, billeting had 
already taken its toll on the population.  For the first time, France was subjected to the 
pillage and destruction that her own armies had regularly practiced with impunity under 
the Empire.  Allied troops went above and beyond the sanctioned requisitions of food and 
clothing, destroying crops, robbing and burning private property, and assaulting women.  
Resentment was particularly acute along the eastern borders of France, areas that bore the 
full brunt of occupying forces; in Alsace alone, 40,000 troops were stationed between 
1815 and 1818.120  Moreover, France now found herself hemmed in by a cordon sanitaire 
of buffer states along her borders.  To the north, Belgium was incorporated with Holland 
into the Kingdom of the United Netherlands.  Most of the Italian peninsula was placed 
firmly under Austrian control, while the Piedmontese-Sardinian kingdom was enlarged to 
include Genoa, Nice, and Savoy, measures that were intended to prevent further French 
interference in Italy.  To the east, the Allies hoped to contain France by confirming Swiss 
neutrality and giving Prussia control of the Rhineland from the Dutch frontier south to 
Koblenz.   
 France also found itself isolated diplomatically by the 1815 settlements.  On the 
same day that the Second Peace of Paris was signed, the four major powers concluded the 
Treaty of Defensive Alliance.  The Quadruple Alliance, as it came to be known, 
effectively renewed the terms of the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont, by which Austria, Russia, 
Prussia, and Britain pledged mutual resistance against French aggression.  But it was the 
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formation of the Holy Alliance among Austria, Russia, and Prussia that became the real 
target of French vitriol.  Inspired by the pronounced mysticism of Tsar Alexander, the 
Holy Alliance ostensibly bound its signatories to frame their diplomatic policies in 
accordance with Christian ethical principles.  In reality, the Alliance became under 
Metternich’s deft direction a tool for securing monarchical interests against revolutionary 
impulses throughout Europe.  A stark representation of the forces of reaction, the Holy 
Alliance made it even easier for Napoleon’s liberal apologists to pose him by contrast as 
the legitimate heir to the principles of 1789.121 
 As a result of the duc de Richelieu’s skillful negotiations, the number of 
occupation troops was reduced from 150,000 to 120,000 in April 1817, and they were 
withdrawn entirely after the minimum period of three years by the Treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle of October 1818.  France also managed to pay the indemnity in full by 1820.  
Nonetheless, the settlements remained a poignant symbol of defeat, humiliation, and 
wounded national pride for decades to come.  Even though Richelieu was successful in 
obtaining more lenient terms, he was nonetheless deeply shamed by the whole affair, 
remarking sadly, “As a Frenchman, I deserve to put my head on the scaffold for putting 
my name to such a treaty.”122  Vehement protests against the treaty, seen as the product of 
concerted efforts among the Allied powers to hinder French recovery, became a yardstick 
for measuring patriotism on both ends of the political spectrum.123  Memories of the 
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humiliation suffered because of this treaty would recur periodically over the next several 
decades, usually at times when France felt itself threatened by foreign enemies of old, 
entrenching the doctrine of natural frontiers in political discourse.  While throughout the 
Restoration the discourse tended to be a divisive one, determined by those who accepted 
the boundaries of 1789 and those who didn’t, over time the idea of natural frontiers as 
France’s ineluctable destiny was accepted on both the right and left and established as a 
guiding principle of French foreign policy by many of the Revolution’s early historians 
of the July Monarchy and Third Republic.124 
 Finally, the image of Napoleon as a liberal emperor and heir to the Revolution, 
originating in the Hundred Days, would become central to the Napoleonic myth as it 
developed over the next several decades.  The ideological imperative of a “harmony of 
interests” in particular foreshadowed what would become a primary preoccupation in 
Restoration political discourse – the emergence of parties.  The Restoration period, the 
crucible of French parliamentary politics, paradoxically witnessed a growing discomfort 
with the notion of politics itself, an uneasiness that also harkened back to the Revolution 
and especially to the dark days of the Terror.  Esprit de parti had no place in what Colin 
Jones calls the “glacial logic of republican unity,” in which the overblown moral rhetoric 
of the general will and amour de la patrie was supposed to transcend the sectionalism 
and self-interest associated with political passions.125  Throughout the Restoration, 
whether from the floor of the Chamber of Deputies or across the pages of daily journals 
and pamphlets, politicians and journalists on both the right and left accused their 
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opponents of fracturing the national unity by pursuing factional interests.  Bitterly 
divisive memories of the emigration also persisted throughout the Restoration, 
culminating in the acrimonious debates over the Indemnity Bill of 1825.  The Empire, 
characterized by members of the liberal opposition as a period in which France enjoyed 
this “harmony of interests,” would thus become a useful foil to the Second Restoration.
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 – “King of two peoples” 
 
Following the first Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1814, Louis XVIII 
attempted to strengthen the fragile consensus of post-revolutionary France by promoting 
a spirit of national reconciliation.  Article 11 of the Constitutional Charter instituted a 
policy of oubli by expressly forbidding the investigation of political opinions held prior 
to the Restoration, in effect legislating collective French amnesia concerning the 
turbulent events of the preceding twenty-five years.  Unlike the more extreme members 
of the royalist party, the king appeared genuinely committed to a policy of national 
reconciliation.  In a letter to his far more reactionary brother, the comte d’Artois, Louis 
defended his policies of moderation, promising to reign according to the “maxim that I 
must not be king of two peoples, and all the efforts of my government are directed 
towards forming these two peoples into one.”126  Nonetheless, reconciliation would be 
achieved at the price of memory, as suggested by the slogan union et oubli.127  The first 
was contingent upon the second, and reconciliation, it was believed, could only be 
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achieved by forgetting, or at least ceasing to acknowledge publicly, the recent 
revolutionary and imperial past.   
Despite Louis XVIII’s pious wish not to be the “king of two peoples,” it soon 
became clear that France was no longer one and indivisible.  It was the entrenchment of 
divisive memories, perhaps even more than differences in political principles, which 
precluded true reconciliation under the Restoration.  The policy of pursuing reconciliation 
through forgetting had the opposite effect of reifying divisions in the French polity.  
These ruptures revealed themselves not only in factional politics, but also in more 
dramatic fashion in the departure of hundreds of Bonapartist exiles, most of whom found 
their way to the United States and points further south in the Americas.  Rather than 
trying to fade into the woodworks of American society, most of them maintained a highly 
conspicuous presence there.  In so doing, they proved a useful tool for the liberal 
opposition, who publicized the exiles’ activities in France as a means of criticizing the 
reactionary policies of the Second Restoration.   
 
The Politics of Forgetting 
 In keeping with the original spirit of union et oubli, the First Restoration 
witnessed little in the way of a counter-revolution.  Notables of the imperial elite were 
welcomed at court, if not by the ancienne noblesse and the snobs of the faubourg Saint-
Germain, at least by the king himself.  Despite demands from émigrés that their former 
properties, sequestered by the revolutionary government, be returned to them, purchasers 
of biens nationaux saw no concerted efforts to infringe upon their rights legally.  There 
were also no widespread purges in the administrative bureaucracy.  All members of the 
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imperial Legislative Corps were automatically granted membership in the Chamber of 
Deputies.  The Chamber of Peers included ten of Napoleon’s marshals and ninety-three 
imperial Senators, the rest of whom were granted life pensions.  According to statistics 
compiled by Napoleon during the Hundred Days, the Bourbons had replaced only thirty-
five percent of the imperial prefectoral personnel in 1814.128  Former imperial officials 
comprised sixty percent of the Conseil d’État, ninety-five percent of the Cour des 
Comptes, and one hundred percent of the Cour de Cassation.129   
The army was a rather different story.  Reduced from 531,675 in April 1814 to 
220,000 in December, 300,000 men were demobilized and sent home with pensions.  The 
reorganization left 11-12,000 officers unassigned, all of whom were put on inactive duty 
on half-pay, thus earning themselves the sobriquet of demi-soldes.  Moreover, the 
budgets for the Legion of Honor and Les Invalides were drastically reduced, while the 
military schools of Saint-Cyr, Saint-Germain, and La Flèche were closed.  Although 
returning émigrés and other royalist officers did not gain overwhelming advantages in 
staff changes, these measures convinced Napoleonic veterans that the Old Regime 
vanguard was benefiting at their expense.130  However, the markedly Napoleonic 
character of the army would prove itself under the Hundred Days when it defected from 
the Bourbons en masse, ensuring the success of Napoleon’s coup d’état.131  
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Napoleon’s notoriously and fiercely loyal Imperial Guard into a Royal Guard.  Instead, 
these regiments remained largely intact and were sent to provincial garrisons.   
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 For the most part, the First Restoration witnessed attempts to implement oubli by 
reviving Old Regime practices and symbolism without directly confronting those of the 
revolutionary and imperial periods.132  But the ease with which Napoleon recaptured the 
French throne in March 1815 convinced many royalists that the policy of union et oubli 
was a dangerous approach, and they demanded far more extreme measures under the 
Second Restoration as a deterrent against further assaults on Bourbon authority.133  The 
White Terror began even before Louis XVIII reentered the country.  A largely 
spontaneous and popular royalist reactionary movement directed at exacting vengeance 
against the “traitors” responsible for the Hundred Days, it was also fueled by the desire to 
settle even older scores dating back to the Revolution.134  Violence was especially acute 
in the south of France, where unusually high conscription quotas and economic decline 
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caused by the Continental System rendered the population largely hostile to Napoleon.135  
Marseilles was the first major city to fall to the Allies, shortly after the defeat of Waterloo 
became known.  On 24 June, General Verdier evacuated imperial troops from the city, 
opening the door for popular royalist retribution against supporters of Napoleon and 
former Revolutionaries.  About 50 were killed, 200 wounded, and another 200 arrested 
and imprisoned, often without benefit of due process.   
Now under the control of a royalist committee, Marseilles became a staging 
ground for further attacks in neighboring areas.  On 24 July, Marshal Brune was forced to 
evacuate Toulon, where the weakness of local administration allowed royalist bands to 
carry out reactionary violence over several weeks.  As many as 850 were arrested and 
another 1,000 fled the city, the main targets being purchasers of biens nationaux and 
those who held public office during the Hundred Days.  Brune himself was tracked down 
and brutally murdered at Avignon, his body dragged through the streets and dumped in 
the Rhône.  In Toulouse, royalist operations were aided considerably by Bertier de 
Sauvigny’s secret society, the Chevaliers de la Foi, which had been operating secretly to 
undermine Napoleon’s popularity in the region since 1810.  In late July 1815, royalist 
battalions, known as verdets for their green uniforms, were given leave to arrest hundreds 
of enemies of the regime – Jacobins, regicides, and Bonapartists, anyone with the 
slightest whisper of a revolutionary past.  On 15 August, the Feast of the Assumption 
and, until recently, a national holiday in honor of the emperor’s birthday, the verdets 
violently attacked and dismembered General Ramel, former commander of the imperial 
garrison and president of the electoral college during the Hundred Days.  The White 
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Terror assumed a particularly insidious form in the department of the Gard, where 
political passions combined with centuries-old religious conflicts to fuel violence against 
Protestants, who had enjoyed greater tolerance since the Revolution and by and large 
supported Napoleon during the Hundred Days. Between July and October of 1815, about 
2,500 Protestants, threatened with imprisonment, destruction of property, and even 
lynching, fled the region. 
The Second Restoration was also accompanied by legal forms of reaction that 
were far more extreme than those of 1814.  The regime’s first priority was to punish 
those most responsible for aiding and abetting Napoleon’s return to power in March 
1815.  Returning to Paris from his bolthole at Ghent in June, Louis XVIII issued a 
declaration from Cateau-Cambrésis attempting to appease the royalists by promising to 
punish all those who had rallied to Napoleon during the Hundred Days.  But a second 
declaration, issued from Cambrai on 28 June, was more in line with the king’s 
conciliatory instincts, modifying his initial pledge by granting pardon to all “misled 
Frenchmen,” with the exception of “the instigators and the authors” of the Hundred 
Days.136  Louis turned to his Minister of Police, Fouché, who, like his fellow seasoned 
girouette Talleyrand, managed to weather successive regime changes by convincing 
those in power that his services were indispensable.  Thus, he found himself charged with 
the unpleasant task of rounding up his fellow accomplices in the Hundred Days to serve 
as official scapegoats.137  He and perhaps even the king would have preferred to avoid the 
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issue altogether in favor of a total amnesty, but they faced significant pressure from both 
the royalists and the Allies to make an example of Napoleon’s boldest supporters.  To 
satisfy these demands for vengeance, the Amnesty Decree of 24 July 1815 named a total 
of fifty-seven people exempted from the general pardon.  Article 1 identified those “who 
betrayed the king before the 23 of March [the day on which Louis XVIII crossed the 
border into Belgium], or who attacked France and its government by force of arms, and 
who seized power for themselves by violent means.”138  Among the nineteen officers 
named were Ney, Labédoyère, Charles and Henri Lallemand, Grouchy, Clausel, 
Cambronne, and Lavallette, who were ordered to face trial by court-martial.  Article 2 
named an additional thirty-eight individuals, both civilians and militaires, charged with 
making public statements favoring Napoleon’s return.  Essentially condemned to 
domestic exile, they were ordered to leave Paris within three days and placed under 
police surveillance while the Chambers debated their fate.  
The government also implemented a series of measures intended to purge the 
military of Bonapartists, as Napoleon’s success in March 1815 was blamed first and 
foremost on his command of the army’s loyalty.  Discharges were liberally granted to 
those who wanted them, even those who had recently deserted, while those who had 
                                                                                                                                            
personal weakness” towards his friends and colleagues.  “He had sacrificed himself 
liberally; only his name was lacking” from the list of conspirators.  Quoted in Jesse S. 
Reeves, The Napoleonic Exiles in America: A Study in American Diplomatic History, 
1815-1819 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1905), 22.  In reality, Fouché did 
what he could to minimize the scale of retaliation by submitting a large and ill-assorted 
list of names in the hopes of discrediting the whole endeavor.  He also supported the idea 
of publishing the list in the Moniteur on 25 July, possibly to give those named time to 
escape, which he further facilitated by handing out passports and money to suspects.   
138 Quoted in Marcel Doher, Proscrits et exilés après Waterloo (Paris: Peyronnet, 1965), 
22. 
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served eight years, were married, or unable to serve effectively were obliged to leave as 
well.  All officers were placed on inactive duty at half-pay, just as they had been in 1814.  
Moreover, forced retirement was ordered for senior officers who were fifty-five years of 
age or with thirty years of service, and for junior officers over fifty years of age or with 
twenty-five years of service.  While awaiting the recall to active duty (which for most 
would never materialize), demi-soldes were required to reside in the department where 
they had first enrolled.  Moreover, they were forbidden to marry without permission or if 
the prospective spouse had a dowry of less than 12,000 francs, and were not legally 
permitted to seek other employment in order to supplement their income.  In essence, 
their reintegration into civil society was suspended until they attained sufficient seniority 
to retire.139  Such measures demonstrated the government’s determination not only to 
excise Napoleon’s former soldiers from the army, but to restrict their financial resources 
and their movement within the country, thereby preventing potential uprisings against the 
regime.    
Ultraroyalists blamed the Hundred Days on continuity not only in the army but in 
the government bureaucracy as well, especially at the departmental and prefectoral level.  
The Second Restoration thus also witnessed a rigorous purge of lingering traitors from 
the administrative ranks, replacing them with individuals who had never wavered in their 
commitment to the royalist cause.  The Amnesty Decree of 24 July, for example, had 
removed 29 peers from the Chamber convened during the Hundred Days, and a second 
ordinance of 17 August appointed 94 new hereditary members.  All were staunch 
royalists and military men who had refused to rally to Napoleon upon his return from 
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Elba.  Altogether, as many 80,000 individuals, or one-third of the administrative corps, 
were removed from office at the beginning of the Second Restoration.140  Another purge, 
this one waged against the insidious philosophies that had launched the Revolution, took 
place in intellectual circles.  As many as 200 university rectors and professors lost their 
positions as the regime attempted to undo the secularizing educational reforms instituted 
by the revolutionary governments and Napoleon.  Over thirty academicians were ejected 
from the Institut de France, including the mathematician Gaspard Monge, who had joined 
the corps of scientists that Napoleon took along on the Egyptian campaign, and Jacques-
Louis David, the father of French Neoclassicism, whose canvases immortalized the 
principal events of the past twenty-five years.141 
Having obtained an overwhelming majority in the first Chamber of Deputies of 
the Second Restoration, the so-called Chambre Introuvable, the ultraroyalists used their 
legislative prerogatives to seek further revenge for past transgressions.  November 1815 
witnessed initiatives in the Chamber of Deputies to create additional exemptions to the 
Amnesty Decree of 24 July, despite the king’s promise that no names would be added to 
the list of individuals to be punished.  Although moderate deputies succeeded in taming 
some of the ultras’ more extreme demands for revenge, the Law of Proscription enacted 
on 12 January 1816 enlarged on the original cadre of forced exiles considerably.  The 
thirty-eight individuals initially sentenced to domestic exile by the decree of 24 July were 
banished from France, as were the so-called regicides (former deputies to the National 
Convention who had voted for the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793) who had 
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openly supported Napoleon during the Hundred Days.  All members of the Bonaparte 
family and their descendants were banished from France in perpetuity.   
The Chambre Introuvable also set about protecting the Bourbon regime with a 
series of laws expanding the state’s powers to police sedition.  The Law of General 
Security, enacted on 29 October 1815, in effect suspended individual liberty, permitting 
authorities to arrest and detain without trial or place under surveillance anyone suspected 
of plotting against the royal family or otherwise constituting a threat to the security of the 
state.  The Sedition Law of 9 November expanded the range of acts punishable by law.  
The concept of sedition, defined in the imperial penal code as written or verbal discourse 
intended to provoke rebellion, was widened to include any speech or writings that 
threatened the person or authority of the king or the royal family.  A number of seditious 
acts were re-classified as crimes rather than misdemeanors, entailing harsher penalties, 
including deportation and fines as high as 3,000 francs.142  In order to effectively 
prosecute such cases, the Chamber also voted to revive the old regime cours prévôtales, 
abolished during the Revolution and succeeded by the special courts of the Empire, 
which would allow for trial without jury or right of appeal.  According to the law of 20 
December 1815, each department was to have one provost court, each with five civil 
magistrates chosen by the Minister of Justice and presided over by a military provost, 
appointed by the Ministry of War.  Their jurisdiction over political offenses was 
determined by the nature of the offense; seditious acts entailing direct threats to the 
security of the king or state (such as a public cry of “À bas le Roi!”) were sent to the 
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provost courts, while threats of an indirect nature (e.g., “Vive l’Empereur!”) were tried in 
the courts of first instance.143 
The policy of enforced amnesia manifested itself in the most pronounced fashion 
through the sedition laws, which took aim at symbols and practices that perpetuated the 
memory of the preceding twenty-five years.  By rendering it illegal to hoist a tricolor, 
sing revolutionary songs, or display imperial emblems, these laws attempted to obscure a 
past in which many French citizens took pride.  Not surprisingly, repression made these 
objects and symbols all the more valuable, and police and judicial records provide a 
wealth of evidence of an illicit trade in signes prohibés. In July 1819, for example, police 
in Bordeaux investigated reports that engravings representing Napoleon’s landing at 
Cannes in March 1815 were being sold publicly by local booksellers.144  At Toulouse in 
October 1819, a writing teacher by the name of Malbec was found in possession of some 
drawings of Napoleon and imperial emblems that, when folded in the right way, were 
cleverly concealed as innocuous fleur-de-lys.  One caricature depicted Louis XVIII 
climbing a pole, supported on the shoulders of Wellington, Tsar Alexander, and the King 
of Prussia, in order to reach the French crown at the top, while Napoleon looks on, saying 
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“I climbed up there all by myself without your help.”145  Seemingly petty offenses, the 
vigilance with which the authorities enforced the sedition laws underscores the power 
that contemporaries ascribed to memory 
Altogether, as a consequence of this legislation and through the combined activity 
of the provost and ordinary courts, approximately 6,000 individuals were sentenced while 
more than 3,000 were subject to police action of some kind.  Even counting the victims of 
popular violence in the Vendée and the Midi, the magnitude of the royalist reaction fell 
far short of the Red Terror, which sent roughly 17,000 to the guillotine in 1793-94.146  
Nonetheless, the White Terror had significant long-term consequences, especially on the 
organization of opposition politics.  By indiscriminately exacting revenge on Bonapartists 
and ex-Revolutionaries alike, the royalist organizers of the White Terror unwittingly 
reinforced a sense of common purpose among their various enemies.  The shared 
experience of being victims of the royalist reaction of 1815 would go a long way in 
fostering their continued cooperation in organized opposition to the Restoration regime 
over the next fifteen years. 
The legacy of the Hundred Days was a serious obstacle to attempts on the part of 
Louis XVIII and moderate royalists to construct a compromise regime.  In the words of 
one historian, the Hundred Days represented an “historical trauma” that permanently 
                                                
145 AN, F7 6704, d. 5906, Prefect of the Haute-Garonne to the Ministry of the Interior 
(Toulouse, 10/5/1819).  
146 Resnick, The White Terror, 114-115, 118.  Resnick concludes that liberal critics of the 
Restoration have greatly exaggerated the scale of the reaction, inflating the numbers of 
those imprisoned and condemned by tens of thousands.  They were especially mistaken 
with regard to the efficacy of the provost courts, whose reestablishment was widely 
feared would institute a new Reign of Terror.  In reality, says Resnick, the provost courts 
were greatly hampered by administrative inefficiencies.  Moreover, the vast majority of 
political offenses were tried by the ordinary courts.  Ibid., 95-96.      
 87 
stamped Restoration politics with old divisive memories of the revolutionary past. 147  For 
ultraroyalists and even some moderates, the fact that many who rallied to Napoleon upon 
his return were breaking oaths of loyalty taken to the Bourbon regime only a few months 
earlier meant that any future cooperation with ex-revolutionaries and Bonapartists was 
out of the question (witness the violent backlash against the election of the regicide abbé 
Grégoire to the Chamber of Deputies in 1819).  Despite their unwillingness to forgive 
those responsible for bringing down the monarchy, whether in 1792 or in 1815, the ultras 
nonetheless persisted in the politics of forgetting in another sense.  By attempting to erase 
all traces of the period 1789-1815 in everything from legislation to institutions to public 
monuments, the reactionaries of the Second Restoration essentially wanted to pretend that 
the Revolution had never happened.  This assault on memory was the common thread 
running through all of the various aspects of the royalist reaction that occurred with the 
Second Restoration, whether they attempted to purge remnants of the revolutionary past 
in the form of symbols or individuals.  Paradoxically, the latter actually perpetuated one 
of the most divisive legacies of the Revolution – that of the emigration – by producing a 
new class of exiles who fled France, some by force and some by volition, in order to 
escape the Restoration regime’s proscription of the past.  
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American Utopia 
 Chapter Five of Honoré de Balzac’s La Rabouilleuse opens as an American mail 
boat docks at Le Havre in October 1819.  A young man disembarks and is greeted at the 
docks by his anxious mother.  She is brought to near despair by the state of destitution in 
which she finds her son, who bore visible signs of physical suffering and pecuniary 
hardship.  Her late husband had been a career bureaucrat in Napoleon’s Interior ministry, 
whose untimely death in 1809 was deeply mourned by both his family and the emperor.  
Inheriting his father’s fanatical devotion to Napoleon, Philippe resolved to serve the same 
master but in a military capacity.  Aged eighteen by the time of the disastrous retreat 
from Moscow, he wrote directly to Napoleon begging for a commission.  He acquitted 
himself well during the campaign of France in 1814, earning rapid promotions and the 
cross of a knight of the Legion of Honor, and was wounded at Waterloo.   
Like many of Napoleon’s devotees, Philippe refused to seek service in the 
Bourbon army after the fall of the Empire.  After the saga of the Hundred Days played 
out, he cheerfully took up the life an urban demi-solde, frittering away his time and 
meager half-pay in Parisian cafés known to attract Bonapartists and liberal discontents.  
Implicated in one of many abortive conspiracies against the Restoration regime, he was 
arrested, and although released for lack of evidence, it seemed only a matter of time 
before the police would find cause to detain him again.  It was at this time that Mme 
Bridau, on the counsel of her late husband’s trusted friends, began beseeching her son to 
seek military service abroad, where his valuable experience as a veteran of the 
Napoleonic wars would earn him favor.  Philippe found the idea abhorrent.  As his 
younger brother Joseph perceptively remarked, “Frenchmen are too proud of the column 
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in the Place Vendôme to go and enlist in some foreign army.  Besides, perhaps Napoleon 
will come back a second time!”148  However, to assuage his mother’s fears, Philippe 
resolved instead to join General Charles Lallemand’s Champ d’Asile, a short-lived effort 
on the part of imperial veterans to settle a colony in the Texas borderlands in 1818.   
By the time he returned to France nearly two years later, Philippe had gained little 
and lost much.  Up until this point in his life, Philippe’s flaws were of a rather ordinary 
sort for an imperial cavalry officer.  Brash, brazen, and given to pompous displays of 
martial courage, he now compounded these venial faults with more serious sins stemming 
from total self-absorption.  His sojourn in America indelibly stained his character; “his 
misfortunes in Texas, his stay in New York, a place where speculation and individualism 
are carried to the very highest level, where the brutality of self-interest reaches the point 
of cynicism and where a man, fundamentally isolated from rest of mankind, finds himself 
compelled to rely upon his own strength and at every instant to become to be the self-
appointed judge of his own actions, a city in which politeness does not exist.”149  
However inadequate his moral compass was before he left for America, Philippe 
appeared to have dispensed with scruples entirely as a result of his experiences in Texas.  
Former acquaintances who once admired the dashing young officer now took offense at 
his coarse manners, his vulgarity, and the noxious smell of smoke and drink emanating 
from his person at all times of the day.  Worst of all, Philippe became a chronic gambler.  
The rest of the novel charts the downward spiral of this shiftless demi-solde into a life of 
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deceit and criminal behavior, to the great detriment of his family’s fortune and his 
mother’s sorrow. 
 Though hardly a sympathetic portrayal of a demi-solde, the figuration of Philippe 
Bridau in La Comédie humaine testifies to a genuine social concern in the early years of 
the Restoration.  As was the case with so many of Balzac’s characters, Bridau was 
invented to represent an historical type and an historical problem – the anomalous 
existence of Napoleonic war veterans in post-Napoleonic France.  The demi-soldes 
occupied a liminal space in Restoration society.  Determined on pursuing a policy of 
peace and rebuilding diplomatic relations with the rest of Europe, the Bourbon regime 
had little use for their military services.  Moreover, their imperial past rendered even 
those who took no part in various Bonapartist conspiracies as objects of suspicion in the 
eyes of the Restoration government.  Career soldiers for the most part, many knew no 
other profitable occupation, and they faced further barriers to reintegration in civil society 
by the terms of the army’s reorganization.  Charles Lallemand’s disastrous venture in the 
Texas borderlands was, in part, a response to this problem. 
 
The Champ d’Asile was itself an ill-fated and short episode in a much longer 
story of French exiles in America during the early nineteenth century.  The White Terror, 
in both its legal and extralegal forms, sent hundreds of soldiers and civilians into exile, 
many of whom found refuge in the United States.  Some, like Marshal Grouchy, General 
Clausel, and former commissioner of police Pierre-François Réal, were among those 
named in the laws of proscription, who had little choice but to leave France or face trial 
and possibly execution.  These bannis were joined by many more who found it prudent to 
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emigrate in order to escape ostracism (or worse) because of their political sympathies, 
especially those who had followed Napoleon to Elba or facilitated in one way or another 
his return to power during the Hundred Days.  Upon arriving in the United States, they 
gravitated towards the substantial French communities that already existed in cities like 
Philadelphia and New Orleans, formed in the 1790s by refugees fleeing the slave revolts 
in Saint Domingue and other French possessions in the Caribbean, as well as a handful of 
revolutionary émigrés who had never returned to France.  Men like the diplomat and 
industrialist Dupont de Nemours and the wealthy banker Stephen Girard, already well-
respected and established in their communities, provided introductions for high-ranking 
exiles and facilitated their reception in American society.   
But for most exiles, whether soldiers or civilians, French or Domingan, making a 
living in the United States posed a thorny problem.  Out of necessity was born the idea of 
a permanent and independent Francophone settlement where these exiles could live 
according to their own customs.  The project was assiduously promoted in L’Abeille 
américaine, a Philadelphia-based French-language newspaper run by Jean-Simon 
Chaudron, former editor of the Bonapartist Parisian journal, Le Nain Jaune.  The 
Colonial Society of French Emigrants formed in the fall of 1816 with the purpose of 
founding an agricultural community, either in the Ohio or Mississippi River valleys, 
devoted to the cultivation of two profitable agricultural crops – grapes and olives.  Over 
the next several months, the society lobbied members of Congress and other politicians 
for a grant of land in one of the newly acquired and developing territories of the U.S.  On 
3 March 1817, President James Madison signed an act authorizing the society to settle 
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bordering the Tombigbee River in the Alabama Territory, under exceedingly generous 
terms.150  Thus was born the Vine and Olive Colony.151 
Under the direction of Generals Clausel and Lefebvre-Desnouettes, the society 
began preparations in the spring of 1817, sending advance survey teams to scout a 
suitable location for the townships, purchasing supplies, obtaining vine cuttings and olive 
seedlings from Europe, and arranging transportation for the colonists.  The main 
contingent set sail from Philadelphia in August.  After enjoying a warm welcome in 
Mobile, they proceeded upland to a point of land overlooking the junction of the 
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Tombigbee and Black Warrior Rivers known as White Bluff, where they settled their first 
town called Demopolis.  When “the city of the people” had to be abandoned because it 
was found to be outside the boundaries of their grant, they were discouraged but 
undeterred, moving farther inland and starting again.  Whereas the name Demopolis was 
a clear nod to their revolutionary heritage, subsequent settlements were given distinctly 
Napoleonic monikers – the principal town of Aigleville paid homage to the imperial 
eagle, and a second smaller town was named Arcola after a battle in the first Italian 
campaign.  The county in which they were located was later called Marengo, named for a 
decisive French victory during the second Italian campaign.  By 1822, nearly 70 of the 
347 original shareholders had arrived and spent at least some time in the colony.152 
But by mid-decade many had abandoned the enterprise, discouraged by labor 
shortages, lack of infrastructure, squatters, and an unforgiving natural environment.  
Moreover, the climate and terrain proved unsuitable to the cultivation of grapes and 
olives, making it impossible to fulfill the conditions of the land grant.  Over the course of 
the 1820s, land in the Vine and Olive Colony became increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a few families; between 1817 and 1834, the number of landholders had been 
reduced by nearly half.  For those who remained, the key to their success was the shrewd 
recognition that cotton, not grapes or olives, was king in Alabama.  The demographic 
character of the colony also changed.  More and more Anglo-Americans settlers bought 
in, replacing as majority owners the French landholders, who by and large removed to 
cities like Mobile and New Orleans.153  By the mid-1830s, the colony was unrecognizable 
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from the agricultural utopia first envisioned by Colonial Society of French Emigrants; 
rather than a Francophone society dedicated to collective agricultural enterprise, it had 
devolved into privately held, large scale plantations owned by a small number of French 
and American elites. 
In what is by far the most well documented study of the Vine and Olive colony, 
Rafe Blaufarb demonstrates that it was in fact refugees from Saint-Domingue who 
comprised the majority of the French agricultural settlement in Alabama.  Although 
sixty-five of the Vine and Olive shareholders were Napoleonic war veterans, only twelve 
of them ever set foot on the colony.  Most of the exiles who left France in the wake of the 
1815 reaction had no intention of settling permanently in the United States, and directed 
most of their energies towards negotiating pardons from the Restoration government.  
The Domingans remained in Alabama long after the others returned to France, creating 
successful cotton plantations and insinuating themselves into the elite antebellum 
Southern planter class.  Nonetheless, their role in the Vine and Olive Colony was 
overshadowed, both in contemporary accounts and in historical memory, by the smaller 
but far more high-profile contingent of Bonapartist exiles, whose fleeting presence has 
conditioned romanticized versions of the Vine and Olive history ever since.154  
The alarms raised among the diplomatic community were partially responsible for 
focusing the spotlight on the exiles of 1815.  European governments followed their 
movements closely, and with good reason.  These French refugees were, by and large, 
accorded an enthusiastic reception in the United States because of shared ideological 
sympathies rooted in the revolutions of the late eighteenth century.  The recent Vienna 
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settlements having restored the pre-revolutionary status quo in Europe, the U.S. found 
itself an increasingly isolated republic in a monarchical Atlantic world.  Many Americans 
viewed the French exiles, more or less revolutionaries who were persecuted by a 
reactionary regime, as natural allies in the global revolutionary struggle for liberty.  
Moreover, even while Napoleon’s popularity in the United States had waned as his rule 
became increasingly despotic, he still earned some favor in American eyes for of his 
implacable hatred of “perfidious Albion.” 155  This mutual accord between the French 
exiles and their American hosts fueled conservative Europe’s fears of further 
revolutionary disturbances.  More terrifying still was the possibility that they might use 
their new home in America as a staging ground for plots to rescue Napoleon from his 
island prison in the South Atlantic.   
These fears coalesced in the maelstrom of revolutionary fervor raging in Latin 
America, in itself an indirect result of the Napoleonic saga.  When Napoleon installed his 
brother Joseph on the Spanish throne in 1808, the colonies of Latin America refused to 
recognize his authority.  Establishing juntas in the name of the deposed King Ferdinand 
VII, they took advantage of the weakness of the Bonapartist regime, securing a large 
measure of autonomy while Joseph’s energies were otherwise engaged in fighting 
Spanish nationalists and Wellington’s troops.  After his restoration in 1815, Ferdinand 
embarked on a brutal campaign to restore Spanish control over the Latin American 
colonies, providing further impetus to independence movements.  For thousands of career 
soldiers put out of work by the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, the 
prospect of military service in foreign armies proved an attractive option for mercenary 
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 96 
work, and revolution in the Spanish colonies provided lucrative opportunities for the 
pursuit of glory.156  To the defenders of the old order, it was alarming enough that these 
experienced veterans might now put their talents to good use in the service of 
revolutionary movements.  European diplomats, especially Richelieu, also feared that 
these rogue soldiers might take advantage of the collapse of colonial governments in 
Latin America to establish Bonapartist regimes, possibly even under Napoleon himself.  
Although the Allied powers had redoubled their vigilance after Napoleon’s escape from 
Elba, making it highly unlikely that he would attempt yet another triumphant return to 
Europe, they were unable to similarly secure the coasts of the Americas.  The collapse of 
colonial governments and ensuing administrative chaos in the Spanish colonies in 
particular seemed ripe for clandestine activities.   
Rumors, ranging from the credible to the paranoid, abounded of operations to 
rescue Napoleon from St. Helena.  Considerable alarms were raised, for example, over 
Napoleon’s former aide-de-camp, General Dirk van Hogendorp, now living in Brazil.  A 
Dutch nobleman who became attached to Napoleon after Holland was annexed to the 
Empire in 1810, Hogendorp was welcome in neither his homeland nor in France after 
1815.  Dubbed the “hermit of Corcovado,” he tried to maintain a solitary and quiet 
existence on a mountain overlooking Rio de Janeiro, but the relative proximity of the 
Brazilian coast to the island of St. Helena (just over 2,000 miles) rendered any one 
connected with Napoleon living in that country an object of suspicion.157  Another 
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157 There was, in fact, some evidence of correspondence between Hogendorp and the 
exiles on St. Helena.  Napoleon left Hogendorp 100,000 francs in his will, as he did for 
other exiles in the Americas rumored to be plotting his escape, including Generals 
Brayer, Rigau, and Charles Lallemand.  Inès Murat, Napoleon and the American Dream, 
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Bonapartist exile and future Vine and Olive landholder, Colonel Paul-Albert Latapie, was 
also rumored to be orchestrating a rescue operation from Pernambuco.158   
The most obvious object of suspicion was Joseph Bonaparte, undoubtedly the 
most conspicuous of all the French exiles in America.  After unsuccessfully trying to 
persuade Napoleon to attempt an escape from English custody by disguising himself as 
Joseph and boarding a ship for America, Joseph himself set sail for the U.S. and arrived 
in New York on 28 August 1815.  After various peregrinations along the Eastern 
seaboard, he settled on the estate of Point Breeze near Bordentown, New Jersey, having 
received assurance that he would be allowed to live undisturbed in the U.S. from 
President Madison (who nonetheless refused Joseph’s request for an audience).  Situated 
on the Delaware River, Point Breeze lay on the main road from New York to 
Philadelphia.  There he adopted his favored posture of a gentleman farmer, playing host 
to frequent visitors, both curious Americans and fellow exiles, showing off his extensive 
art collections and collecting news of European affairs.159  Despite his efforts to remain 
aloof from conspiracies (or at least to maintain the appearance of disinterestedness), 
adventurers and authors of various Bonapartist plots naturally sought Joseph out for 
support.   
                                                                                                                                            
trans. Frances Frenaye (Baton Rouge, LA: University of Louisiana Press, 1981), 149, 
167. 
158 Blaufarb, Bonapartists in the Borderlands, 40, 78-80. 
159 Joseph also opened his home to various members of the imperial family over the 
years, including his daughters Charlotte, who would later marry her cousin Napoléon 
Louis, son of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense de Beauharnais and brother of the future 
Napoleon III, and Zenaïde, along with her husband Charles, one of Lucien Bonaparte’s 
numerous sons.  He was also visited by two of Caroline and Joachim Murat’s sons, 
Lucien and Achille, both of whom married and settled in the United States. 
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Hyde de Neuville, the French ambassador at Washington and an ultraroyalist 
avant la lettre, was especially troubled by rumors of efforts to place Joseph at the head of 
a Mexican insurgency.  The most credible (if improbable) reports came in August 1817, 
when Neuville received concrete evidence of a plot to establish a “Napoleonic 
Confederation” devised by Joseph Lakanal.  A defrocked priest and former conventionnel 
who had voted for the death of Louis XVI, Lakanal was also an able administrator who 
was instrumental in reforming national education during the Revolution.  Ejected from 
the Institut and banished by the Proscription law of 1816, he took refuge in the U.S., 
where he corresponded warmly with Jefferson on his farming efforts in Kentucky and 
eventually served as president of what is today Tulane University.  But in 1817 he came 
under suspicion because when one of Neuville’s agents intercepted a packet of 
documents in which Lakanal beseeched Joseph Bonaparte to reassert his claims to the 
Spanish throne and thus to Spanish colonies in the Americas.  He asked Joseph for 
65,000 francs to fund a harebrained scheme for the conquest of Mexico with a small force 
of 900 men recruited in the western and southern U.S. territories, as well as a Spanish 
distinction of some sort for himself.  As proof of his elaborate plans, Lakanal also 
provided a vocabulary for negotiating with Native American tribes, as well as a cipher for 
constructing secret messages disguised as Latin prayers.  Nothing ever came of this or 
any other plot, for Joseph, as the debacle in Spain proved, had never been inclined to take 
up the family business of ruling nations, much preferring the comfort of his country 
estates to the exercise of royal power.160  Nonetheless, the credence lent to rumors of this 
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nature reflects the extent to which European diplomacy was dominated by a single 
objective between 1815 and 1821 – to prevent at all costs another Napoleonic 
restoration.161  
Such was the immediate context for the Champ d’Asile, the brainchild of General 
Charles Lallemand.  Born at Metz in 1774, Lallemand enlisted in the revolutionary army 
at the age of seventeen and quickly rose up the ranks, distinguishing himself in the major 
campaigns of the Empire.  Although he initially retained his commission under the First 
Restoration, he fell from Bourbon favor after conspiring to lead a military uprising in 
Napoleon’s favor in March 1815.  Accompanying Napoleon in his retreat to Rochefort 
after the second abdication, he unsuccessfully tried to persuade the emperor to attempt an 
escape to America.  Lallemand was denied permission to follow Napoleon into exile on 
St. Helena, ostensibly because he was named in the Amnesty Decree of 24 July 1815.  He 
and seven other French officers were transferred to the island of Malta, where he 
remained in English custody until April 1816.   
In the meantime, a court-martial had sentenced Lallemand to death in absentia, 
and thus a return to France was out of the question.  Like Balzac’s Philippe Bridau and 
thousands of real career soldiers put out of work by the European peace settlements, he 
looked abroad for employment.  After being released from English custody, he traveled 
to Smyrna and then to Constantinople, where he applied to the sultan for a post as an 
instructor in the Turkish army.  The French ambassador was quick to warn the sultan of 
the deleterious effect this would have on diplomatic relations with the Bourbon regime.  
                                                                                                                                            
into an American burgher and spend his fortune on laying out gardens.”  Quoted in 
Murat, Napoleon and the American Dream, 28. 
161 Blaufarb, Bonapartists in the Borderlands, 81. 
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Lallemand then traveled to Tehran, where he was similarly rebuffed by the shah of 
Persia.  Having exhausted his options in the east, he joined his younger brother, Henri, 
also a veteran of the Napoleonic wars, in the U.S. in May 1817.   
Napoleon, adept at measuring the character of those close to him, spoke highly of 
Lallemand as a man of action on St. Helena, crediting him possessing with the “sacred 
fire.”  True to this assessment, Charles wasted no time in organizing a Bonapartist 
mission upon his arrival in the U.S., and in the fall of 1817 hatched a plan to establish a 
colony of Napoleonic war veterans in the Texas borderlands between the U.S. and 
Spanish Mexico.  In a letter to his brother he confessed, “I have more ambition than can 
be satisfied by that colony on the Tombigbee.”162  Lallemand was determined to organize 
a military expedition to Spanish America, and began recruiting participants among the 
exile communities along the East Coast, in the French Caribbean, and even among the 
ranks of disaffected Bonapartists back in Europe.  Hampered in his efforts by skepticism 
and a shortage of funds (Joseph Bonaparte and other wealthy exiles disapproved of the 
venture and refused to lend financial backing), the general turned to the Society for the 
Cultivation of the Vine and Olive as a tool for achieving his ends.  Taking advantage of 
divisive rifts in the rudderless society between civilian and military factions and disputes 
over land grant allotments, Lallemand managed to have himself named president and 
concocted a scheme for funding his side project by selling off the landshares owned by 
his followers to the Domingan merchants.   
The first contingent of Lallemand’s recruits set sail from Philadelphia on 17 
December 1817 under the command of General Antoine Rigau.  The group included 
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fifteen colonels, fifteen staff officers, seven doctors, and roughly 100 others, as many as 
one-third of whom hailed from Napoleon’s satellite kingdoms – Poland, Belgium, 
Holland, Italy, Spain, and the German states – and were now regarded as traitors by their 
compatriots for having served the imperial regime.  Ostensibly bound for the port of 
Mobile, the recruits learned of their real destination en route – the island of Galveston, 
off the coast of Texas.  Located along the disputed boundary between the United States 
and Spanish Mexico, Galveston had already lured other adventurers as a potential base of 
insurgent operations.  In 1816, Louis-Michel Aury, former quartermaster of the French 
navy, occupied the island in the name of the revolutionary Mexican Congress, using it as 
a base for harassing Spanish merchant ships in the Gulf and for mounting expeditions 
against royal troops in Mexico.  Aury abandoned the island the following year to join up 
with the Scottish adventurer Gregor MacGregor at Amelia Island, helping the U.S. to 
seize Florida from Spain.  But when Rigau’s contingent arrived at Galveston in January 
1818, they found the island in the possession of yet another mercenary, the notorious 
privateer Jean Lafitte.  For the next two months, the two groups lived in uneasy co-
existence on the island while Rigau and his men awaited the arrival of Lallemand, who 
had remained in New York to pursue negotiations with potential backers.   
Survivors later described their sojourn on Galveston as a most frightful 
experience. 
What we did not suffer on this island.  Hunger, thirst (for there is no drinking 
water), rains and tropical downpours, wet clothes, vermin, and the stings of 
myriad mosquitoes that attacked us.  But bodily pains were nothing in comparison 
with those of the soul, for it was difficult for some of us to live mixed in with a 
horde of real brigands.  Disunity was the rule between the leaders and their 
subordinates.  Every day there were duels; one of my friends was assassinated.  
The ill-conduct and the misunderstanding of the superior officers had given rise to 
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the most complete lack of discipline, so we were more than once at the point of 
cutting each other’s throats.163 
 
Plagued by the harsh conditions and dwindling supplies, Rigau had great difficulty 
maintaining discipline among the tense and impatient recruits in Lallemand’s absence.  
The general finally arrived in March with another contingent, and after re-establishing 
order, he quickly organized a departure for the site of their permanent settlement.  
Located on the Trinity River, Cayo de Gallardo occupied a strategic position, outside the 
jurisdiction of Mexican officials at San Antonio, and west of the Neutral Strip, a zone 
that the U.S. had pledged in 1806 not to cross.164   
After a treacherous journey through wetlands and thick vegetation, losing six men 
when one of their ships sank in a violent wind, the veterans finally reached their 
destination.  Lallemand immediately set to work organizing the settlement according to 
military principles.  The colonists were divided into three cohorts – infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery – who were woken each day at 4 a.m. with a bugle call.  Every man had to render 
six hours of common labor building fortifications and producing munitions, with minimal 
free time for hunting, fishing, and building dwellings.  Each colonist was allotted twenty 
acres of land, with an additional five if he married.165  Beggary, gambling, and 
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slaveholding were expressly forbidden, and Lallemand stationed twenty men around the 
encampment every night with orders to shoot deserters.   
Challenged by lack of experience and an unfamiliar climate, the veterans were 
unsuccessful in their haphazard efforts at farming and remained dependant on Lafitte for 
supplies throughout the duration of their stay in Texas.  Even had the colony flourished, it 
was clear that neither the United States nor Spain, both of whom laid claims to the region, 
would tolerate the presence of armed foreigners in these disputed borderlands.  Moreover, 
there was a great deal of concern in the diplomatic community that the United States 
would use the Bonapartist presence as a pretext for invading and occupying the area, 
employing the same tactic that had enabled the U.S. to seize Florida from Spain after it 
chased MacGregor out of Amelia Island.166  Thus, in the summer of 1818, the Mexican 
viceroy began mobilizing troops to eject the French from Texas.  Warned by Lafitte, 
who, recently become a secret agent for Spain, was also conspiring to get rid of them, 
Lallemand and his followers quit Cayo de Gallardo on 23 July and took refuge on 
Galveston.  When President Adams’ emissary George Graham arrived at the end of 
August to determine their intentions, Lallemand abandoned command to Rigau and set 
sail for New Orleans, still hoping to negotiate some terms of service with the U.S.  
Rigau’s efforts to maintain discipline again proved inadequate, leading to quarrels and 
desertion.  Some of the wealthier and more enterprising members profited from the lack 
of supplies, selling meager rations to their fellows at exorbitant rates.  A hurricane 
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flooded the island in mid-September, compounding their physical hardships.  The arrival 
of the Spanish commander the following month with orders for the French to withdraw 
provoked a schism between pro-Lallemand (still absent) and pro-Rigau factions, and 
bloodshed was only narrowly averted.  Demoralized by privation and disillusioned by 
Lallemand’s departure, Rigau and most of the remaining refugees straggled back to New 
Orleans at the end of October with the help of Lafitte.  The Champ d’Asile was no more. 
 
Lallemand’s true intentions in founding the Champ d’Asile were somewhat hazy 
and more than a little mercenary.  He was deliberately vague in his recruiting efforts, 
revealing little about the expedition’s goals or even its destination to prospective 
participants.  While he hinted that the project had something to do with revolutionary 
movements in Latin America, its real purpose was rumored to be a mission to rescue 
Napoleon from St. Helena.  In addition to his negotiations with Mexican insurgents and 
fellow adventurers, Lallemand vigorously sought the backing of both the U.S. and Spain, 
apparently willing to serve either side so long as he rendered himself indispensable in the 
conflict by occupying a strategic territory.167  Lallemand’s ideological promiscuity 
notwithstanding, it is clear that most of the veterans who joined the Champ d’Asile did so 
for other reasons.  It was above all an effort to recreate the life they had known for 
twenty-five years as soldiers of the Revolution and Empire, a life that was now 
impossible in post-Napoleonic France.  Their early enthusiasm for agricultural labors 
having quickly petered out, the veterans took to whiling away their time reminiscing 
about the imperial campaigns.  Nicknaming their campfire the “Palais-Royal,” they 
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gathered there in the evenings to tell tales of former glories and to dream of new 
adventures in Latin America.  “We resumed practicing the use of our weapons, we 
recalled battlefield maneuvers and celebrated the anniversaries of our triumphs; the 
solitude of America echoed our patriotic songs.”168  Hanging from a tree at the center of 
the settlement, the tricolor symbolized the Champ d’Asile’s true character, and served as 
a daily reminder of a cherished past.169   
 
Une nouvelle patrie 
For diplomats of the period as for modern historians, the principal significance of 
Lallemand’s project lay in its relationship to revolutionary movements in the Atlantic 
world.170  But the Champ d’Asile, and the French diaspora in the Americas more broadly, 
exercised a different sort of attraction for the French public.  The project was eagerly 
reported on in the liberal press and quickly permeated the popular nouveauté market.  
Engravings and lithographs depicting Lallemand’s soldier-farmers were hawked by 
peddlers and merchants brave enough to risk distributing Napoleonic imagery, and even 
turned into wallpaper.  Béranger’s musical refrain – “We are Frenchmen!  Take pity on 
our glory” – echoed in the cafés, where Bonapartists and their sympathizers drank 
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“liqueur de Champ d’Asile.”  On one level, fascination with the agricultural experiments 
in the American hinterlands, especially among those of liberal persuasion, owed much to 
their Rousseauian nature.  Shareholders in the Society for the Cultivation of Vine and 
Olive hoped to find in the Alabama wilderness a land uncorrupted by man where they 
could govern themselves according to an ideal social contract, even appealing to the 
“sage of Monticello” to play the role of legislator and outline a basis for their 
constitution.171  Moreover, bucolic images of the soldier-farmer and the cultivation of 
grapes and olives raised echoes of ancient Rome, particularly appealing to those of a 
republican bent.  Pursuing a life of agricultural simplicity in the New World, these 
refugees were cast in the mold of George Washington, the “American Cincinnatus” who 
laid down his arms and returned to the plow, and who remained a popular figure in 
France throughout the revolutionary and imperial periods.  But above all, publicity about 
the Champ d’Asile was uniquely poised to stimulate French interest because it starkly 
represented the forces of reaction and division that had been tearing France apart since 
June 1815.  There was no image better suited to elicit French sympathy in the immediate 
aftermath of the Napoleonic saga than that of a soldier, his face scarred by battle, excised 
from the nation by hostile factions, forced into an ignominious exile, trying to eke out a 
bare existence in the inhospitable wilderness of the New World.   
 
The French public’s perception of the Champ d’Asile was shaped in large 
measure by Lallemand himself.  In true Napoleonic fashion, he issued a proclamation, 
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rules and regulations of state formation set forth by the U.S. Congress.  Blaufarb, 
Bonapartists in the Borderlands, 46-47. 
 107 
widely reprinted in both English- and French-language newspapers, calculated to win 
sympathy and ease suspicions by convincing his readers of his pacific intentions.  The 
chief purpose of the colony, Lallemand announced, was agriculture and trade; military 
preparations were solely for defense and preservation.  In a vaguely Rousseauian echo, 
Lallemand laid claims to “the first right that the Author of nature gave to man.  That is, 
we are settling on this land in order to cultivate it with the work of our own hands.”  The 
same dogged perseverance that had formerly swept them from victory to victory across 
the European continent would now serve these soldiers-turned-farmers in a different 
capacity, allowing them to reap the rewards of their labors in bountiful harvests.  
Harboring no hostile intentions, they pledged to live in harmony both with neighboring 
Native American tribes and with citizens of “civilized” countries.  But they would not 
hesitate to defend themselves against any attempts to eject them from the land.  Soldiers 
to the end, “we shall live in freedom and honor or else find a grave that just men will 
remember and honor.”  Likewise, they would never forget the course of events that 
brought them to the New World in the first place.  “We shall call the site of our colony 
Field of Refuge.  This name, while recalling our reverses, will also remind us of the 
necessity of creating a future, of settling our household gods – in a word, of finding a 
new patrie.”172 
In painting a pathetic portrait of these beleaguered veterans shunned by their 
homeland and forced to seek refuge in a foreign country, Lallemand’s propaganda proved 
useful to French liberals in their opposition to the Bourbon regime.  His themes were 
quickly taken up by the editors of La Minerve Français, the leading liberal journal of the 
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day run by Benjamin Constant.  Since its first incarnation as the Mercure in January 
1817, the journal’s editors had peppered its pages with proud remembrances of imperial 
military glories and manifested a distinct sympathy towards Napoleon’s soldiers, even if 
their attitudes towards Napoleon himself were more ambiguous.173  The Minerve first 
reported on the Texas colony in August 1818, reprinting excerpts from Lallemand’s 
proclamation, and kept its readers apprised of the expedition’s progress in subsequent 
issues.  The Champ d’Asile also provided fertile ground for chansonniers like Béraud and 
the irrepressible Béranger, both of whom were granted space in the pages of the Minerve.  
Unaware that Lallemand and his followers had been chased out of the Champ d’Asile, the 
editors issued calls for recruits and in the fall of 1818 proposed a donation campaign to 
raise funds on behalf of the struggling settlement.  The number of donors swelled from 
the hundreds to the thousands over the next several months, and the campaign succeeded 
in raising just over 95,000 by July 1819.174  Contributions continued to flow in well after 
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regime, although in the case of the Champ d’Asile subscription campaign, says Gonnard, 
they were probably motivated by genuine pity rather than political calculation.   
174 These funds were eventually disbursed to some of the surviving members of the 
Champ d’Asile.  Using the wealthy Louisiana planter J. Noël Destréhan as a liaison, the 
editors of Minerve sent the money to New Orleans, where a committee was formed to 
oversee its distribution.  The committee sought out Charles Lallemand, who, since fleeing 
Galveston, had become a U.S. citizen and settled in New Orleans.  Hesitant at first to 
respond, Lallemand was goaded by Rigau’s public criticisms of his behavior into 
producing the names of the refugees so that the funds could be disbursed.  To repair the 
damage that had been done to his reputation, Lallemand refused his share and the money 
was donated to the parish of St. Louis to help the poor.  Kent Gardien, “Take Pity on Our 
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it was known that the Champ d’Asile had failed, suggesting that at least one of the 
subscribers’ motivations was to send a highly publicized message to the Bourbons 
protesting the reactionary measures of 1815 that had sent these men into exile.175  The 
journal regularly published lists of donors organized by department and city, providing a 
veritable map of political opposition.  
The national subscription campaign was the object of the most contemptuous 
denunciations on the part of Balzac, who in La Rabouilleuse charged the liberal party 
with masterminding the whole disastrous enterprise of the Champ d’Asile as a 
“confidence trick” for their own political gain.  “This incident in the history of Liberalism 
at the time of the Restoration is decisive proof that its interests were entirely self-centered 
and in no way patriotic, and only concerned with power.”  The proposed conquest of 
Texas had every chance of success if only material support had been forthcoming, for 
“today,” as Balzac noted, “Texas is a republic with a bright future ahead of it.”  The 
attempt to raise money on the veterans’ behalf was ultimate proof of the liberals’ 
hypocrisy, designed to mask the fact that they gave up none of their own.  “The Liberal 
leaders were quick to realize that they were doing Louis XVIII’s work for him by sending 
forth from France the glorious remains of the imperial army, and they abandoned the 
most loyal, keen and enthusiastic of the men, those who came forward first into the 
venture.”176   
                                                                                                                                            
Glory: Men of Champ d’Asile,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 87 (January 1984), 
258-60. 
175 Blaufarb, Bonapartists in the Borderlands, 173-74. 
176 Balzac, The Black Sheep, 59, 63-64.  It should be noted that despite Balzac’s 
unqualified hostility towards the liberal opposition, he was likewise critical of the ultra-
royalist reaction.  In his opinion, Bridau and his fellow members of the Champ d’Asile 
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While there is little evidence that French liberals had anything to do with 
instigating Lallemand’s project, they certainly did not hesitate to make use of its publicity 
as a means of opposing the more reactionary policies of the Restoration.  The 
subscription campaign, suggested Antoine Jay, was an opportunity to set aside hatred and 
factionalism in the spirit of humanity and a common national interest.  Far from their 
native soil as they may be, the refugees in Texas are still French, attached to their 
homeland and their fellow citizens by the common bonds of a shared religion, language, 
and manners.  As such, they deserve the pity of their compatriots, regardless of 
differences in class or political opinions.  Should these tales of privation and hardship not 
suffice to stir pity in the hearts of Frenchmen, it is up to hommes libres, such as himself 
and his fellow editors at the Minerve, to set an example.  Such generosity of spirit was an 
“homage to the virtues of the monarch and the farsighted wisdom of the government,” 
and only those who wanted to protect their “fragile despotism” could possibly take it 
otherwise, said Jay, aiming a subtle dig at the ultraroyalists.177   
Early in 1819, Jay penned another article refuting accusations from the political 
right that the donation drive was motivated purely by political interests.  Even while 
insisting on the purely humanitarian nature of the subscription campaign, Jay nonetheless 
at the same time proved its utility as a political weapon against the ultras.  He skillfully 
framed his rhetoric with reminders of the dark days of 1815, a time when “a simple 
friendly goodbye could be construed as a sign of malevolent intentions and a symptom of 
conspiracy.”  Many citizens lived in fear of arbitrary surveillance, the loss of their 
                                                                                                                                            
were victims of both “the Liberals’ double-dealing and the Bourbons’ relentless 
harassment of the Bonapartists.” 
177 La Minerve Française (Paris: August-October 1818), 348-49. 
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livelihoods, and even physical violence.  Among them were the brave soldiers of the 
Empire, who received nothing in return for their sacrifices but insults and suspicion.  
Eager to drive an ideological wedge between Louis XVIII and the ultraroyalists, Jay 
praised the king in his wisdom and moderation for putting an end to the worst of their 
reactionary excesses.  The ordinance of 5 September 1816, which dissolved the Chambre 
Introuvable and prompted fresh elections that greatly reduced the number of ultraroyalist 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, “saved France from falling in the revolutionary abyss.”  
Public liberty was restored, and citizens no longer feared arbitrary persecutions.  But 
memories of the White Terror were vividly resurrected in 1818 when the French public 
learned of the Champ d’Asile, provoking sympathy for these veterans who remained in 
exile out of fear and alienation.  Their departure in 1815 had hardly been noticed amidst 
the anarchy and confusion that reigned during the White Terror, wrote Jay.  Now that the 
truth of their distress has become known, patriotism and goodwill has prompted citizens 
“whose imagination became enflamed at the very mention of the words glory and liberty” 
to come forth with contributions for their aid.178 
By contrast, the ultras rejoiced in the exiles’ misfortunes; “the men of 1815 hound 
their victims to the very ends of the earth; nothing is sacred to them, even misfortune, and 
they slander those Frenchmen who have been deprived of their patrie…the exile of their 
fellow citizens excites their gaiety, they joke about the proscription, and the distress of 
the unfortunate makes them cry out for joy.”  Jay heaped opprobrium on his opponents, 
singling out the editors of the right-wing journal, Le Conservateur.  If those responsible 
for the reaction of 1815 weren’t so blinded by factionalism, he charged, they would 
                                                
178 La Minerve Française (Paris: February-April 1819), 92-94. 
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recognize that it better served their interests to demonstrate generosity on this occasion.  
It was their responsibility to prove “that a rapprochement was possible between 
themselves and the French people,” instead of blaming others for their isolation while 
repulsing all efforts at reconciliation.  Jay implied that the ultras displayed the most 
outrageous hypocrisy by stirring up memories of the Terror of ’93 and its persecution of 
émigrés, while at the same time seeking to employ the exact same tactics against 
Bonapartists and former revolutionaries in 1815.  “Under a government whose strength 
lies in its constitutionality, we shall henceforth fear neither the Terror of 1793 nor of 
1815.  You insult [the king’s] authority with such odious comparisons, while we honor it 
with our confidence in his respect for laws and for humanity.”179  
Paradoxically, suggested another of the Minerve’s regular contributors, Charles-
Guillaume Étienne, the ultras should have had the most sympathy for the refugees of the 
Champ d’Asile, having themselves suffered the torture of exile and the subsequent joy of 
being reunited with their native land.  But unlike the vast majority of the French people, 
whose generosity and pity has been aroused by the plight of the refugees, the ultras 
remained implacable in their demands for vengeance.  As a consequence, they “malign 
the very government they profess themselves loyal to.”  By contrast, those who inscribed 
their names on the lists of donors rendered proof of “the most honorable confidence in 
[the king’s] authority…that they do not confuse constitutional government with those 
ephemeral authorities who, when they reigned in France, guarded her borders through 
terror and death.”180  
                                                
179 La Minerve Française (Paris: February-April 1819), 94-96. 
180 La Minerve Française (Paris: November 1818-January 1819), 570-71. 
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The rhetoric employed by both Jay and Étienne reflected the liberal opposition’s 
primary strategy during Louis XVIII’s reign, which was to discredit their opponents on 
the right as dangerous reactionaries, while courting the king with repeated professions of 
loyalty to the constitutional regime.181  Throughout the early years of the Restoration, the 
liberal opposition, sensing Louis XVIII’s inclination towards moderation, consistently 
sought to exploit divisions between the king and center-right royalists from the more 
extreme members of the party for their own gain.  Thus, the appeal for aid for the Champ 
d’Asile was publicized as an act of patriotic virtue rather than of subversion, enabling 
them to cast critics of the campaign as self-interested enemies of the nation. 
In publicizing the Champ d’Asile in France, Lallemand’s sympathizers, whether 
journalists or poets or painters, did not rely solely on fanning the flames of political 
passions.  They also employed language and imagery calculated to arouse an emotional 
response over the issue of proscription.  The pity accorded to the exiles of 1815 stands in 
sharp contrast to the vilification of the royalist émigrés of the Revolution, a contrast that 
cannot be explained by differences in political opinion alone.  Semantic clues signaled 
this distinction.  The Bonapartists who left France in the wake of the 1815 reaction were 
referred to as proscrits, bannis or the more neutral exilés, never as émigrés, which 
implied a willingness to leave the patrie.  In emphasizing the involuntary nature of their 
exile, the Bonapartists and their sympathizers turned them into martyrs, victims of 
implacable and hostile forces, and thus worthy of the nation’s pity. 
In an intellectual climate dominated by ideas about the innate qualities of national 
character and the powerfully emotive bonds that existed between individuals and their 
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native soil, exile was widely considered as akin to a state of living death.  The ancients, 
wrote Jay in La Minerve, considered courage in the face of adversity as the noblest of 
qualities.  For them, exile was the worst misfortune that could befall citizens, bound as 
they were to their native land by patriotism and the most intimate relationships.  Should 
circumstances force them from their homeland and sever all civil ties between them, they 
nonetheless maintained the most profound affection for their patrie.  This very same 
spirit of patriotism in exile revered by the ancients, announced Jay, may be found among 
the inhabitants of the Champ d’Asile.  Men of less character and less elevated sentiments 
would doubtless have retaliated against their enemies by slandering France’s reputation 
while begging their daily bread from foreigners.  But Lallemand and his followers, 
recognizing the dishonor implicit in such conduct, have remained noble and loyal even in 
their exile.182   
They had, moreover the noble example of the founders of the American republic 
to follow.  The first English settlers, fleeing religious intolerance in their native land, by 
dint of hard work and perseverance, built flourishing and industrious cities and 
established a new society “where liberty reigns without license…No injurious privilege 
threatens to randomly reward birth rather than merit or virtue; all citizens enjoy the same 
rights and protection of the law; never are private interests elevated over that of the 
common good.”  Likewise, the veterans of the Champ d’Asile are guided by the idea of 
founding a new patrie where they can live in freedom, a principle that sustains them in 
the face of adversity, exhaustion, and boredom.  “You have before you an image of the 
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Seine, and a new patrie that is of your own making.  Pray may she be luckier than the 
other, and never have to suffer the fury of foreign enemies.”183 
These sentiments were echoed in a letter written by one of the Champ d’Asile 
refugees upon his arrival in Texas to his mother in Paris, excerpts of which were 
reprinted in the Minerve.184  In it, he described the Champ d’Asile as a reprieve from 
exile, a happy end to three years of lonely wanderings across Europe that brought him to 
the depths of despair.  Among compatriots, he no longer had to rely on the support of 
foreigners, “the most insufferable torment to my soul.”  Together he and his fellow exiles 
were going to create a new patrie in a land of their choosing, open to all Frenchmen 
“recommended by their probity, their courage, and misfortune.”  There they would “live 
freely, industriously, and peacefully; that is our only ambition.”185 
In June 1819, two exiles recently returned to France, L. Hartmann and Jean-
Baptiste-Auguste Millard, published together the journals they recorded on their journey 
to Texas.186  Both men were soldiers who, bored by the inactivity of civilian life, left 
France in 1817 seeking adventure in America.187  They both saw the Champ d’Asile as an 
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connection with the assassination of the Duc de Berry in February 1820.  He was found 
guilty of conspiring to assassinate the royal family and was sentenced to ten years of 
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escape from idleness, and neither spoke of any overarching Bonapartist plot.  Millard 
shrewdly swore that he was not discontent with the Bourbon regime, “for it was with 
pleasure that I saw the French government consolidate its power amidst the confidence 
and the love of the French people.”  He regarded his voluntary act of exile not as a breach 
of patriotic faith but as a protest against France’s humiliation and submission before the 
Allies, who for twenty-five years had been their most implacable enemies.  Fate having 
doomed their efforts in Texas, they advanced a touching plea for reconciliation between 
the bannis and their native land, appealing to the king to revoke the order of proscription.  
“The paternal heart is an inexhaustible source of the most mild and tender affections, and 
this thought is for us our only consolation.”  Must France be forever divided?  The 
authors exhorted individuals of all political leanings and loyalties to forget the past and 
be reunited with the bannis, “as if we have just come from a long and painful journey.”  It 
is time, they declared, for all French people to reunite under a single leader as a family, 
and to sanction “the return of Frenchmen who have never ceased to be French, for death 
alone, as involuntary as birth, can efface that distinction which no living man could 
willingly renounce.”188   
Borrowing from Lallamand’s own propaganda, these authors also celebrated the 
idealized image of the Champ d’Asile as a bucolic colony of soldier-farmers who have 
beaten their swords into ploughshares.  The concept of the soldat-laboreur, so familiar to 
ancient writers like Cato and Pliny, became commonplace in French thought during the 
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Enlightenment.  Diderot, d’Holbach, Rousseau and others reprised the classical notion 
that peasants, by virtue of their attachment to the petite patrie and daily experience of 
hard labor, were best equipped to withstand the hardships of military service and to 
faithfully defend the fatherland.189  The classical archetype of the soldat-laboreur was 
influential throughout the revolutionary and imperial periods, inspiring various efforts by 
Saint-Just, Jourdan, and Napoleon to create a ready supply of virtuous male citizens 
willing to sacrifice their lives for the patrie.  The idea of the soldat-laboreur gained new 
currency after 1815, when it became widely used as an emblematic reference to the 
Napoleonic war veteran in peacetime.  Tranquil imagery of soldiers tilling the soil found 
in paintings by Vernet and Charlet or songs by Debraux and Béranger intersected with 
liberal efforts to rehabilitate the reputation of the demi-solde by portraying veterans as 
exemplars of civic virtue, unfairly reviled as a threat to the security of the state when they 
should be seen as France’s natural protectors.190  Their historical ideal was Cincinnatus, 
the legendary Roman general who resigned his dictatorship and humbly returned to his 
plow after leading his army to victory against the Aequians, demonstrating his selfless 
devotion to the Republic and lack of personal ambition. 
Friends rather than rivals, “Cincinnatus marches with Achilles.” 191  The farmer 
and the soldier represented two sides of the same civic coin, the one nurturing the 
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homeland while the other defends it, both equally worthy of glory and dignity.  The 
colonists of the Champ d’Asile, too, translated their agricultural enterprises into the more 
familiar idiom of battle.  They found comfort and strength in their memories of past 
glories, finding in the crossing of the Alps or the Danube parallels to their present trials 
and models of courageous behavior.  “[Even] if we here do not have to fight the enemies 
of our country, we shall nonetheless triumph over the elements that wage war upon us, 
and we shall say with pride that for a Frenchman, everything is possible.”  Denied the 
right to serve the patrie on the battlefield, the veterans of the Champ d’Asile sought civic 
virtue in a different kind of labor.  “Our imagination carried us back to our own country, 
and we said with a certain pride that when France learns that her children have settled on 
unknown shores, where, one might say, no man’s footprint has yet been left, she will be 
proud of our efforts to overcome adversity and conquer the rigors of destiny; she will 
recognize that no species of glory is foreign to us, and that these same men who have 
distinguished themselves on the field of battle, gathering innumerable crowns of laurel, 
can also distinguish themselves by their industry.”192  
 
By the end of the decade, the Bourbon regime had relaxed its intransigent stance 
against the “traitors” of the Hundred Days and granted clemency to many individuals on 
the proscription lists, with the exception of the regicides.  General Clausel, for example, 
sentenced to death by a court-martial in 1815, was pardoned in 1820.  He immediately 
left the U.S. and returned to France, where he was reinstated in the army and later 
enjoyed prominence under the July Monarchy.  Praising these acts of royal clemency and 
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justice, the poet Maffre took the occasion to revisit and condemn the climate of 
reactionary vengeance that reigned during the “fatal epoch of 1815.”  What deadly 
calamity could have possibly merited such extreme measures, to wrench citizens from 
their homeland, “to separate France from her bravest defenders, from the arts their most 
illustrious friends, from the Muses their most celebrated infants, and from glory its most 
cherished favorites?”  Like Teucer, Aeneas, and Idomeneus, and other heroes of antiquity 
banished from their homelands, these brave souls set off to found a new kingdom in 
foreign lands.193  Menaced by the “executioner’s ax,” they have gone abroad to “seek a 
new France.”194  Maffre cast Lallemand in the role of a modern Neleus, exhorting his 
companions in exile to forget their misfortunes and reclaim their liberty in a foreign 
land.195   
See these people whom traitors, 
Relentless tyrants, ignominious aggressors 
Have enslaved; long have they suffered themselves to be mastered; 
But now they have broken the iron chains of their oppressors. 
Time, which destroys all, destroys tyranny. 
Liberty is reborn in this happy climate, 
And their masculine virtue is no longer blighted 
By an odious yoke.196 
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Even in the face of adversity, they “maintained that grandeur of spirit that rendered them 
worthy to tread the native soil” of France.  By remaining faithful to the character of bons 
Français, they merited the rewards of royal justice and were able to return home. 
 
Conclusion 
The Champ d’Asile became a symbol of the factionalism that divided the French 
nation under the Second Restoration, a factionalism driven as much by resentment and 
bitterness over the past as it was by differences in principles.  While the administrative 
purges and other measures of the “legal” White Terror could be considered largely as 
pragmatic attempts to ensure loyalty to the regime among the ranks of its civil servants, 
the extralegal reactionary violence in the provinces was clearly motivated by vengeance 
and retribution for the revolutionary past.  The liberal opposition in turn exploited more 
recent memories of imperial military glories and the White Terror of 1815 to portray the 
proscrits as exemplars of patriotic virtue, unfairly persecuted by reactionaries who were 
the real enemies of the state.  The discourse on both sides appeared bound by the terms of 
the past; liberals ridiculed the ultraroyalists for trying to turn the clock back to 1789, 
while Lallemand and his veterans, for their part, were unwilling to accept that the 
Napoleonic saga was over.   
In October 1819, police in Lons-le-Saunier in the Jura seized copies of Béranger’s 
popular song about the Champ d’Asile from a couple of itinerant merchants, one of 
whom was identified as a former soldier.  According to the local prefect, “the 
government’s mild attitudes favoring freedom of the press are not incompatible with wise 
supervision.  I believed it necessary to stop the clandestine distribution of a song that is 
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doubtless of little danger, but which seems to me capable of making a certain impression 
on the multitude – attracting a crowd, recalling memories weakened by the passage of 
time, and which reason makes it imperative to forget…”197 The prefect’s opinions testify 
to the spirit of the sedition laws, which aimed at restraining the pervasive power of 
collective memories to sow the seeds of political discontent.  In policing the distribution 
and display of signes prohibés, Restoration authorities seem to have been troubled less by 
the actual messages conveyed by seditious speech and symbols than by their power to 
revive the memories of what, in their opinion, should be safely confined to the realm of 
history, or oubli.  When news of Napoleon’s death reached France in July 1821, the 
government appeared at first to breathe a proverbial sigh of relief, believing that fate 
would finally achieve what six years of vigilant policing of public opinion could not.  
Their hopes proved in vain, for the myth-makers, refusing to let Napoleon become “un 
personnage historique,” sought and found ever new and inventive ways to insert the past 
into the present.
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Chapter 3 – “Bonaparte n’est plus” 
 
Napoleon’s death on 5 May 1821 furnished the final, requisite elements of 
tragedy and pathos in the making of the Romantic hero.  In stark contrast to the resolute 
and infallible demi-god created by the Neoclassicists, Romantic sensibilities preferred 
more wretched and ultimately more accessible representations of the man after his fall.  
The image that came to dominate the nineteenth-century imagination was that of 
Napoleon alone on St. Helena, shoulders slumped, brooding, gazing out at the empty 
ocean around him, condemned to inaction and endless contemplation of the consequences 
of his own audacity.  In their quest to plumb the extremes of human emotion, Romantic 
artists and writers delighted in exciting pity by embellishing the loneliness of his final 
years and the unceremonious nature of his death – humiliated in his subjection to the 
watchful eyes of his English jailers, deprived of the solace of wife and child, tended to 
only by the handful of faithful friends who had the fortitude to share his exile to the end.  
Chained to his rocky island in the South Atlantic like a modern Prometheus, his captivity 
was seen as the poetic end to a life that had trespassed the normal boundaries of human 
action.198   
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But the full-blown elaboration of the Romantic myth was far in the future, 
awaiting the deft touch of writers and artists like Stendhal, Hugo, and Vernet.  In fact, the 
news appeared to have little immediate effect in France; royalists and the fashionable 
denizens of the Faubourg-Saint-Germain affected an attitude of studied indifference, 
while the attention of the political press was fixed squarely on the vicissitudes of the 
Richelieu ministry, which was caught in the crossfire between liberal and ultraroyalist 
deputies and enjoyed the support of neither.  On 7 July, following a report published in 
the London Courier three days earlier, the Journal des débats announced simply, 
“Bonaparte n’est plus.”  Over the next several days, the Débats continued to reprint 
excerpts from the London papers with relatively dry accounts of Napoleon’s last days, 
but they were largely overshadowed by the more substantial coverage of a particularly 
contentious debate in the Chamber of Deputies over the extension of press censorship.  
But what at first appeared to be an apathetic response was soon belied by the spate of 
funeral odes, elegies and panegyrics that flooded the nouveauté reading market in the 
second half of 1821.  While the self-appointed arbiter of public opinion Talleyrand might 
smugly dismiss Napoleon’s death as a non-event, these writers of these texts invested it 
with great significance in the fevered climate of the royalist reaction that followed in the 
wake of the duc de Berry’s assassination in February 1820.  Taking the occasion to form 
a more or less coherent narrative of the Napoleonic past, they kept that narrative fluid and 
malleable by shaping it to fit various items on the liberal political agenda, be it the 
philhellenist campaign on behalf of Greek nationalists or protests against perceived 
attacks on the sanctity of the constitutional charter.  This narrative also furnished much of 
the evidence for the unsuccessful but nonetheless passionate arguments for reclaiming 
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Napoleon’s body and giving it a proper burial on French soil, arguments which stressed 
the conscious aspects of remembering as a national act of reconnaissance.     
 
In search of “inexorable but impassive truth” 
Despite the Restoration regime’s vigorous policing of public opinion through 
censorship and anti-sedition measures, the second half of the year 1821 witnessed a 
veritable flood of printers’ ink spilled on Napoleon’s life and death, ranging in form from 
the academic-style éloges and oraisons funèbres to epic poems to dialogues des morts.  
In large measure, this impulse to actively remember and honor the dead belongs to the 
long-standing practice of cultivating a cult of “grands hommes,” a tradition of 
encouraging virtue through emulation that accelerated in the final decades of the old 
regime and reached a new pitch during the Revolution with the construction of the 
Panthéon.199  On the whole, however, the writers of these texts aimed not only to 
celebrate Napoleon’s memory, but to evaluate his character and actions, both good and 
bad, in order to determine his place in French history.  In this respect, the corpus of texts 
written in the months immediately after Napoleon’s death shared more in common with 
the particularly republican idea popularized during and after the Terror that citizens had a 
moral responsibility to judge and rank their dead compatriots, grands hommes and 
anonymes alike, on the basis of their civic virtues as a means of promoting social 
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morality.200  Viewing historical narratives as “a critical discourse of truth” in much the 
same way that Napoleon and Las Cases did in the Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, they 
manifested a touching faith in the impartiality of History.201  
Napoleon’s death and the subsequent demands for impartial judgments of his 
character and actions provided an opportunity for political writers to excoriate the bête 
noir of Restoration political culture – esprit de parti, framing their arguments as a 
palliative to the highly polarized climate of opinion regarding France’s recent past that 
perpetuated so many fractures in Restoration politics.  Many writers expressed concern 
that the normal course of postmortem judgment was complicated in the case of Napoleon 
because his physical death had been preceded by his mort civile: “It is not always death 
that finishes the life of great men, and long before 5 May 1821, Napoleon’s destinies 
came to an end on the plains of Waterloo.”  But an excess of political passions on both 
sides, coupled with the rhetorical shackles imposed by the sedition laws and other, more 
covert, means of repressing Napoleonic memories, had hitherto made any sort of attempts 
at objective judgment impossible in the intervening years.  Even now, that excess of 
passions made it impossible to hear “the language of inexorable but impassive truth,” 
warned the poet Louis Belmontet.202  Nonetheless, many writers were optimistic that his 
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natural death would bring an end to the interminable bickering over the past and pave the 
way for a balanced and honest assessment of the Napoleonic era.  
At times this search for “inexorable but impassive truth” took some imaginative 
detours.  His eulogizers often adopted the trope of apotheosis, painting fanciful depictions 
of some Elysian realm where he was called upon by some celestial court to recount his 
merits before being obsequiously received into an illustrious pantheon of immortals. The 
result was a series of dialogues between the dead so inventive they bordered on the 
risible.  In one version of Napoleon’s welcome to the Elysian Fields, Napoleon 
encountered Alexander, Caesar, Pompey, Augustus, Charlemagne, Charles XII, Peter the 
Great, and Frederick of Prussia, in the midst of a heated debate as to which of them was 
the greatest warrior.  Upon seeing the newcomer, they exclaimed in unison, “this one did 
more than all of us put together!”203  This device was useful for several reasons.  First, it 
removed the potentially contentious task of judging the dead and turned it over to some 
immortal whose capacity for impartiality was unimpeachable, whether the denizens of 
Olympus, the illustrious souls of those long dead, or the muse Clio herself.  Secondly, it 
was a means of anticipating the “jugement de l’histoire” by elevating him to the status of 
already recognized grands hommes, and thus forestalling any argument on the matter.  
For one anonymous writer, impartiality was a means of asserting personal control 
over the impersonal forces of history; “it is we who should prepare the judgment of 
history, and the different faces under which we envisage it will one day illuminate the 
final truth.”204  But this demand for impartiality can also be traced, in part, to a subtle 
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generational shift in the construction of the Napoleonic myth that manifested itself in the 
discourse of 1821.  Many of these writers were members of what Alan Spitzer has called 
the “generation of 1820,” the children of the Revolution.  Born between 1792 and 1803, 
their “collective trauma” and defining moment was not the fall of the Bourbon monarchy 
or the Terror but the defeat at Waterloo and collapse of the Empire in 1815.  Neither 
bohemians nor dandies, they distinguished themselves by their grave demeanor and high 
moral tone, shaped by a distinct sense of collective responsibility for shaping the nation’s 
future. 205  They claimed impartiality in their attitudes towards Napoleon, not on the basis 
of their past politics like the vieux républicains of the Hundred Days, but by virtue of 
their relative youth: “Free from partiality, because I was too young to have served he 
whom every good Frenchman should pity and mourn, I will state my thoughts frankly.  I 
seek the truth that one almost always finds among the general opinion.”206 
Albin Thourel manifested this hankering for impartiality among the younger 
generation.  Born at Montpellier in 1800, Thourel was a lawyer by profession and a 
writer by inclination.  In the mid-1820’s, he expatriated to Brussels where he worked for 
a local journal, Manneken, and later relocated to Geneva, where he was inspired to 
publish a two-volume work celebrating the historical progress of the city’s civil, political, 
and religious institutions.207  By the 1840’s, Thourel had returned to France and settled in 
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Marseilles, where he was elected to the Academy of Sciences, Letters, and Arts under the 
Second Empire.  In 1821, while still a law student, Thourel published a short essay titled, 
Les accens de la liberté au tombeau de Napoléon, which illustrates the rationale by which 
young men of a liberal persuasion under the Restoration were able to accommodate the 
Napoleonic myth.  Yes, we who were “educated at the school of Liberty” lament 
Napoleon’s death, said Thourel, because the passing of an unhappy hero merits our tears.  
But, he cautioned, we should not forget that Napoleon also betrayed the Revolution by 
pardoning the émigrés and reestablishing the nobility as a distinct social caste, 
extinguishing political liberties, and institutionalizing despotism.  It was only as a general 
that Napoleon merited the designation of “grand,” for under his reign, France triumphed 
over all her adversaries, courage was rewarded, and the brave defenders of the patrie, 
honor, and glory were never reduced to beggary.  Thus, Frenchmen should “weep for the 
proscribed, dying in a foreign land; [weep] for an exiled hero, banished from the land he 
defended for twenty years.  But brand the tyrant, who never shed a single tear over the 
tomb of Liberty, with the crime of parricide.”  Napoleon’s soldiers could mourn his 
passing without shame, provided they recognized “that it was to satisfy the ambition of a 
single man, and not for the interests of France, that they marched into combat so many 
times.”208 
André-François de Carrion-Nisas proposed an even more concrete distinction in a 
pamphlet titled, Bonaparte et Napoléon, parallèle.  His father was a cavalry officer who 
had attended military school at Brienne with the young Napoleon, supported his rise to 
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power and took part in numerous campaigns, giving final proof of his devotion by 
rallying to the emperor during the Hundred Days.  Born in 1794, Carrion-Nisas fils was 
far more left-leaning than his father and adopted republican principles from a young age, 
which he warmly espoused in a prolific body of writings during the Restoration.  
Disappointed by the outcome of the July Revolution, he sought election to the Chamber 
of Deputies as a radical candidate several times under the Orléans monarchy without 
success.  The Revolution of 1848 and short-lived Second Republic finally secured him a 
place in the National Assembly, where he took his place on the extreme left and 
maintained staunch opposition against the prince-president, Louis-Napoleon.   
Like many of his fellow political writers, Carrion-Nisas took Napoleon’s death as 
an occasion to advance his version of history’s judgment of the grand homme.  Two men, 
he announced, died on 5 May 1821 – Bonaparte and Napoleon, the former having given 
way to the latter on 2 December 1804, the day of the imperial coronation.  Bonaparte, as 
First Consul of the French Republic, delivered his country from anarchy and governed by 
rule of law.  Napoleon, on the other hand, found it necessary to deprive the country of 
liberty in order to restore monarchy.  Bonaparte respected his revolutionary heritage and 
all of its principles, and equality above all, while Napoleon himself unleashed the forces 
of Counter-Revolution by resurrecting the noble class with its attendant privileges.  The 
Concordat with the papacy was Bonaparte’s sole mistake; Napoleon compounded the 
error by allowing his reign to be sanctified by the pope and delivering education back 
into the hands of the Jesuits.  Both, he admitted, were the greatest military commanders 
of all ages and reveled in the art of war.  Bonaparte, however, went to war only in 
defense of France and the Revolution against their common enemies.  Napoleon, on the 
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other hand, often (but not always) the aggressor, compromised both the Revolution and 
France by going to war solely in the interests of glory.  The former, moreover, contented 
himself with overthrowing the decrepit monarchies of the Old Regime and establishing 
republics in their stead; the latter flattered himself by allying himself with the old 
aristocracies and fancied himself a kingmaker.  The ultimate proof, argued Carrion-Nisas, 
that Bonaparte was greater than Napoleon lay in the fate of France against her enemies – 
Bonaparte, in defense of liberty, was invincible and no single coalition could defeat him.  
Napoleon, by contrast, reigning over an enslaved people, met his end in ignominious 
defeat and left France at the mercy of invading hordes of foreign armies.  Thus, he 
concluded, that while one might admire Napoleon, one could admire and mourn only 
Bonaparte.  The name Napoleon was destined for great renown, but only Bonaparte could 
truly be considered a great man, for he was a patriot, while Napoleon was only a 
sovereign.209 
Just as fears of another allied invasion caused even the most skeptical “vieux 
républicains” during and after the Hundred Days to forgive Napoleon his past 
transgressions, so his death in 1821, which served as a guarantee against another return to 
imperial despotism, freed these liberals of a new generation to absolve him of his sins.  
One writer summed up the prevailing sentiment succinctly: “without a doubt he had 
faults…but these faults were entirely erased by the good that he did and by his glory.”  
Napoleon’s achievements covered a multitude of sins; ambitious though he was, the 
indisputable fact remained that “France under his reign assumed the first rank among all 
nations on earth, whereas now…”  Leaving the thought unfinished, the writer poignantly 
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alluded to the sad contrast afforded by France’s much diminished prestige under the 
Restoration.210  Another writer, who identified himself only as an officer in the imperial 
armies, freely reproached Napoleon, “audacious conqueror of our liberty,” for destroying 
the republic.  “But misfortune crowns his head, and spreads a touching charm upon its 
glory.  I become his friend, I will be his poet; he has ceased to be powerful.”211  Having 
been finally stripped of his power by the great equalizer, Napoleon ceased to be a threat, 
paving a path towards reconciliation and acceptance of a divisive national past.  
 
“Quel roman que ma vie!”212 
These impulses to actively remember and judge the dead produced a sort of meta-
narrative of Napoleonic history that coalesced in the months immediately following his 
death in May 1821.  Whereas the needs of oppositional politics had created numerous 
occasions for remembering specific aspects of the Napoleonic past at various times since 
the emperor’s first abdication – the rise of the myth of the liberal emperor in 1815, for 
example, or the glorification of imperial military service in response to the White Terror 
– Napoleon’s death provided the first real impetus to put it all together in one totalizing 
narrative, to impose order and coherence on those memories as a meaningful story about 
France’s recent past.  The highly formulaic nature of that narrative, moreover, suggests 
that these writers constituted something of a definable literary community, actively 
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engaged in reading each other’s works and borrowing freely from one another.213  The 
result was a series of recurring and sometimes contradictory images of Napoleon, seen 
alternately as a legislator and a warrior, a conqueror and a champion of liberty and 
national self-determination, the son of the Revolution and a mediator between the Old 
Regime past and the post-revolutionary present, the savior of France and finally, a 
martyr. 
Despite Napoleon’s efforts to erase his revolutionary heritage from the minds of 
his contemporaries in order to legitimize the founding of the empire, the myth-makers 
preferred an alternate myth of origin that more firmly rooted his origins in the 
revolutionary élan of 1789.  Whereas opponents like Chateaubriand and de Staël 
questioned his right to rule France because of his foreign birth, these writers, on the 
contrary, celebrated his Corsican heritage because it identified him with the universal 
struggle for liberty that defined the second half of the eighteenth century.  (The cause of 
Corsican independence, after all, had merited the attention of Rousseau himself, 
rendering Napoleon’s revolutionary credentials unimpeachable.)  Turning his humble 
origins to his advantage, they narrated his meteoric rise to power as a foil to the 
reactionary regime of privilege resurrected by the Restoration.  Rising through the ranks 
by virtue of merit rather than birthright, his early career as an artillery officer also 
exemplified the meritocratic ideals of the Revolution.  Baptized by fire amidst the sacred 
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combats of the republican armies, he assured himself of the loyalty of his soldiers and 
shielded himself from jealousy on the part of his fellow officers, who were proud to serve 
someone born of their own ranks.214  
The year 1799 marked the first truly pivotal moment in this narrative, when 
Napoleon miraculously emerged from the depths of Egypt to restore order in France.  
France was seen as poised on the edge of an abyss, threatening to engulf the entire nation 
in the horrors of full-fledged civil war.  The Directory government was widely reviled as 
corrupt and ineffectual, unable to fend off assaults on its authority from either the 
royalists or the Jacobins and utterly discredited by its reliance on military strongmen.  
“France was plunged in the chaos of anarchy; no religion, no order in administration.  
Worse still, no finances – its coffers were denuded by the depredations of various heads 
of state who so rapidly succeeded one another.”215  Domestic instability, in turn, 
threatened to undermine the hard-fought victories won by the armies of the First 
Republic.  Taking advantage of France’s turmoil at home, coalition forces launched a 
concerted effort to reverse the revolutionary tide and recapture lost ground in the 
Rhineland and Italy.  Their success made an invasion of France itself appear imminent, 
and the failure of so many French commanders to contain the threat reinforced popular 
beliefs that only General Bonaparte could save the Revolution from its enemies, both at 
home and abroad.216  In this context, Napoleon’s unexpected return from Egypt in 
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October 1799 seemed like a miracle; braving both the forces of nature and the watchful 
eye of the English navy that patrolled the Mediterranean, Napoleon slipped away in the 
dead of night, and, guided by destiny, was safely deposited on the shores of his native 
land so that he might rescue the nation from the threat of counter-revolution.217  Thus was 
born the myth of the Savior,218 which was strong enough to insulate his reputation from 
the potentially damaging effects of the disastrous defeat at Aboukir Bay, the fact that he 
had just abandoned his command, even the rather embarrassing rumors circulating about 
his marriage – all of which paled in comparison with the evils from which he was 
expected to deliver the French nation. 
The years immediately following the coup d’état of 18 Brumaire helped to create 
an image of Napoleon as a mediator between France’s past and present, an image that he 
deliberately encouraged by pursuing policies of moderation and reconciliation during the 
Consulate.  Having saved France from the threat of counter-revolution posed by the 
Republic’s enemies both within and abroad, his task was now to ensure that those threats 
never reared their heads again, not by radicalizing the Revolution in the manner of his 
Jacobin predecessors, but, intuitively responding to the wishes of a nation exhausted by 
ten years of bloodshed and turmoil, by healing France’s breach with its pre-revolutionary 
past.  These writers, having to contend with the parallel image of Napoleon as the 
Revolution’s ideological heir, worked diligently to establish how he was able to do so 
without fundamentally violating the principles of 1789.  For example, the narrative 
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praised him for resurrecting two of the Revolution’s heaviest casualties – religion and the 
social order – while modifying them to suit the post-revolutionary order.   The genius of 
the Concordat of 1801 was that it satisfied the wishes of the French people in re-
legitimizing an “exiled religion,” while securing the papacy’s recognition of the sale of 
church lands and state-sponsored salaries for clergy.  Likewise, the Napoleonic system of 
social distinction, first introduced in the Legion of Honor and later the imperial nobility, 
proved palatable because it was based, theoretically at least, on the principle of merit.  
The general amnesty of 1802 also figured prominently if implicitly in this narrative, for 
Napoleon’s gestures of rapprochement towards the émigrés, who were welcomed back to 
the “pays natal” without fear of further retribution, earned specific praise.219  
Meanwhile, Napoleon induced the Republic’s enemies one by one to conclude a 
favorable peace, and the treaties that ended the Second Coalition freed him to turn his 
attention to France’s internal organization.  Consequently, “he reestablished financial 
order, purged the administration of all its vices, and drafted those immortal codes upon 
which the welfare of peoples are founded.”220  Napoleon’s accession to power marked the 
return of domestic peace and general prosperity, and, as a mark of their gratitude, the 
French “bestowed” upon him the title of Emperor.221  Thus commenced the golden age of 
the Empire.  “The perfect tranquility which France enjoyed abroad allowed domestic 
commerce to flourish.  The banks of the Seine became the patrie of the sciences and 
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beaux-arts, and agriculture doubled its production.  Everywhere new ports, roads, and 
canals rendered communication and exchange easier and more active.  Industry achieved 
such a degree of perfection that France had no rival in any sector.”  Finances naturally 
benefited from the “subsidies” that subdued nations willingly relinquished to France.  
“Never was France greater, richer, or happier than during this memorable period.”222  
These writers celebrated his commitment to public works, ranging from the utilitarian to 
the ornamental, making Paris “the modern Athens/Under this modern Pericles.”223  
Contrary to much historical opinion, which characterizes the imperial era as a particularly 
sterile one in terms of cultural and intellectual activity, the myth-makers vigorously 
maintained that both the arts and sciences flourished under his benefaction.  Himself a 
member of the Institut de France, they argued, he was motivated by both a natural 
inclination and a desire to restore France to her rightful place as the center of European 
civilization.   
Not surprisingly, Napoleon’s audacity, strategic genius, and unparalleled exploits 
on the battlefield formed the centerpiece of this narrative.  The past 2,500 years of human 
history, opined one anonymous writer, boasted only perhaps fifty memorable battles 
fought by forty memorable names; Napoleon accomplished far more in the space of only 
sixteen years.224  “Every day of his life was a whole century’s worth of glory.”225  Even 
after raising himself to the highest ranks on the basis of his own merits, Napoleon 
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retained the virtues of a simple soldier: “He was valiant and never feared death, hoping 
always to expire on the field on battle.”226  He thus secured for himself the undying 
loyalty of his troops, while also wringing admiration, however grudging, from his 
vanquished foes, to whom he was always generous and noble in his conduct.  But the 
authors of this narrative were equally disposed to celebrate his civil legacy, although in 
this respect, their enthusiasm tended to be tempered by acknowledgments of the 
emperor’s more despotic qualities.  Ultimately, however, the ends justified the means for 
most of these writers.  For example, the poet Belmontet argued that although the penal 
code was unjust, the Empire’s body of civil legislation was nonetheless an indisputably 
commendable achievement.  Napoleon may have wielded and even abused an absolute 
power, but France thereby reaped the benefits of a public administration that improved 
infrastructure and public works.  Despite the errors of the Continental System, Napoleon 
did much to encourage domestic commerce and industry.227  He was praised for 
balancing the sword with scepter, patiently attending to the most minute details of 
statecraft and administration with the same penetrating eye with which he surveyed the 
field of battle.228  Branding him a modern Justinian, they viewed the Code Napoléon as 
his crowning achievement in the civil sphere, a testament to his genius so certain that it 
outlasted the empire itself.229 
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As proof of their impartiality, many of his apologists conceded that great as he 
was, Napoleon was still only human, and as such, imperfect.230  Stubbornly adhering to 
the argument that those who owed him most deserted him first, they reserved the right to 
absolve him of final responsibility for France’s humiliation by attributing his reversals in 
fortune to betrayal and intrigue on the part of his officers, bureaucrats, and even his 
family.  Nonetheless, they were willing to admit, at the very least, that he rendered 
himself vulnerable to these machinations by a few crucial errors.  Unanimously they 
agreed that the execution of the duc d’Enghien was a singular stain upon his honor.  
(Nonetheless, hinted one author, the murder of Clitus didn’t prevent Montesquieu from 
praising Alexander.231)  Even more disastrous in terms of consequences were the ill-
timed and ill-conceived invasion of Spain, which proved ruinous to France’s finances as 
well as her armies, and, of course, the cataclysmic Russian campaign.232 Above all, 
however, Napoleon was guilty of “forgetting that a free people always knows how to 
defend its rights, but the enslaved have nothing to defend,” which proved to be his most 
costly mistake of all.233  With the Allies at the gates of Paris, he found himself unable to 
rekindle the sacred fires of patriotism in the French people that he had himself 
extinguished by arrogating for himself increasingly dictatorial powers as the imperial era 
progressed, depriving himself of the support necessary to wage a successful campaign for 
the defense of France in 1814.   
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Nonetheless, the myth-makers were able to transform Napoleon’s first abdication 
in April 1814 into the second pivotal moment in the making of a savior, who chose to 
sacrifice himself for the good of the nation rather than continue to prosecute a war simply 
to save his own throne.  To those who charged Napoleon with incessant warmongering to 
satisfy his own ambition and self-aggrandizement, his apologists insisted instead on his 
innate pacifism.  Provoked by the agents of counter-revolution, they argued, he went to 
war only to secure an honorable peace that would ensure the welfare of France.234  Thus, 
in 1814, Napoleon chose to risk it all on the field of battle and ultimately to abdicate 
rather than sign a treaty that would shame France by truncating her borders and besmirch 
the memory of those brave soldiers who sacrificed their lives in her defense.235  The love 
of country that motivated Napoleon’s military exploits thus elevated even his most dismal 
defeats into glorious moments unparalleled in the annals of history.  France had no cause 
to reproach the emperor for her recent misfortunes, for he “raised her to the highest 
degree of glory and splendor, made all of Europe fear and revere the name French, and 
when he could no more good for her sake, immolated himself for her happiness and 
tranquility.”236  Hidden between the lines of this didactic tale of the patriotic sovereign 
was an implicit rebuke to the Bourbons for having consented to France’s humiliation in 
the treaties of 1814-15 in order to regain the throne.  
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In March 1815 commenced the final, albeit miscarried, moment in the making of 
a savior.  From his exile’s roost on the island of Elba, Napoleon “observed this same 
Europe that his abdication was supposed to have rendered tranquil and, judging by the 
proceedings of the Congress of Vienna, concluded that this tranquility was an illusion.  
He saw France divided, torn to pieces by her own children.”  Believing that he might be 
of service to the nation, he embarked on a daring act of escape, without thinking of the 
possible dangers to himself. 237  Thus, the “flight of the Eagle” was narrated as an act of 
disinterested heroism, rather than a desperate attempt to escape oblivion and boredom.  
He returned from Elba, moreover, a changed man; having learned the error of his ways, 
he renounced his former autocratic tendencies and committed himself wholeheartedly to 
the project of liberal reform.  Hunted relentlessly by a vengeful coalition of reactionary 
kings, Napoleon waged one final battle not for conquest but as a bid for France’s 
independence, to force Europe to cease meddling in France’s domestic affairs.  “A single 
battle would have changed the face of Europe again, but a single battle destroyed all his 
projects and hopes.”  Denied an honorable death on the field of battle, Napoleon “bid 
France goodbye forever,” and placed his fate in the hands of his enemies. 238 
The six-year drama that played out on the island of St. Helena furnished the final 
and pathetic image of Napoleon as a martyr.  The myth-makers employed the face-saving 
tactic of attributing his final defeat to betrayals rather than any misstep on his part – 
betrayed by those whom he had showered with gifts and rewards, betrayed, too, by 
perfidious Albion, on whose mercy he had thrown himself.  Gradually abandoned even 
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by those who elected to share his exile, who one by one found pretext to return to Europe, 
his English “gaoler,” Sir Hudson Lowe, compounded his isolation by ruthlessly censoring 
Napoleon’s contact with the outside world.  Among the little band of exiles who 
accompanied Napoleon to St. Helena, comte Henri-Gratien Bertrand cut the most 
sympathetic figure, the faithful friend and brother-in-arms who tended to the emperor 
until the bitter end.239  The myth-makers recreated what they imagined to be his simple 
existence on the island, making much of his intellectual labors in dictating his memoirs, 
which offered a welcome distraction from the pains of separation from a beloved wife 
and child.  Although he had lost an empire, he remained hard-working and diligent to the 
end, applying himself to the chronicles of his history with the same rigor he had deployed 
in making it.240  His last words – “France…the army…head of the army…Josephine” – 
were often repeated, although seldom accurately, embellished and elaborated to create the 
impression of a selfless patriotism unabated even in his final anguish. 
Napoleon’s martyrdom on St. Helena also reinforced the most tenuous of mythic 
claims, which posed the emperor in the role of liberator of oppressed peoples and early 
champion of nationalism.  This image proved to be of great political utility as the 
nineteenth century progressed, exploited first by various political groups in opposition to 
the foreign policies of the Restoration and July Monarchy, and later by Napoleon III.  
Imagined as a fellow victim of the Holy Alliance and the forces of counter-revolution, 
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Napoleon was recast in the mold of friend and ally to the very people he had conquered.  
The Italian campaigns of 1796-99 were of enormous significance in this regard; not only 
did they give him occasion to prove his strategic genius, but as endeavors to free the 
descendants of the Romans from the jackboot of Austria they also cemented his 
revolutionary credentials.241  Often at pains to plausibly interpret his subsequent 
campaigns as wars of liberation rather than conquest (although they certainly tried, 
especially in the case of the Rhineland and Spain), these writers nonetheless found ample 
justification for their arguments in the later years of his history, when the tide turned 
against him and the vanquished became the victors.  The campaign of France in 1814, the 
disastrous defeat at Waterloo, and his subsequent persecution on St. Helena all reinforced 
Napoleon’s mythic image as defender of universal revolution against the reactionary 
despots of old Europe, and this image, more than anything else, was responsible for 
ensuring Napoleon’s continued relevance in political culture as the nineteenth century 
progressed. 
 Thus the ur-myth of Napoleonic history assumed its conventional form in the 
months immediately following his death in 1821.  Rendered familiar and even hackneyed 
by endless repetition ever since, there are nonetheless two salient points about its 
evolution that are often overlooked, the first being the timing of its development.  All too 
often, the Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène is given the lion’s share of the credit for creating 
this meta-narrative of Napoleonic history, especially by scholars who prefer to view the 
myth as something that was imposed by Napoleon and his faithful scribes upon a largely 
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passive and naïve audience.242  While the Mémorial certainly proved to be of much more 
far-reaching and long-lasting influence than these ephemeral and often anonymous 
oeuvres de circonstance, the latter provide evidence that this narrative developed at least 
parallel to Napoleon’s own attempts to narrate his past, and figured prominently in 
French political discourse well before the first publication of Las Cases’ text in 1823.  
Secondly, developing out of the impulse to impose order on the flood of memories 
occasioned by Napoleon’s death, this narrative was sustained by its proven utility in the 
political sphere as a potent weapon in the liberal opposition’s arsenal. 
 
“Victims of tyrants” 
In his Mémoires d’outre-tombe, Chateaubriand perceptively observed that 
Napoleon posed a greater danger dead than he had while still alive: “The world belongs 
to Bonaparte.  What the destroyer could not manage to conquer, his fame has succeeded 
in usurping.  Living, he lost the world; dead, he possesses it.”243  Those who hoped that 
his death would sap Napoleonic memories of their vitality and finally assure the security 
of the Bourbon regime were sadly disappointed.244  On the contrary, members of the 
liberal opposition could henceforth exploit the Napoleonic past for political purposes 
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without any real danger of precipitating another imperial restoration, for l’Aiglon was as 
yet a boy of ten and a virtual prisoner at the court of his maternal grandfather, while 
Louis-Napoleon could not present himself as a serious candidate for imperial pretender 
while Napoleon’s son still lived.  His death thus eased the conscience of those liberals 
and republicans who collaborated with Bonapartists in opposing the Bourbon regime, 
facilitating further cooperation among the three groups.245  In fact, the ephemeral 
literature published in the second half of 1821 suggests that Napoleon was even more 
useful to the liberals now that he was deceased; no longer an active participant in the 
creation of the Napoleonic myth, he was more easily molded to their particular political 
needs.  The Napoleonic past proved itself especially adaptable to two of the most 
pressing issues on the liberal agenda in the early 1820s – the Greek struggle for 
independence from the Ottoman Empire and the urgent need for an opposition revanche 
in the wake of the royalist reaction of 1820. 
The mythic account of Napoleon as a liberator of oppressed peoples was a 
cornerstone of the narrative woven by the emperor himself in the memoirs penned in 
exile on St. Helena.  Appropriating for himself the role of prophet of liberty, Napoleon 
reversed his previous ambivalence towards his revolutionary heritage and enthusiastically 
posed as heir to the principles of 1789, who resorted to despotic measures only in order to 
prevent France from falling into the abyss of anarchy and civil war.  The Napoleonic 
Wars were refashioned into an act of self-defense against reactionary impulses rather than 
unbridled imperial ambition – Napoleon’s ultimate design, in this version of the myth, 
was a federated Europe composed of free and independent states governed according to 
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liberal principles.  Yet even before the Memorial of Saint-Helena appeared in print for 
the first time in 1823, a similar narrative of Napoleonic history was developing in French 
political discourse, first surfacing during the Hundred Days and crystallizing in the 
months following his death in 1821.  The return of the Bourbons and the triumph of the 
old order cast Napoleon in a new light; his despotic excesses seemed to pale in 
comparison with what was seen as the revival of pre-revolutionary feudalism, while the 
Restoration’s passivity in foreign affairs gave the French cause to re-evaluate and 
appreciate the Empire’s militant attitudes.  In his captivity he became a martyr at the 
hands of the Holy Alliance, and Napoleon’s aggressive and belligerent foreign policy, 
from Italy to Spain to Poland, was re-translated as a crusade against old regime tyranny.  
In short, the Holy Alliance having become the bogeyman of French liberals, Napoleon’s 
numerous campaigns against the crowned heads of Europe gave him impeccable 
credentials as a symbol of nationalist revolutionary fervor.   
This image of Napoleon gained fresh impetus in the 1820s and early 30s, as 
liberal movements and nationalist aspirations reared their heads throughout Europe and 
provoked a swift response from the great powers.  The Troppau Protocol of 1820 left no 
doubt as to the reactionary character of the Holy Alliance: drawn up by Austria, Prussia, 
and Russia, it pledged their collective intervention by armed force in the internal affairs 
of any state which dared to threaten the peace of Europe (or the monarchical status quo) 
by revolutionary activity.  Liberal and nationalist movements in Naples, Spain, and 
elsewhere appealed to the sympathies of the French left, for whom the nation’s 
revolutionary heritage made it the natural standard-bearer of any struggle against tyranny.  
Roughly coinciding with these events, Napoleon’s death prompted reflections on his 
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revolutionary heritage, encouraging opposition political writers to wield his name as a 
battle call in the crusade against the resurgent forces of old regime despotism.  The 
crowned heads of Europe might profit from this lesson, suggested one anonymous writer; 
“Let the oppressors of peoples tremble in considering the fall of the great Napoleon, he 
who was always a friend and father to his own people, and never their master!”  The 
members of the Holy Alliance had long held both Napoleon and the people of Europe in 
bondage, but “death freed the emperor from his chains, and our grief will free us from 
ours!”246  
The year 1821 also witnessed the opening salvos in the Greek War of 
Independence.  In February of that year, the Danubian prince Alexander Ypsilantis 
coordinated the first revolts against Turkish rule, precipitating a major uprising in the 
Morea.  News of the insurrection and subsequent Ottoman retaliation rocked the congress 
of European powers meeting at Laibach and accentuated the growing rift within the 
Alliance over the Troppau Protocol, which had been issued without the formal assent of 
either Great Britain or France.  But more pressing concerns such as the resolution of 
Neapolitan affairs and the escalating conflict in Spain diverted foreign policy away from 
Greece for the time being, and France did not formally engage in the war until 1827.  
Nonetheless, philhellenism remained conspicuous in French political discourse, 
transcending to some degree the usual partisan divisions between right and left.  Greek 
antiquity exerted a strong grip on the French imagination, and allusions to the proud 
heroes of the Persian Wars or the Athenian golden age elicited strong sympathies on 
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behalf of the “classical land of liberty and the arts.”247  Moreover, Christian sensibilities 
were outraged by the idea that this cradle of European civilization should be held in 
bondage by the heretical Turks, and the struggle was easily cast as a holy war that 
demanded the support of the whole of Christendom.  But as a nationalist revolution 
against despotic foreign rule, the Greek war was especially calculated to win sympathy 
among liberals.  They constituted a majority in the nominally apolitical Philhellenic 
Committee, formed in 1824, whose philanthropic activities eventually ceded importance 
to the political objectives of advocating revolutionary tactics among the Greeks and a 
more aggressive foreign policy for France.  Its membership boasted some of the most 
recognizable names of the day, including Chateaubriand, Constant, the duc de Broglie, 
the banker Lafitte, and even Napoleon’s faithful amanuensis, Emmanuel de Las Cases.  
For the liberals, eviscerated in the elections of 1824, the committee provided a vital outlet 
for public organization as well as potent means of opposition against the right-wing 
Villèle ministry.248   
Frustrated with the government’s unwillingness to commit itself to the Greek 
cause, liberal writers tried to shame the deputies into action by appealing to their pride in 
the revolutionary past: 
“Oh France! what have you done with your brave soldiers? 
When your heart is bound, your arms are immobile; 
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You want to see Greece free, but you do nothing to avenge her! 
When the sons of Tyrtaeus and Leonidas, 
Lay dying upon the smoldering remains of a patrie in ashes, 
And sigh out a touching appeal to magnanimous hearts, 
You fly not to their aid, 
You offer them nothing but tears!249   
Some of the more inventive liberal political writers were also quick to harness the 
Napoleonic past, which the emperor’s recent death had returned to the forefront of 
political discourse, to this cause célèbre, once again proving the extraordinary plasticity 
of the Napoleonic myth.  At first glance, the association appears highly unlikely, having 
little basis in historical events.  Although Napoleon’s seizure of the Ionian Islands from 
Venice in 1797 fostered hopes that the French Republic might do for Greece what she 
had done for Belgium and Italy, these hopes were largely extinguished after the Egyptian 
expedition ended in failure, becoming ever more remote as the Napoleonic saga assumed 
its increasingly imperialist character.  Nonetheless, liberal political writers found ample 
justification in the mythic narrative of Napoleonic history that celebrated the late emperor 
as the son of revolution and a champion of nationalist revolt against the reactionary 
forces of the old regime.   
This paradoxical relationship between the imperial conqueror and Greek 
nationalism articulated itself in a curious and anonymous piece titled L’apparition de 
Napoléon, ou le songe d’Ypsilanti, in which the would-be hero of the Greek war was 
counseled by the benign ghost of the recently deceased emperor.  Notwithstanding 
Ypsilantis’ service in the Russian cavalry, where he fought against Napoleon’s armies in 
the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, the author of this fantasy imagined the prince to be full 
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of admiration for his former foe: “the image of Napoleon accompanied him everywhere, 
whether he was asleep or in the midst of combat.”  Invoking Napoleon’s name as a god of 
war, a providential dream finally transported him to the island of St. Helena.  Hinting at 
parallels between Ypsilantis’ nationalist fervor and the revolutionary spirit that had fired 
a young General Bonaparte twenty-five years earlier, the writer cast Napoleon as full of 
sympathy for “the unfortunate descendants of Miltiades and Pericles, who, shaking the 
chains of a most frightful despotism, denuded of all resources and sustained only by their 
love of liberty, appreciated the importance of an able general.”  Sounding a distinctly 
Napoleonic note, much of the advice offered by Ypsilantis’ spirit sage concerned strictly 
military matters – the placement of troops, conduct towards prisoners of war, and the 
necessity of establishing an “absolute empire.”  But Napoleon also charged the cabinets 
of Europe with duplicity in their overtures of support for the independence movement 
and set out to unmask their pretensions.  None of the great powers really wanted to see 
the Greek nationalists succeed, he observed; on the contrary, the commercial interests of 
both France and England were wholly antithetical to the establishment of an independent 
Greece.  Cautioning Ypsilantis against placing his hopes for success on the aid and 
intervention of foreign armies, he ought to instead kindle the “spirit of independence” 
native to the people of the Peloponnesian peninsula, for “unfortunate are the peoples who 
require the mediation of foreigners!”250   
This unlikely union between the Napoleonic Myth and Greek nationalism is 
indicative of the process by which political writers shaped and reshaped the past into 
historical narratives that served present objectives.  In and of itself, the language of 
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national independence and patriotic self-reliance in le songe d’Ypsilanti could be read as 
a challenge to the paternalist attitudes enshrined in the Troppau Protocol, formulated in 
response to the revolutionary uprisings in Naples the previous year and which 
philhellenists justly feared might be invoked again to extinguish nationalist hopes in 
Greece.  But issuing from the spirit of the recently deceased Napoleon, it was also meant 
to remind readers who still bristled with resentment over the treaties of 1814-15 of the 
humiliation suffered by France at the end of the imperial era, and in particular of the loss 
of her “natural frontiers.”  Those treaties were, moreover, directly responsible for 
France’s much-deteriorated diplomatic clout, evidenced in the very public snub France 
had recently received during the Troppau negotiations.  Taking the form of a dialogue 
between the son of the French Revolution and a revolutionary hero in the making, this 
sacred language of national autonomy was thus a means of extending the revolutionary 
lineage both temporally, from 1792 through 1815 up through 1821, and spatially, from 
France to Greece, in the hopes of making a strong argument for French intervention on 
the Greeks’ behalf. 
Le songe d’Ypsilanti was one of many mythic texts published in the second half of 
1821 that employed the rhetorical device of a dialogue between the dead and the living.  
This device proved useful to members of the liberal opposition, who could fashion the 
imagined, and hence more pliant, figure of Napoleon into a mouthpiece for their own 
political views.  For the journalist Pierre Barthélemy, Napoleon’s spirit was an especially 
effective weapon against Richelieu’s center-right ministry formed in February 1821.  In 
L’ombre de Napoléon au conseil des ministres, Barthélemy used Napoleon to vilify the 
cabinet members one by one with scathing attacks on both their deeds and character, 
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accusing them of hypocritical posturing as devoted servants of the public good.  Setting 
the scene at midnight, Barthélemy described the council as busy with designs for 
“oppressive legislation, keeping up taxes, preparing snares, fixing the price of certain 
consciences, bribing vile persons; in a word, marking their zeal by great useless acts and 
grand phrases.  By such devotion they produce nothing, and by such noble 
disinterestedness the ministers’ fortunes increase.”  Suddenly, the ghost of Napoleon 
appeared among them, not in the feeble state of a man on his deathbed, but as he was at 
the height of his glory and power.  Barthélemy charged the council with a long list of 
crimes designed, he suggested, to perpetuate France’s state of debasement vis-à-vis the 
rest of Europe.  First and foremost, the ministers were guilty of squandering the benefits 
France had reaped in the realms of commerce and agriculture under the Empire.  “The 
navy is destroyed, the army lacking in discipline and patriotism, public administration 
abandoned to a generation of men for whom it has become their inheritance, the courts 
subordinated to the government, and the spirit of factionalism has taken the place of love 
of country and of national glory.”  He reserved his especial contempt for Richelieu, 
whose long exile and service to the court at St. Petersburg rendered him a stranger in his 
own native land and, in the journalist’s opinion, unfit to occupy the high office with 
which he had been favored.251    
Published in August 1821, Barthélemy’s pamphlet was less about the death of 
Napoleon than it was about the current crisis of the liberal opposition.  Louvel’s 
assassination of the duc de Berry in February 1820 had sparked widespread fears of a 
vast continental liberal conspiracy and precipitated a period of royalist reaction.  Decazes, 
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the prime minister and the king’s favorite, a moderate royalist but long suspected by the 
ultras of liberal sympathies, made a convenient scapegoat.  Long the bête noir of the 
right, they now accused him of facilitating the plot and finally succeeded in forcing his 
resignation.  A new ministry formed under Richelieu, who swiftly proposed a number of 
legislative measures, known as the “exceptional laws,” intended to insulate the Bourbon 
regime from further attacks on its authority.  Passed on 30 March, a stringent press 
censorship law, introduced by Decazes himself in a last-ditch effort to deflect charges of 
complicity in Louvel’s crime, effectively muzzled the opposition press.  Journals and 
periodicals of a political nature, whether they appeared regularly or not, were now subject 
to the authorization of both the king and a censorship committee before each issue could 
be printed.  Penalties for unauthorized publication ranged from fines and imprisonment to 
suppression of the journal.  Despite the Parisian committee’s attempts at impartiality, it 
was the liberal journals and provincial press that suffered most heavily, with La Minerve 
and the Bibliothèque historique ceasing publication entirely.252  Paired with the second 
exceptional law that expanded police powers to arrest and detain without trial anyone 
suspected of threatening the security of the state or royal family for up to three months, 
these measures testified to the regime’s continued willingness to maintain public order by 
policing opinion. 
These infringements on freedom of the press generated a furious debate that 
would only be rivaled by the even more contentious electoral reform law introduced in 
May 1820, and continued well into the summer of 1821 when the deputies were asked to 
consider extending the term of the law.  To members of the liberal opposition, the 
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reintroduction of press censorship was but the latest proof that their hard-fought 
constitutional guarantees were being steadily eroded by the regime’s inevitable drift 
towards the absolutist creed of its pre-revolutionary ancestors.  According to one writer’s 
calculations, “in the seven years since the Charter’s inauguration, France has enjoyed 
only 10 months of liberty of the press, without which exists neither public liberty nor 
constitutional government.”253  News of Napoleon’s death opportunely coincided with 
this debate, and some of its most impassioned speeches appeared right alongside reports 
on the emperor’s demise in the Journal des débats.  The coincidence suggested parallels 
in some liberal minds between these two victims of absolutism – freedom of the press 
and the martyr of St. Helena, despite the fact that Napoleon had done more to destroy that 
freedom than the Bourbons. 
The left also suffered heavy electoral losses in November 1820 following passage 
of the much reviled Law of Double Vote, and they were to lose even more seats in partial 
elections the following autumn.  Stripped of any real parliamentary power, the liberal 
opposition increasingly turned towards sedition and conspiracy as means of achieving its 
goals.  Although liberals and republicans had found common ground with Bonapartists 
before, having rubbed elbows with one another in the federative movement of 1815, 
Napoleon’s death considerably eased the conscience of the first two groups by making 
the likelihood of an imperial restoration less likely in the event of a successful revolution 
against the Bourbons.  Evidence of this fusion can be seen in the flurry of conspiratorial 
activity organized in the year 1821 by the Charbonnerie, a highly organized network of 
discontents modeled on the Carbonari movement that had orchestrated the Neapolitan 
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uprisings of 1820.  Aimed vaguely towards a violent overthrow of the Bourbon 
monarchy, the association appealed to a diverse range of would-be revolutionaries, united 
only by their desire to see the hated reactionary regime replaced, be it by the duc 
d’Orléans, Napoleon II, or a republic.  With as many as 60,000 members throughout 60 
departments, the Charbonnerie boasted among its ranks prominent politicians like 
Lafayette and Manuel in addition to soldiers, students, and members of the commercial 
and professional classes.  The Carbonari strategy hinged on military revolt, and the 
leadership counted on Bonapartism in particular for its ability to secure support among 
the army as well as its broad popular appeal.  Plots to foment insurrections in Thouars, 
Belfort, Saumur, and various other garrisons throughout the winter of 1821-22 all failed 
miserably, however, as sloppy attempts at secrecy tipped off authorities.  Nonetheless, the 
Charbonnerie did succeed in confirming the pragmatic character of the liberal opposition, 
which proved willing to co-opt Bonapartist sentiments in the hopes of achieving its 
broader objectives.254   
Napoleon’s death was thus something of a happy accident for Barthélemy and 
other political opposition writers, allowing them to tap into the great public demand for 
all things Napoleonic while fashioning his memory to meet their own needs for a highly 
publicized discourse against the government.  Throughout Barthélemy’s phantasmagoria, 
the shade of Napoleon recited certain articles of liberal faith in the form of advice to the 
council on how to repair the wrongs they have done to France.  Using historical examples 
that surely would have made the real Napoleon chuckle, he counseled the ministers to 
emulate not the conquering Romans but the industrious Tyrians, for commerce was the 
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surest route to a beneficent glory.  In a maxim more clearly liberal than Napoleonic, he 
reminded the ministers that it is great to govern a France that is both free and educated, 
but humiliating to reign over a “nation of Helots.”  Barthélemy concluded the piece in his 
own voice by demanding a reorganization of the cabinet, with new ministers “devoted to 
the interests of the patrie,” men like Marshal Soult and comte Daru (both of whom, not 
coincidentally, had been well trusted by Napoleon).  In a not-so-subtle dig at Richelieu, 
Barthélemy demanded that the portfolio of foreign affairs go to “a man who, having 
never been obliged to foreigners, could act independently in his ministry.”  Such an 
appointment, he hoped, would ensure a more militant foreign policy and bring about an 
alliance with Russia aimed towards securing Greek independence.255 
The year 1821 assumed apocalyptic proportions in the mind of Barthélemy’s 
fellow opposition journalist and jack of all literary trades, Alexandre Barginet.  For 
Barginet, Napoleon’s death was only one of a series of disastrous portents for a grim 
future, a harbinger of the grand assault being waged against the liberty of peoples, 
Christian virtue, and, in short, the whole of European civilization.  He went so far as to 
accuse the great powers of assassinating both Napoleon and Queen Caroline of England, 
also deceased in 1821.  The recent turns of the diplomatic tables were clearly very much 
on Barginet’s mind; it was at the very least highly suspicious, he implied, that Great 
Britain, which up until now had staunchly opposed the Troppau Protocol of allied 
intervention against “revolutionaries and enemies of peace,” should suddenly cease to 
actively oppose the “ambitious designs” of the tsar.  Soon, he warned, France being too 
weak and Great Britain too cowardly to resist, Alexander would establish himself upon 
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the throne at Constantinople and subordinate the whole of Europe to his will.  Coy in his 
reasoning, Barginet suggested that Napoleon, who even in exile was able to inspire fear 
in the hearts of Europe’s sovereigns, was sacrificed to the political interests of the Holy 
Alliance, which, by pledging itself to ruthlessly repress revolutionary activity anywhere 
in Europe, proved itself more of an enemy to political liberties than Napoleon had ever 
been.  Paradoxically, then “liberty descends into the grave” at the very same time as the 
man who was charged with oppressing it, both of them “victims of tyrants.”256 
The mythic narrative of Napoleonic history that developed in the second half of 
1821 provided the liberal opposition with useful fodder in their struggle against the forces 
of counter-revolution both on the domestic front and on a wider European scale.  Seen 
variously as the Son of the Revolution, the liberal emperor of the Hundred Days, and the 
liberator of oppressed peoples, Napoleon made for a useful foil against the reactionary 
Concert of Europe.  Capitalizing on persistent resentment of France’s diplomatic 
subordination that began with the treaties of 1815 and evident still in the congresses at 
Carlsbad, Troppau, and Laibach, liberal writers alluded to the Napoleonic past in order to 
draw lines in the sand between France and her historic role as the harbinger of nationalist 
and liberal revolution throughout Europe on the one hand, and the Holy Alliance with its 
retrograde intentions on the other.  The seemingly natural alliance between the 
Napoleonic past and oppositional politics would continue to characterize public political 
discourse throughout the second half of 1821, even when the message was ostensibly one 
of reconciliation. 
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The Politics of Reconnaissance 
Many writers expressed hope that Napoleon’s death would extinguish the fires of 
“esprit de parti” excited by his legacy, allowing his opponents to make peace with a 
divisive past now that the immediate threat of another imperial restoration had passed.  
The ultimate act of national reconciliation with the Napoleonic past would not come until 
his ashes were laid to rest at Les Invalides in December 1840.  But already in 1821, a 
vigorous argument ensued among politicians, journalists, and other writers concerning 
the fate of his mortal remains.  These writers predicated their demands for the repatriation 
of Napoleon’s body on the idea of reconnaissance, in the sense of recognition of, and 
gratitude for, services rendered to France.  Almost unanimously, they concluded that the 
Vendôme Column, that triumphant monument constructed out of melted-down enemy 
cannon and dedicated to the exploits of the Grand Army, was the most suitable resting 
place for France’s greatest military hero.  Despite the fact that these demands were 
almost always framed as appeals for reconciliation, the more inventive and experienced 
opposition writers also wielded them as protests against what they saw as the erosion of 
constitutional liberties in the wake of the royalist reaction of 1820. 
Efforts to reclaim Napoleon’s remains from the island of St. Helena began shortly 
after news of his death reached Europe early in July of 1821.  Letters written by members 
of the imperial family to the British government and sovereign members of the Holy 
Alliance went unanswered.257  England’s official position was equivocal; General 
                                                
257 Napoleon’s mother and sister Pauline made several attempts to have their claims 
recognized by the British government, even soliciting the assistance of Lord Holland, 
well known to be a partisan of the emperor’s cause throughout his exile.  There was also 
 158 
Bertrand and the comte de Montholon, having petitioned George IV personally upon their 
return from St. Helena, were informed that the British government considered itself 
guardian of Napoleon’s remains until such time as the French government manifested its 
desire to have them.258  The Restoration regime showing little inclination to do so, 
deputies and political writers initiated a campaign to pressure the French government into 
action.  The idea that the body of France’s greatest warrior should remain in the hands of 
her mortal enemy was an irritant to wounded national pride, still smarting from the defeat 
at Waterloo and the humiliating treaties of 1814-15.  On 14 July 1821, a petition was 
advanced to the Chamber of Deputies by no less a personage than the Marquis de 
Lafayette, who laid aside his former opposition to the emperor for the sake of French 
dignity.  In the name of national honor, the signatories demanded the return of 
Napoleon’s body to prevent it from becoming a trophy of war for the insolent English.259  
According to the polemicist Barthèlemy, the repatriation of Napoleon’s remains would 
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allow the “partisans of glory and national prosperity” to deliver a parting shot to the 
English by declaring, “Napoleon’s ashes are here, for the French didn’t want to leave to 
the English the mortal remains of a man who was the honor of the patrie and the eternal 
shame of England.”260  
But wounded pride and bellicose sentiments were not the only motivations for 
reclaiming Napoleon’s body from the island of St. Helena.  At their core, these arguments 
revolved around the role of collective memory as an act of reconnaissance, defined as 
“the most beautiful and most sublime price of great deeds, enthusiasm, and genius.”261  
Recalling to memory the benefits that Napoleon had bestowed upon France was a way of 
rendering thanks to “the hope, the foundation, the regenerator of France.”262  In 
constructing their rhetoric, these authors availed themselves of the mythical meta-
narrative of Napoleonic history – having saved France from the terrors of a civil war, 
Napoleon established the stability and order necessary for commerce, the sciences, and 
the arts to flourish, while French flags floated victoriously on the fields of battle across 
all of Europe.263  The duties imposed by reconnaissance rendered it imperative for the 
sake of French dignity to reclaim his body and lay it to rest on native soil, lest they be 
branded as a nation of ingrates.264  Moreover, Napoleon had a right to expect 
reconnaissance from every class of French society – from the pious, for reestablishing 
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the Christian faith. from the disciples of the “nine sisters,” for protecting the arts and 
sciences, and from “honest artisans,” for endeavoring to create works of utility and 
embellishment in even the smallest hamlet.265   
But naturally, the army owed him the greatest debt of gratitude of all for the 
simple glory of having served him, and veterans of the imperial wars not surprisingly 
formed the vanguard of the campaign to return Napoleon’s body to France.  One of the 
earliest pamphlets to appear in print was penned by a former artillery officer, Alexandre 
Goujon, who took up a literary career after defeat in 1815 brought an end to more than 
fifteen years of service in the revolutionary and imperial campaigns.  In the name of 
“martial piety” and French national honor, he implored the government to allow the few 
brave men who remained faithful to Napoleon’s memory to build a tomb for him.  All 
they asked for was “a simple stone…provided that stone rests on French soil.”266  For 
Goujon, the Vendôme Column was the only suitable resting place for the emperor’s 
ashes; Napoleon, pondering his own mortality even during his days of prosperity, had 
already ordained his own funerary monument.  While the Bourbons may have succeeded 
in toppling the statue atop the column, “providence seemed by design to have spared the 
pedestal” so that it might serve its intended purpose.267  Moreover, as a commemorative 
monument, the Vendôme Column was meant to appease royalist and other anti-
Bonapartist opinions by defining Napoleon’s role in French history almost solely by his 
military exploits.  “If the title of emperor irritates or offends you, do you no longer 
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remember General Bonaparte,” victor of Arcola, the Pyramids, and countless other 
battles?268  Recognizing the divisive nature of the Empire’s political legacy, Goujon 
sought to make Napoleon’s memory more palatable by distilling the history of the entire 
epoch into one of glory and prestige, a legacy that belonged to the entire nation rather 
than of any one party or faction. 
Perhaps the most curious characteristic of this discourse surrounding the fate of 
Napoleon’s remains was the tendency to address these demands directly to Louis XVIII.  
Some appealed to the king’s sense of honor; a former law student named Giraud almost 
tried to shame Louis XVIII into making a show of courage against the arrogant 
sovereigns of the Holy Alliance by reclaiming the body of their enemy: “tell them, 
enjoying the amity of your people, you have nothing to fear from them.”269  Others 
adopted a more flattering tone, appealing to Louis’ sense of clemency and justice.  
Surely, gushed one anonymous author, Louis in his magnanimity and patriotism could 
not fail to admire and feel pity for a warrior like Napoleon, thorn in the Bourbons’ side 
though he may have been.270  History, moreover, both ancient and modern, furnished 
instructive examples of such noble behavior; did the Romans refuse the body of 
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Germanicus, asked Barthélemy?271   No, for “when the Great Man is no more…his glory 
is the property of the patrie, and an entire people have no less right than that of a single 
citizen to reclaim the remains of a friend who died in a foreign land.” 272  Did France, 
who had so often in the past granted asylum to dethroned kings, not have “a small plot of 
earth” for one of her own?273   
The duties imposed by reconnaissance also involved a certain amount of quid pro 
quo.  After all, as Goujon pointedly reminded his audience, Napoleon honored the 
memory of the Bourbons for the sake of the common patrimony, going so far as to 
reconsecrate the ancient resting place of French kings at Saint-Denis.  In carrying off 
Frederick the Great’s sword amidst the spoils of war, he vindicated the veterans of 
Rossbach; could the Bourbons not likewise offer a sop to the wounded pride of imperial 
veterans? 274  Furthermore, Napoleon manifested disinterested clemency when, upon 
taking leave of his loyal guard at Fontainebleau in April 1814, he admonished them to 
remain as faithful in their defense of the Bourbons as they had for his own.275  It was only 
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just that Louis reciprocate by honoring the memory of the man who did so much to 
embellish the throne which the Bourbons now occupied.276 
At first glance, this confidence in Louis XVIII’s magnanimity appears naïve at 
best.  The Restoration government, particularly after the Hundred Days, went to great 
lengths in its attempts to erase the usurper’s presence from the national consciousness by 
vigorously prosecuting the least suspicion of Bonapartist sedition.  Although Napoleon’s 
death put an end to fears that he would escape and return to terrorize the crowned heads 
of Europe yet again, the government had little reason to relax its vigilance, as Bonapartist 
hopes were kept alive in the person of Napoleon II.  Furthermore, given France’s 
precarious diplomatic position, the government had little reason to antagonize England 
with importunate demands for Napoleon’s body.  But considered within the context of the 
Restoration’s failure to “unite and forget,” the shrewdness of this tactic becomes clearer.  
Enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter, which ordained a policy of “forgetfulness” by 
forbidding investigation into individuals’ political opinions held prior to the Restoration, 
this attempt to enforce collective amnesia represented the regime’s desire to forge 
national unity by burying the proverbial hatchet.  It was doomed to fail, not least because 
of the resilience of collective memory.  As Sheryl Kroen has argued, the highly public 
and ceremonial destruction of revolutionary and imperial symbols tended to encourage 
the process of remembering rather than forgetting.277  Furthermore, the assassination of 
the duc de Berry in 1820 by Louvel sounded a death knell for the “unite and forget” 
principle, unleashing the royalist reaction that precipitated the demise of the liberal 
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majority in the Chamber of Deputies and rendered further cooperation between the king 
and the left untenable.   
By appealing to Louis’ sense of justice and reconnaissance, these writers were in 
effect challenging him to make good on his promise to forget the bitter past for the sake 
of national reconciliation.  Proponents of repatriation claimed that their motives 
transcended the pettiness of party spirit and partisan divisions.  In a polemical pamphlet 
directed at ultra-royalist and “counter-revolutionary” writers, Barginet blamed his 
opponents on the right for injecting “party spirit” into the debate.  In an effort to cover up 
their own insidious machinations against the government, he charged, the ultras had 
raised a false cry of alarm over the seditious nature of public mourning for Napoleon, 
attempting to turn the king against the nation.  None of the “petits oeuvres” occasioned 
by Napoleon’s death contained even the faintest whisper of a threat against the Bourbon 
family, yet the ultras foresaw the end of the monarchy itself, “as if Napoleon’s coffin 
could open and let loose again the triumphant victor of Europe!”278  Was it not possible, 
he asked, to mourn Napoleon without insulting “a lawfully-reigning king?”  Was it an 
insult to the memory of Henri IV to honor the unhappy courage and glory of an exiled 
hero?  As one anonymous author put it, “I love my king, my country, and my honor!/But 
I also mourn a hero who was my emperor.”279  
No partisan observer, Barginet admitted that he often denounced Napoleon’s 
power, but that this did not preclude him from honoring his memory.280  He conceded 
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that Napoleon was indeed guilty of despotic excesses, which had alienated “the friends of 
constitutional liberty.”  But to those who accused him and other liberals of hypocrisy, 
having opposed Napoleon in life and mourned him in death, he insisted that it was 
important to distinguish between the two aspects of Napoleon’s character – “the 
conqueror and the Great Man.”  To honor the latter was not the same thing as forgiving 
the former.  For Barginet, Bonapartism was less a political doctrine and more of a 
willingness to recall “the great acts of a beneficent and glorious Revolution,” and thus 
reconcilable with liberalism.281 
Nonpartisan claims notwithstanding, liberals were quick to make use of the 
repatriation project as a proxy in their protest against the erosion of constitutional 
liberties.  The arguments of Barginet and others contained subtle warnings to the king 
that he could count on the support of the nation only so long as he reigned in accordance 
with the Charter.  They implored Louis to make a show of good faith by uniting himself 
with the majority of the French people and concede to their desires to reclaim Napoleon’s 
body.282  Pierre Grand, a student and later a lawyer at the royal court, was even more 
explicit in linking the repatriation project to the liberal cause.  In a pamphlet entitled Le 
Cri de la France, Grand lamented the death of the Charter, “no more than a phantom, a 
vain simulacrum of illusory liberty!”283  Having satisfied the wishes of the French nation 
in 1814 with a constitutional guarantee of their political liberties, Louis XVIII caved into 
the hysteria of the Jesuits and the ultras, who held the liberals responsible for Berry’s 
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assassination and seized the event as a pretext for violating the Charter.284  For Grand, the 
perpetual exile of Napoleon’s body was as much a symptom of liberty annihilated as 
arbitrary censorship and the suspension of habeas corpus; “today France demands in vain 
that the lifeless remains of this Great Man, over which even Caesar would have mourned, 
be deposited beneath the [Vendôme] Column.”  In a nation where such a thing is 
possible, suggested Grand, “perhaps it is dangerous to even hope to obtain a new 
constitutional charter.”285   
The campaign to repatriate Napoleon’s remains was thus insinuated into the wider 
context of parliamentary politics that pitted the liberal opposition against the ultra-
royalists.  Support for the repatriation of Napoleon’s remains became a sort of litmus test 
for loyalty to France and to the constitutional regime.  Contrary to the wishes of the 
national majority, enemy factions had conspired to banish Napoleon from France, and 
now compounded their perfidy by attempting to consign his memory to oblivion.286  They 
were castigated as “French only in name,” for whom “the sacred title of patrie was 
nothing but a vain and empty word.”287  By contrast, every “good Frenchman,” including 
the king himself, was called upon to defend national honor by joining in the demands to 
reclaim the ashes of France’s greatest warrior from her eternal enemy.  By offering 
Napoleon a resting place beneath the Vendôme Column, a testament to the glory that 
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France enjoyed under his reign, French citizens could fulfill the sacred duties of 
reconnaissance and prove their patriotism by manifesting their willingness to remember. 
 
Conclusion 
The year 1821 has long been recognized as a particularly fertile moment in the 
creation of the Napoleonic myth.  Public mourning over Napoleon’s death prompted an 
unprecedented flood of texts in the form of funerary odes, elegies, and essays, all of 
which betrayed a conscious desire to remember the past, whether it be simply to honor 
the dead, to judge the man and his actions, or as an act of gratitude for his services to the 
French nation.  All of this attention given to a hostile past alarmed the Restoration regime 
and much of the political right, who feared that it would encourage seditious activity.  For 
a brief moment, it did seem that those fears would bear fruit, facilitating the cooperation 
of liberals, republicans, and Bonapartists in their various efforts to undermine the regime, 
both through parliamentary and more covert, conspiratorial means.  Ultimately, however, 
the event failed to send profound shockwaves through the French political landscape, and 
at first glance even the tenor of the discourse itself seemed to indicate a desire to consign 
Napoleon to the realm of History and thus remove him from the contentious realm of 
political passions.  Many of these writers framed their narratives as a palliative to the 
fractures that the Napoleonic past still caused in the French political landscape, and the 
demands to give Napoleon’s mortal remains a resting place on native soil were presented 
in part as a symbolic act of reconciliation between the Restoration regime and a legacy 
that had lost its divisive potency. 
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Yet despite the ostensible calls for reconciliation over the past, the fact remains 
that memories of Napoleon continued to lend themselves to opposition and division.  For 
one thing, public expressions of mourning over Napoleon’s death were intrinsically 
“frondeuse,” given the injunctions imposed by the Restoration regime.288  Thus, as one 
writer suggested, remembering was an act of defiance: “Together the force of 
circumstance and the law may prevent us from publicly celebrating a cult that we used to 
consider valorous.  One may repress and restrain the noble spirit of French hearts, but in 
vain does man hope to arrest the thoughts of another.”289  Doubtless, some of this 
literature was the product of short-lived nostalgia for the Napoleonic golden age, inspired 
by a perfectly natural and largely reflexive emotional impulse to mourn a national hero.  
But this discourse also featured a small but highly vocal clique of politically engaged 
writers who continued to appropriate the myth for their own ends, fashioning a narrative 
of Napoleonic history that cast him as a friend of oppressed peoples and champion of 
liberty against the tyranny of reactionary Europe.  
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Chapter 4 – Narrating a New National Past 
 
July 1830 marked a turning point in the fate of the Napoleonic myth and its 
relationship to the official memory of the French state.  In attempting to solidify his 
legitimacy in the aftermath of the July Revolution, Louis-Philippe had good reason to 
distance himself from Restoration precedents, including the Bourbons’ hostile attitudes 
towards the revolutionary and Napoleonic past.  The new king undoubtedly recognized 
the potential benefits to be gained from exploiting the popularity of Napoleonic 
memories, for he and his ministers faced considerable challenges in attempting to 
reestablish political stability and consensus in the aftermath of the July Revolution.  The 
Restoration bequeathed its divisive legacy of political factionalism and bitter wrangling 
over the past, while also issuing a spate of new scores to settle, as evidenced in the public 
furor surrounding the trial of the Polignac ministry that plagued the very early days of the 
Orléans regime.  Although many members of the liberal opposition had welcomed the fall 
of the Bourbons at any price, others were disappointed by the failure of Les Trois 
Glorieuses to reestablish a republic, while French citizens of all political stripes were still 
deeply embittered by the humiliating defeat at Waterloo and loss of international prestige 
under the Restoration.  France, moreover, was experiencing the ever-increasing 
polarization of socio-economic classes that accompanied industrialization, and the long-
standing antagonisms between the Old Regime nobility and ascendant bourgeoisie was 
compounded by grievances among the peasantry and working classes.   
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Napoleon was a powerful symbol of France’s past grandeur around which the July 
Monarchy would attempt to construct some sort of national unity.  Long viewed as a 
hostile and seditious political force by the Bourbon government throughout the 
Restoration period, memories of Napoleon and the First Empire were largely 
incorporated into the “official memory” of the French state under the July Monarchy.  
Such a move was calculated to win support for the new regime not only by appealing to 
popular nostalgia for the Empire, but also by clearly distinguishing the Orléans monarchy 
from its discredited Bourbon predecessor.  This is not to suggest, however, that Louis-
Philippe embraced the Napoleonic past without reservation, and his attitudes towards it 
were undeniably characterized by a certain ambivalence throughout the first decade of his 
reign, directed by the potentially contradictory aims of maintaining control over a 
potentially subversive force while securing his own popularity.290  On the one hand, he 
moved quickly to crush popular agitation likely to encourage Bonapartist aspirations, 
such as that which broke out on the occasion of General Lamarque’s funeral on June 5, 
1832.  That same year, the government deemed the threat of a coup on behalf of a 
Bonaparte pretender strong enough to warrant strengthening the Law of Proscription 
against the imperial family and their properties in France.  At the same time, however, the 
Orléans regime demonstrated its favorable attitude towards the Napoleonic past in a 
number of different ways, including conciliatory gestures towards former imperial 
officials who had been largely shunned from participation in political life during the 
Restoration.  But perhaps the most visible and unambiguous manifestations of official 
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favor towards the Napoleonic past were the new regime’s efforts at commemorating and 
monumentalizing the First Empire.  Over the course of his first decade in power, Louis-
Philippe sponsored a number of projects that celebrated the Napoleonic heritage, 
including the inauguration of the museum at Versailles, dedicated to “all the glories of 
France” and that featured several galleries dedicated to the Napoleonic period, the 
restoration of the emperor’s statue to the Vendôme Column in 1833, and the completion 
of the Arc de Triomphe in 1836.  Nonetheless, there were limits to the king’s willingness 
to consecrate the Napoleonic past, and, until 1840, at least, the prospect of bringing 
Napoleon’s ashes back to France remained beyond those limits.  
This ambivalence suggests that Louis-Philippe feared that the regime’s 
recognition and celebration of the Napoleonic past might have potentially damaging 
repercussions for the security of his own reign, especially since that past had figured 
prominently in the revolutionary discourse of July 1830.  Thus, in order to protect the 
legitimacy of the newly established constitutional monarchy, it was imperative that the 
Orléans regime separate the officially-sanctioned cult of Napoleon from Bonapartist 
political principles.  The mythic narrative of Napoleonic history that coalesced after the 
emperor’s death in 1821 furnished many images from which to choose, and over the 
course of his first decade in power, Louis-Philippe cultivated a benign, universally 
appealing, and essentially depoliticized memory of the Napoleonic past as an instrument 
of national reconciliation.  By focusing on Napoleon’s legacy as a patriotic warrior who 
had raised France to the pinnacle of glory and de-emphasizing his civic achievements and 
role as the political heir to the principles of 1789, Louis-Philippe hoped to harness the 
popularity of the Napoleonic myth and channel it into support for his own regime.  
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Napoleon and the Revolution of 1830 
The humiliation of 1815 clearly loomed large in the revolutionary consciousness 
of 1830, and many believed that by toppling the Bourbon dynasty, they were finally 
avenging the humiliating defeat of Waterloo.  The equation was rather simple: having 
overthrown the “anti-national” and “foreign” government of the Restoration, the 
revolutionaries were also repudiating the treaties of 1815.  The by now iconic image of 
the Bourbons as cowardly pawns of the Allies had long contrasted against an image of 
Napoleon as a patriot who fought resolutely to defend French soil from foreign enemies.  
Thus, the Revolution could also be imagined as vindication of his final defeat.  In the 
words of one poet, the triumph of liberty in July 1830 had resuscitated the “the great man 
whose ghost alone frightened the anti-national government” of the Bourbons, overthrown 
by the “children of Lutèce.”291  Another poem written shortly before the Revolution and 
dedicated to the most popular chansonnier of the Napoleonic cult, Béranger, predicted 
the imminent arrival of “the day of independence,” when the emperor’s soldiers would 
avenge his defeat and France’s subsequent humiliation at the hands of “tyrants.”  When 
the poem was published in late 1830, Thévenot added optimistically that the day of 
independence had arrived sooner than anyone dared to hope, and although Napoleon 
didn’t live to see the day of France’s emancipation, he imagined that this “dawn of 
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universal regeneration” would have pleased the emperor, seeing in it “the triumph of the 
principles which he had so long fought for.”292  
Memories of Napoleon also loomed large in the Revolution of 1830 because the 
prospect of replacing Charles X with Napoleon II seemed a realistic option, at least for a 
short time.  Bonapartism enjoyed greater popular appeal during the July Revolution than 
either the republican or Orléanist causes, and the most frequent cries heard in the streets 
of Paris during the July days were those of “Vive l’Empereur!”293  Veterans of the 
Napoleonic wars, with their highly prized knowledge of defense tactics and combat 
experience, also played a crucial role in the fighting that raged through the Paris streets.  
The demographic makeup of the combatants, moreover, suggests that the experience of 
Empire played a greater role in their consciousness than the Revolution of 1789.  Fifty-
four percent of those dead and wounded in the July Revolution were aged twenty to 
thirty-five.  Born after 1789, these individuals had no personal connection to the first 
revolution.  Conversely, more than half of them were old enough to remember the Empire 
and to have served in Napoleon’s armies, and numerous contemporary accounts singled 
out Napoleonic veterans for their patriotic courage and leadership in the events of 
1830.294  The marked presence of Napoleonic veterans both in the regular army and 
among the revolutionaries also accounts for the furious reaction against Charles X’s 
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appointment of Marshal Marmont to command all troops in the capital.  Marmont was 
widely considered responsible for French defeat and Napoleon’s subsequent abdication in 
1814, having surrendered Paris to the Allies in a panic while the emperor was en route 
from Fontainebleau with his troops.  He was subsequently named to the Chamber of 
Peers and given a commission in the Royal Guard by Louis XVIII.  The appointment of 
this “traitor” to lead the army in July 1830 incensed the revolutionaries further, and 
resentment amongst veterans of the Napoleonic wars may have contributed to the army’s 
markedly half-hearted efforts to defend the Bourbons.295  For the revolutionaries of July 
1830 then, it was 1815, rather than 1789, that served as the most immediate historical 
referent. 
Nonetheless, Bonapartist hopes for a restored imperial regime under Napoleon II 
failed to constitute a viable option following the fall of Charles X.  The Duke of 
Reichstadt was under virtual house arrest in Vienna, and any attempts to install him as 
emperor of the French would doubtless have met with heavy opposition from the Holy 
Alliance.  None of the many imperial relics who played a part in the Revolution took any 
real steps to advance the Bonapartist cause, and the most significant Bonapartist attempt 
to seize power during the July days was orchestrated by a journalist, Evariste Dumoulin.  
After distributing a proclamation in the name of the Provisional Government calling for 
the restoration of Napoleon II as emperor of the French, Dumoulin was promptly arrested 
by Lafayette and Bonapartist hopes soon lost momentum as the tide turned in favor of 
Louis-Philippe.296  Nonetheless, the popular appeal of Napoleon’s memory was eagerly 
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appropriated by the liberal opposition and thus remained a potent rallying force in the 
Revolution of 1830.  Most Bonapartists, recognizing the slim chances of success for an 
imperial restoration, ultimately threw their lot in with the Orléanists, seeing in the new 
regime the best chance for advancing their careers. 
 Their hopes did not go unfulfilled.  Of the twenty men appointed to ministerial 
posts within the first seven months of the new regime, eighteen were former imperial 
officials, and twelve had rallied to Napoleon during the Hundred Days in a highly public 
manner.  The July Monarchy’s departmental administration featured a similar 
preponderance of imperial civil servants among the prefecture, and imperial notables also 
formed a majority in the reconstituted Chamber of Peers.  Military officers also benefited 
from the change in regime.  Following a rash of desertions during the July Revolution 
and the preceding months, Louis-Philippe’s first Minister of War and another Napoleonic 
leftover, General Gérard, made recourse to the vast numbers of demi-soldes to fill these 
vacancies.297  An ordinance of August 28, 1830, in fact reserved one-half of all open 
positions for imperial veterans.  Furthermore, although the new regime did not carry out 
anything like the administrative purges of Napoleonic sympathizers and girouettes that 
characterized the Second Restoration, the Hundred Days continued to serve as a potent 
source of contestation.  Many public officials who had sided with the Bourbons during 
that divisive period or who had ranked highly during the Restoration consequently found 
themselves without employment under the July Monarchy.298   
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Louis-Philippe’s willingness to employ Napoleon’s bureaucrats and military 
officers led contemporaries and historians alike to brand, often derisively, the July 
Monarchy as a Bonapartist regime in Orléanist clothing.  But it would be facile to 
conclude that all of these individuals were Bonapartists simply because they had 
benefited from the employment opportunities afforded by imperial expansion and 
centralization of power.  Except for a handful of individuals who actively sought the 
restoration of Napoleon II in 1830, the vast majority of these former imperial servants 
showed little evidence of preference for another imperial regime, even while they may 
have been favorably disposed to fond memories of the Napoleonic past.  The high 
proportion of former imperial civil servants and militaires in the new regime did not, in 
fact, translate into a revivified Bonapartist movement among political elites during the 
Orléans regime.  Rather, what the July Monarchy accomplished was to renew hopes and 
ambitions for many whose careers had been terminated or interrupted by the Second 
Restoration.299  By satisfying these ambitions, Louis-Philippe did much to preempt the 
threat of potential assaults on his sovereignty, at least among politicians and the 
administrative bureaucracy. 
In many ways, Bonapartist hopes launched by the Revolution of 1830 were 
thwarted by the movement’s own inertia.  Disorganized and lacking leadership, partisans 
of Napoleon II failed to take advantage of the power vacuum created by the overthrow of 
Charles X, and throughout most of Louis-Philippe’s reign, the principal sources of 
opposition would come from republican and legitimist rather than Bonapartist camps.  
Any popular Bonapartist hopes for a restored imperial dynasty remaining in the wake of 
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the July Revolution were dashed on 22 July 1832, when the Duke of Reichstadt died of 
tuberculosis at the age of twenty-one.  His death signaled the loss of “hope, legitimate but 
illusory,” for an imperial restoration, for Louis-Napoleon had yet to make his name 
widely known in Europe, and even after the disastrous Strasbourg coup of 1836, few 
were convinced of his pretensions to inherit the imperial succession.300  Even before his 
death, Napoleon II had become an irresistible icon for the sentimental.  Languishing in 
Vienna, where his maternal grandfather, the Emperor Francis, along with Metternich, 
ensured that he grew up knowing little of his native land, he was cast in the role of a 
modern Astyanax.301  It was a parallel first suggested by Napoleon himself, when, in 
March 1814, as the Allies were closing in on Paris, he issued orders for Marie-Louise to 
flee the capital with their son upon the first sign of enemy approach.  “I would rather see 
my son drowned than in the hands of the enemies of France.  I have always looked upon 
the fate of Astyanax, the prisoner of the Greeks, as being the most miserable one which 
history records.”302  Separated at a young age from his father and his fatherland, denied 
his claims to the French throne, denied even his name, Napoleon II had already become 
an object of pity.  His death earned him the status of a martyr, encouraging a host of 
funerary odes that struck a chord of regret for what might have been and testified to the 
persistent popular appeal of sentimental Bonapartism in the early 1830’s.  His 
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proscription and virtual captivity at the court of his maternal grandfather, the Hapsburg 
Emperor Francis II, made for obvious parallels with his father’s exile at St. Helena.  
Rumors and anecdotes abounded of the gravity and sensitivity he displayed even in his 
youth, which manifested itself in a keen sense of sadness over his separation from France 
and from his father.303  But, also like his father, writers insisted that he remained 
stubbornly attached to his “ungrateful patrie” until the hour of his death.304   
The death of Napoleon II in 1832 also contributed heavily to the increasing 
popularity of Napoleon’s mythic image as a paternal figure, which emerged especially in 
the tragic laments over his death in 1821.  His eulogists consistently appealed to their 
readers’ pathos by underscoring the loneliness of his exile, bereft of the consolation of his 
wife and child.  The image of Napoleon as a paterfamilias was a useful one insofar as it 
exercised a more universal appeal, especially within the Romantic aesthetic that 
dominated after 1830, making the superhuman figure who once seemed to hold the world 
in his grasp more mortal and more familiar.  In his final years, Napoleon found that “the 
world with all its grandeur holds no more appeal for him./So many ingrates!...he is 
nothing but a father now, such is his life.”305  The flexibility that this image gave the 
myth-makers was evidenced in one of the few texts purportedly penned by a woman, 
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Mme Bernard, identified as a “widow of a former aide-de-camp” to Napoleon.  In 
contrast to the typical characterization of French women who lived through the imperial 
era, resentful of Napoleon because of the unremitting demands of conscription that 
stripped them of their fathers, husbands, and sons, and overwhelmingly enthusiastic in 
their reception of the Allied invaders and restored Bourbons, Mme Bernard held no 
grudge against Napoleon, despite the fact that news of Napoleon’s death in 1821 stirred 
up anew her grief over her husband, who expired “on the field of honor.”306  On the 
contrary, she represented herself as the proud widow of a soldier who willingly sacrificed 
himself for a man who directed “the destinies of the patrie,” and who fought on the 
defensive against a coalition of kings who were determined to extinguish the nation’s 
autonomy.  Her loss, moreover, gave her a sense of affinity with the Empress Marie-
Louise, whom she imagined plunged into deep grief over the death of her husband, all 
evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.307  “The widow of a soldier is the widow of a 
great man,” she reminded the empress, regardless of whether he held the rank of 
conqueror of the whole world or simply his humble subordinate.308   
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The image of Napoleon as an unhappy father and husband assumed even greater 
significance as a foil against the royalists’ attempt to boost the popularity of the Bourbons 
through similar means, one of the few ideas upon which Louis XVIII and his ultraroyalist 
brother could agree.  As kings, both men promoted the pre-revolutionary model of 
monarchy as a benevolent dynastic patriarchy.309  The dramatic saga of the duc de 
Berry’s assassination in 1820 and the birth of the “miracle child” prompted a temporary 
rise in popularity for the Bourbon regime, reinforcing the royalist family metaphor.  
Coming close on the heels of the passage of the Law of Double Vote, the birth of the duc 
de Bourdeaux on 29 September 1820 coincided with the most intense phase of the 
royalist reaction and facilitated public acceptance of the radical changes that followed in 
the wake of Berry’s assassination.  The providential and miraculous nature of the duc’s 
birth – five months after his father’s tragic death and providing a desperately-needed 
male heir to the nearly extinct Bourbon line – sparked widespread public enthusiasm and 
demonstrations of affection towards the royal family, lending the regime an air of 
legitimacy it had not previously enjoyed.310  Moreover, the duchesse de Berry’s image as 
a “Good Mother” survived and was even strengthened by the disastrous failure of her 
attempts to lead an insurrection against the Orléans monarchy in 1831-32.  Imprisoned at 
the fortress at Blaye, her captivity leant ammunition to the legitimists, who saw her as the 
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long-suffering mother whose heroism and sacrifice was motivated solely by a dogged 
desire to protect her son’s legitimate interests.311 
Whether or not Bonapartists and the myth-makers consciously employed these 
family images as a counter-strategy against the royalists, the pitiable circumstances in 
which the King of Rome, “child of the whole nation,” found himself after his father’s fall 
from power made him a significant rival to the duc de Bordeaux as an object of pity.312  
The sympathies generated by Napoleon II’s death, coupled with a lingering sense of pity 
for Napoleon and the lonely exile on St. Helena, helped to create a more immediately 
accessible image of Napoleon as a father that was especially appealing to the Romantic 
generation.  As the myth continued to evolve in the early years of the July Monarchy, the 
family metaphor coincided with emphasis on Napoleon’s paternal benevolence towards 
the entire French nation, nourished by counter-memories of the Restoration as a regime 
that favored the few at the expense of the majority.  As the Orléans regime signaled its 
intent to concentrate its celebration of the Napoleonic past almost exclusively on the 
Empire’s legacy of glory on the battlefield, the image of Napoleon as a father found even 
more potent expression in Romantic representations of the highly personal and 
hierarchical relationships that defined the imperial military culture. 
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“France, Glory, Battle” 
Even before the duc of Reichstadt’s death in 1832, Louis-Philippe signaled his 
intentions of appropriating Napoleonic memories for his own benefit, and attempts to link 
the new regime with the military victories of the Napoleonic period were apparent from 
the very beginning his reign.  On 9 August 1830, Louis-Philippe was formally offered the 
title of “King of the French” in the Chamber of Deputies.  It was a very simple ceremony 
by the standards of previous lavish coronations, and the presence of four Napoleonic 
veterans – Marshals Macdonald, Oudinot, Mortier, and Molitor – bearing the insignia of 
kingship (crown, scepter, sword, and hand of justice) was especially conspicuous.313  
Louis-Philippe’s reliance on old “illustrious swords” of the Napoleonic era was also a 
defining characteristic of his cabinets, and three of the emperor’s marshals – Soult, 
Gérard, and Mortier – frequently shared in the many rotations of the post of Prime 
Minister between 1830 and 1848.314  Such men were attractive candidates to the king for 
a number of reasons, not least because they could be relied upon to maintain order, and as 
military men, they were expected to be tractable in their politics.  But perhaps most 
importantly, their glorious exploits on the battlefield were expected to lend the new 
regime, lacking any military credits in its own name, some imperial prestige.  
These overtures towards imperial war veterans were part of Louis-Philippe’s 
carefully calculated effort to cultivate one very specific image of Napoleon furnished by 
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the mythic lexicon.  By focusing commemorative attention on the emperor’s military 
exploits, the king was essentially offering a depoliticized version of the Napoleonic 
narrative, one that could be easily integrated into the national past rather than be 
monopolized by any one political faction.  Louis-Philippe could thus hope to capitalize 
on the popularity of the Napoleonic cult while at the same time insulating himself from 
the threat of rival claims from a reinvigorated Bonapartism.  But it was also another 
useful way of distancing the new regime from its predecessor.  Whether it came in the 
form of material favors bestowed on Napoleon’s marshals, or more symbolic gestures 
like the completion of the Arc de Triomphe, official recognition of imperial military 
glory satisfied a sense of national pride in the past, a pride that had been wounded by the 
Restoration’s attempts to erase the victorious campaigns of the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic periods from national consciousness.  Napoleonic war veterans arguably 
suffered the most tangible consequences of the Restoration’s policy of encouraging oubli, 
ranging from loss of position and unemployment for many to proscription in the most 
extreme cases.  These measures were seen by many as a particularly gross and 
reactionary injustice on the part of the Bourbons, and episodes like the 1818 subscription 
campaign on behalf of the Champ d’Asile or the furor caused by the suppression of titles 
of imperial nobility under Charles X reflected potent popular sympathy for Napoleon’s 
veterans.  
The resentment generated by the Restoration regime’s refusal to recognize and 
reward military services rendered under the Revolution and Empire showed up starkly in 
Balzac’s La Comédie humaine. What makes Balzac particularly interesting to scholars of 
the Napoleonic myth is the apparent paradox between his admiration for the emperor and 
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his legitimist political principles, which crystallized after the Revolution of July 1830.  
Conservative in his politics, Balzac admired Napoleon for his authoritarian response to 
the threats posed by both royalist and republican extremism, and for re-establishing order 
by promoting national unity.315  Moreover, like many of his Romantic contemporaries, 
Honoré de Balzac believed that the novel was an appropriate medium for the 
interpretation of historical fact, and La Comédie humaine was an ambitious attempt to 
chronicle the life and civilization of France.316  In the introduction to the first edition, 
published in 1842, Balzac described the nature of his project: 
French society would be the real author; I should only be the secretary.  By 
drawing up an inventory of vices and virtues, by collecting the chief facts of 
the passions, by depicting characters, by choosing the principal incidents of 
social life, by composing types out of a combination of homogenous 
characteristics, I might perhaps succeed in writing the history which so many 
historians have neglected: that of Manners.  By patience and perseverance I 
might produce for France in the nineteenth century the book which we must 
all regret that Rome, Athens, Tyre, Memphis, Persia, and India have not 
bequeathed to us; that history of their social life…317   
 
Insisting that he was more historian than novelist, his central preoccupation was to make 
sense of the long-term consequences of the French Revolution, and the imperial era thus 
assumed an ideological role in The Human Comedy.318  Balzac’s grognards have long 
been recognized as stock figures in the genesis of the Napoleonic myth, stubbornly 
clinging to the pale shadows of bygone glories and articulating a naïve and unshakeable 
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faith in their fallen hero.  But as historical types, they were also particularly revealing of 
the lingering resentments that the Restoration bequeathed to the July Monarchy. 
Balzac’s Colonel Chabert (1832) is a tragic tale of a Napoleonic war veteran 
struggling to redefine his identity in post-imperial France.  Seriously wounded at the 
battle of Eylau in February 1807, Chabert manages to escape from the mass grave where 
he had been left for dead by the retreating French army.  His death had been duly 
recorded in the official gazette of the French army and the news had spread far and wide 
within the Empire.  Unable to convince anyone of his true identity, he spends the next 
several years as a vagabond, physically and spiritually debilitated, alternately hospitalized 
and imprisoned as a madman.  When he finally returns to France in 1814, he learns that 
his wife has remarried the comte de Ferraud, a Councillor of State and an aristocrat of the 
old regime.  The former Mme Chabert is anything but delighted to learn that her first 
husband has survived; on the contrary, his return jeopardizes the much-elevated social 
esteem she has acquired within royalist circles as a member of the pre-revolutionary 
nobility.  Unwilling to honor Chabert’s claims to his estate that she inherited upon his 
supposed death, she denounces him as an imposter.  Penniless and isolated, Chabert seeks 
the assistance of his wife’s lawyer, M. Derville, to help prove his identity and establish a 
legal claim to his estate.   
The novel’s pathos hinges on Chabert’s identity crisis.  His sense of self was 
derived from his military career, and, more specifically, from the hierarchical bonds of 
loyalty between himself, his regiment, his fellow officers, and ultimately to Napoleon and 
the entire French nation.  He thought of this relationship in filial terms.  “I am an 
orphan,” he says, “a soldier whose inheritance was his courage, whose family was the 
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whole world, whose fatherland was France, whose only protector was the Good Lord.  
No, I am wrong.  I did have a father: the emperor!”319  Chabert is deeply wounded to 
learn of the emperor’s defeat in Russia, and the sight of foreign soldiers occupying Paris 
after Waterloo is a crushing experience for this hardened warrior who had bravely 
defended his fatherland in countless battles.  Consumed by apathy, Chabert confesses: 
“When I think that Napoleon is on St. Helena, nothing on earth matters to me.  I can be a 
soldier no more – that is my true unhappiness.”  By a curiously prescient coincidence, 
Balzac ended Chabert’s story in 1840; the old soldier ultimately makes peace with his 
past in the same year that Napoleon’s ashes would be returned to France and laid to rest 
under the dome of Les Invalides.  More than twenty years after Chabert’s unsuccessful 
lawsuit against his former wife, Derville finds the veteran living in a hospice for elderly 
indigents.  Unable to reconcile himself to a world without Napoleon, Chabert takes 
refuge in anonymity: “Not Chabert!  Not Chabert!  My name is Hyacinthe...I’m not a 
man, I’m number 164, room 7.”320   
Chabert’s rejection of his surname signifies the extent to which his identity was 
bound up with his career as a loyal servant of the Empire.  The name Chabert is much 
more than a patronymic; it designates the man who had been a count of the imperial 
nobility, grand officer of the Legion of Honor, and colonel of a cavalry regiment in the 
Grande Armée.  In renouncing this name, he finally acquiesces in his futile struggle to 
claim what was owed to him.  He would henceforth be an innocuous private citizen 
known as Hyacinthe, a name not expected to inspire recognition.  His sense of self is thus 
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inextricably bound to both France and Napoleon, at once national and patrilineal.  Having 
lost his father and the respect of his fatherland (at least, of its government), he finds it 
impossible to stake out a new role for himself in a society that has no more use for his 
military services.   
While the story of Chabert’s mistaken death and miraculous survival is fictional, 
his subsequent plight was more typical of Napoleonic war veterans in the decades 
following the fall of the Empire.  At the end of the Napoleonic wars, an estimated 1.1 
million soldiers were discharged from active service and returned to their homes.321  
These men occupied a liminal space in French society, for many found it difficult to 
reintegrate themselves into the communities from which they had been largely absent for 
fifteen years or more.  Having long been accustomed to being fêted and favored by the 
imperial regime, veterans now found themselves vilified by the Restoration government 
as an embarrassing relic of the Napoleonic past and a threat to the royalist political order.  
Prospects remained bleak for both retired and active officers throughout the Restoration; 
the latter were poorly remunerated and not much better off than those on half-pay.  There 
was little chance for advancement, and Old Regime noblemen were often promoted over 
commoners in blatant disregard for the 1818 law governing military recruitment and 
advancement.322  Although iconic images of the tragic and poverty-stricken demi-solde 
desperately clinging to his memories of past grandeur may tend towards hyperbole at 
times, it is not difficult to imagine why Napoleonic war veterans in the Restoration era 
would feel nostalgic for the good old days of the Empire.  Some scholars have cautioned 
                                                
321 Natalie Petiteau, “Les véterans du Premier Empire: un groupe socio-professionel 
oublié,” Cahiers d’histoire 43.1 (1988), 27-28. 
322 Jardin and Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848, 51. 
 188 
against conflating the actions and opinions of a few disgruntled officers with former 
Napoleonic soldiers taken as a coherent socio-professional group, in part because they 
lacked a public context on a national scale in which collective political action might 
coalesce.323  Nonetheless, as Sudhir Hazareesingh’s extensive research into provincial 
administrative reports of the Restoration era suggests, the private lives and local 
communities in which these men lived afforded them ample opportunity to “become the 
high priests of the Napoleonic cult.”324  Veterans shared a sense of pride in the successful 
military campaigns of the Napoleonic era and loyalty to the memory of Napoleon, as well 
as the common experience of precarious material conditions following the Empire’s 
collapse.  They remained among the most active participants in Bonapartist political 
agitation throughout the Restoration, and those who didn’t take part in overt rebellion 
nonetheless found ways to demonstrate their hostility to the Bourbons in perpetuating 
Napoleon’s memory – by publicly celebrating imperial anniversaries, peddling prints and 
objects bearing his image, and a host of other symbolic ways.   
Displaced in both the army and in his marriage by the return of the Old Regime, 
Chabert’s quest for recognition in post-Napoleonic France thus parallels the experience 
of a great many veterans of the revolutionary and imperial wars.  These themes were 
echoed in Le Médecin de campagne (1833), a novel in which the Restoration regime’s 
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refusal to honor patriotic services rendered by Napoleon’s veterans is glaringly contrasted 
against the favored status that these imperial relics enjoyed within their local 
communities.  Set in a small village near Grenoble in the Alpine province of Dauphiné, 
the novel opens in 1829 with the arrival of Genestas, a former cavalry officer in the 
imperial armies who, unlike many of his fellow Napoleonic veterans, has been lucky 
enough to maintain a military career under the Restoration regime.  Genestas and his 
fellow veterans of the imperial wars, Goguelat and Gondrin, exemplify the sense of filial 
loyalty that colors Balzac’s representations of Napoleonic veterans and military life.  
Like Chabert, Genestas “was the child of his company; he was alone in the world, so he 
had adopted the army for his fatherland, and the regiment for his family.”325  As an 
officer, he plays the role of father to his men, “‘his children,’ as he always called them,” 
just as Napoleon represented a father to the entire French army.326  Nonetheless, Genestas 
never placed his loyalty to Napoleon above his duties to France as a whole.  Like many 
others who abandoned the Bourbon cause and rallied to Napoleon during the Hundred 
Days in 1815, he justifies his decision in terms of safeguarding France from the vengeful 
intentions of the Allies.  “France must be defended, and that was all I thought about.”327  
The third chapter of Médecin de campagne, entitled “The Napoleon of the 
People,” is one of the most widely recognized examples of Romantic literature’s 
contributions to the Napoleonic myth.  The central event of the chapter is a veillée, a late-
night gathering of local peasants in a barn to exchange folktales and other stories.  The 
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principal storyteller on this evening is Goguelat, the village postman and yet another 
impoverished veteran of the Napoleonic wars.  Yielding to the demands of his audience, 
he delivers his version of the Napoleonic epic, which may be summed up by the motto of 
“Long live ‘Napoleon, the father of the soldier, the father of the people!’”328  It is a 
grandiose tale, in which the familiar image of Napoleon as the father of his soldiers and 
of the French people is further elaborated through a strong messianic idiom.  For 
Napoleon “was the child of God, created to be the soldier’s father,” and divinely 
appointed as the Savior of France.329  Goguelat presents Napoleon as the supreme French 
patriot, a leader whose first priority was the glory of the French nation.  In the wars he 
waged unceasingly on the European continent between 1805 and 1815, Napoleon ensured 
that “the French nation may be masters everywhere…and France may spit wherever she 
likes,” which chauvinist prerogative she lost under the Restoration.330  
For Goguelat, the relationship between France and her army is a metonymical 
one.  Speaking of the devastating and humiliating retreat from Russia, he recalls that the 
bravest men among his regiment sought to save the imperial standard from desecration, 
“for the Eagles…meant France, and all the rest of you.”331  He further elaborates on the 
gendered nature of this partnership between civilians and militaires.  “In France, every 
man is brave.  So the civilian who does gloriously shall be the soldier’s sister, the soldier 
shall be his brother, and both shall stand together beneath the flag of honor.”  It was a 
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sense of honor that motivated Goguelat and his fellow soldiers, a responsibility not only 
to the army and to Napoleon, but to the entire French nation.  “It was the civil and 
military honor of France that was in our keeping, there must be no spot on the honor of 
France, and the cold should never make her bow her head.  There was no getting warm 
except around the emperor.” 332  Napoleon’s soldiers were thus entrusted with defending 
the French patrie not only in its physical dimensions, but its reputation as well.333      
The veillée testifies to the importance of collective memory in constructing the 
Napoleonic myth.  In the absence of more tangible forms of recognition by the 
Restoration government, these memories served as badges of honor for former 
Napoleonic soldiers.  As Benassis, the village mayor and physician, says of Gondrin, “He 
has one great consolation…Napoleon embraced poor Gondrin – perhaps but for that 
accolade he would have died ere now.  This memory and the hope that some day 
Napoleon will return are all that Gondrin lives by.”334  But the veillée also implicitly 
reveals that these memories were a source of deep contestation within the political culture 
of the Restoration.  Goguelat’s tale was precisely the kind of public celebration of 
Napoleon that the Bourbons feared, and which provincial intendants and police were 
instructed to investigate and punish under the category of seditious political acts.  Thus, 
the people of Isère are careful to assemble only late at night, and, as Benassis warns 
Genestas, they will quickly silence themselves if they suspect that they were being 
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overheard.335  Genestas implies that these memories are a means of ensuring the survival 
of those virtues associated with the emperor, even though the official culture of the 
Restoration was unremittingly hostile to such memories: “[Napoleon] died saying ‘Glory, 
France, and battle.’  So it had to be, children, he had to die; but his memory – never!”336 
The geographical setting of Le Médecin de campagne is also highly significant.  
Just as Chabert evoked the circumstances of the demi-solde in Restoration France, the 
popularity of Napoleon’s memory in this fictional village of the Dauphiné evokes the 
province’s very real history of Bonapartist political loyalties.  Grenoble was the first 
major urban area to rally to the emperor upon his return from Elba.  After landing at the 
small port of Golfe-Juan in southern France on March 1, 1815, Napoleon had deliberately 
chosen the more difficult and circuitous route to Paris through Dauphiné in order to avoid 
royalist areas such as Provence.  He reached Grenoble on March 7, and the enthusiastic 
reception he received there was a major turning point in the “flight of the Eagle.”  His 
dramatic and celebrated encounter with French troops, immortalized in a painting by 
Steuben, took place at Laffrey on the city’s outskirts.  Halted by a detachment of royalist 
troops, Napoleon reportedly stepped forward, bared his breast, and declared, “Soldiers!  
If there is any one among you who wishes to kill his emperor, here I am.”  Royalist 
officers gave the order to shoot, but the troops responded with cries of “Long live the 
emperor!” 337  Narratives of this incident, in which Napoleon was able to win back his 
army without firing a single shot, became standard fare of the Napoleonic myth in the 
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first half of the nineteenth century.  Its message was clear: the French army belonged to 
Napoleon.   
After Napoleon’s second abdication in June 1815 and exile to St. Helena, the area 
around Grenoble continued to manifest its loyalty to the Napoleonic cause through secret 
societies and rebellion.  L’Union, a Bonapartist association formed in 1816 by Joseph 
Rey, was responsible for much of the local political agitation during the first decade of 
the Restoration.  Rey, a lawyer and Freemason, was not himself a Bonapartist, but he 
recognized that “in the mountains of the Dauphinois the people nurtured enthusiastic 
memories for the only man they believed capable of bringing back happiness and glory to 
France.”338  Grenoble was also an important center for the underground movement 
known as the Carbonari, an eclectic international alliance of liberals, republicans, and 
Bonapartists with vaguely-defined aims of overthrowing the monarchies of the Holy 
Alliance.339  But perhaps the most famous example of Bonapartist insurrection against the 
Bourbons in Grenoble was the Didier affair of 1816.  Jean-Paul Didier, a former dean of 
the law school, along with former imperial civil servants and military officers, first 
planned an abortive attempt to take over the administrative center of the department of 
Rhône on the night of January 20-21.  Didier hoped for better success in Grenoble, 
particularly counting on the support of former Napoleonic soldiers, and the rebellion took 
place on May 4.  It was quickly dispersed by royalist troops; one hundred and fifty of the 
insurgents were arrested and fourteen were executed.  Didier fled to Savoy, but was 
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ultimately tracked down by the authorities and executed in Grenoble on June 10.340  
Despite the plot’s failure to spawn a coherent and widespread movement to overthrow the 
Bourbon monarchy, the Didier affair encouraged further Bonapartist agitation in the 
provinces.  A proclamation circulated in the aftermath hailed the events in Grenoble as a 
“patriotic insurrection” that would precipitate the proclamation of Napoleon’s son as 
emperor of the French.  The reinstitution of the Bonaparte dynasty would restore 
“liberty” to France: “Long live the Patrie!  Long live Freedom!  Long live the 
emperor!”341  Goguelat’s retelling of the Napoleonic saga at the veillée thus would have 
had particular appeal in this region of France, where memories of the imperial era 
resonated widely among the population. 
The trajectories of Chabert and Genestas, along with other minor characters 
modeled on the Restoration-era demi-solde, testify to the straightened circumstances of 
Napoleonic war veterans under the Bourbons that made them the “high priests” of the 
Napoleonic cult.  The reluctance on the part of the comtesse de Ferraud to acknowledge 
her husband was symptomatic of the hostility towards these veterans on the part of the 
Restoration government and royalist political circles.  Indignant at the manner in which 
he has been snubbed by both his wife and his government, Chabert is convinced that 
Napoleon would set things right if he were still in power.  “If only he could see his 
Chabert, as he called me, in my present state, he would be furious!  But what’s the use?  
Our sun has set, we are all cold now.”342  In stark contrast to the former Mme Chabert 
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and the political culture of the Restoration, Derville is the novel’s unromantic hero.  The 
lawyer not only agrees to lodge a suit on Chabert’s behalf but also offers to support the 
soldier financially until a settlement with his former wife can be reached.  Questioned 
about his unparalleled generosity towards Chabert, Derville admits, “I have already let 
my patriotism get the better of me.”343  As a civilian, Derville is able to participate in the 
military culture of patriotic virtue by aiding the former soldier.  In taking it upon himself 
to reward Chabert’s services to France, the lawyer represents the ideal partnership of the 
civil and military spheres in promoting the glory of the French nation, an ideal that 
characterized the Napoleonic ethos and which Louis-Philippe hoped to recover.  
In a similar vein, Balzac’s veterans also echoed the mythic narrative of 
Napoleonic history in its emphasis on his purportedly meritocratic principles.  Although 
Napoleon re-established systems of honorific personal and hereditary distinctions 
believed to be incompatible with revolutionary egalitarianism, such as the Legion of 
Honor and the imperial nobility, these distinctions were nonetheless believed to be 
distinct from their Old Regime counterparts insofar as they were designed to reward 
merit and service rather than lineage or wealth.  Thus, Genestas is held in great regard for 
his military service as a man whose talents merit distinction from his peers.  “If he wore 
at his buttonhole the rosette of an officer of the Legion of Honor, it was because the 
unanimous voice of his regiment had singled him out as the man who best deserved to 
receive it after the battle of Borodino.”344  Genestas’ fellow veteran, Gondrin, on the 
other hand, despite having accrued twenty years of military service in both the liberal and 
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imperial armies, slipped through the cracks in the chaotic final days of the Empire.  
Following Napoleon’s first abdication in 1814, the First Restoration government denied 
Gondrin his salary, his pension, and the Cross of the Legion of Honor that had been 
promised to him after the battle of Borodino in 1812.  Genestas firmly believes that such 
injustices would never have been tolerated under Napoleon.  “If the Little Corporal were 
alive,” he told Gondrin, “you would have the Cross of the Legion of Honor and a 
handsome pension besides.”345   
The paternal metaphor that became so pronounced after Napoleon’s death in 
1821, and especially after the death of his son in 1832, was not just empty sentimental 
rhetoric.  As Balzac’s veterans demonstrate, it was intricately connected to the mythic 
axiom of “everything for the French people.”  In its insistence that Napoleon justly 
encouraged and rewarded evidence of patriotism and civic virtue, whether among the 
ranks of his armies or the imperial bureaucrats, the mythic narrative was especially 
appealing to those frustrated by the revival of old hierarchies and privileges under the 
Restoration, and who harbored hopes for change under the July Monarchy.  Echoed on 
the very opposite end of the literary spectrum from Balzac, in the rough and anonymous 
language of the cheap popular press, these frustrations manifested themselves loudly in 
the early days of the new regime as demands for redress: “For far too long, under a 
Restoration that restored nothing, the French soldier was humiliated by men who never 
fired a single shot.  But times have changed, and honor will be rendered to those 
grenadiers who, for fifteen years, saw their laurels withered by courtiers, émigrés, and the 
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escapees of Koblenz and Worms.”346  The fictional injustices suffered by Chabert and 
other demi-soldes under the Restoration were thus representative of the many socio-
political ills that the July Monarchy was expected to heal, and helps to explain why the 
quest for an elusive national unity figured so highly on the list of political preoccupations 
in the early years of the regime.   
 
“Une ère réparatrice” 
The July Monarchy was welcomed by many in its early days as the dawning of 
“une ère réparatrice,” a regime capable of healing the many divisions that existed in the 
French political landscape as a result of deep contestations over the Revolution of 
1789.347 The political culture of the Restoration was marked by a deep-seated sense that 
the French public sphere was irreparably divided along the lines of left and right, 
producing a “polarized nation.”348  The fractures imposed by so many rapid changes in 
government over the preceding twenty-five years, coupled with the political factionalism 
and esprit de parti that was part and parcel of the evolution of parliamentary politics, 
produced deep-seated concerns about the lack of national unity.  Moreover, thanks to the 
ultraroyalists, whose obstinate refusal to accept the revolutionary and Napoleonic past 
had compromised Louis XVIII’s hopes for union et oubli and became even more 
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pronounced as a matter of official policy with the accession of Charles X, the Bourbon 
regime was indelibly stamped with a reactionary character in the eyes of the liberal 
opposition.  In the initial euphoria produced by the Trois Glorieuses, there were 
widespread hopes that bitter wrangling over the national past would come to an end and 
that the new regime would redress the reactionary injustices committed under the 
Bourbons. 
Indeed, Louis-Philippe’s own rhetorical posturing encouraged these beliefs.  From 
the very beginning of his reign, he posed as an agent of reconciliation by lacing his public 
discourse with pledges to pursue the politics of a juste milieu and unanimity – to chart a 
middle course between ideological extremes and extinguish the sources of civil 
dissension.349  Official acceptance of the nation’s revolutionary past, which proved so 
divisive under the Restoration, formed an integral part of these efforts, starting with the 
new king’s very public acknowledgments of his own role in that past.  Unlike the 
Bourbons, who relied upon a discredited dynastic principle to legitimate their authority, 
Louis-Philippe offered a different sort of credentials in order to pose convincingly as a 
candidate to assume direction of the July Revolution, from the role played by his father, 
Philippe Égalité, in the Revolution of 1789 to his own very conspicuous part in the heroic 
republican victories at Valmy and Jemappes.  Moreover, through commemorative fêtes 
and measures such as the construction of a new national museum at Versailles, the king 
attempted to prove that he confidently embraced all of France’s past leading up to his 
reign, without needing to privilege any one antecedent or encourage forgetting of another.  
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Having from the outset shown himself willing to embrace to the revolutionary heritage, 
not only his own but that of the entire nation, Louis-Philippe himself set the precedents 
for demands that the new regime heal divisions in French society by avenging the slights 
on Napoleon’s memory inflicted by the Restoration regime.  
The moralist and poet Pierre Colau, himself a seasoned survivor of the many 
regime changes that punctuated the period 1789 to 1830 that had produced such deep 
divisions within the French nation, was one writer who recognized the challenge 
immediately facing the newly minted July Monarchy.  In a pamphlet titled Napoléon au 
Panthéon de l’histoire, published shortly after the Revolution of 1830, he suggested that 
he viewed consensus about the past as a potential antidote to the problem of fractured 
national unity.  Thus, he didn’t simply recapitulate the mythic narrative of Napoleonic 
history, but also attempted to broker a truce between Napoleon’s detractors and his 
legacy by eliminating points of contention within the narrative.  To the republicans, for 
example, who felt betrayed by the establishment of the empire and Napoleon’s 
increasingly autocratic methods of rule, Colau argued that he turned to despotism not 
because of an ideological preference but because this was the only manner of restoring 
order to France at this time.  To the royalists, who charged that Napoleon had usurped 
legitimate sovereign power, he responded that the revolutionaries had already forced the 
Bourbons vacate the throne long before Napoleon seized power.  Finally, to those who 
accused Napoleon of ruthlessness in war, Colau reminded his readers that it was the other 
European sovereigns who betrayed the terms of various treaties and refused to leave 
France in peace.  Finally, he appealed to Louis-Philippe, “friend of national glory,” to 
effect the final reconciliation between Napoleon and the French nation by returning 
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Napoleon’s ashes to rest “beneath the [Vendôme] column that retraces our glory and his.”  
Such was the fitting reward for a man who, banished from his patrie, never ceased to 
think of France, even in his last moments.350 
Louis-Philippe’s accession and apparently favorable attitudes towards the 
Napoleonic past thus rekindled hopes that the government would finally take the 
initiative to claim the emperor’s ashes and give them a final resting place on French soil.  
The Vendôme Column had served as a flashpoint for these hopes since Napoleon’s death 
in 1821, hopes that were further resuscitated when the king made the dramatic gesture of 
restoring the emperor’s statue, torn down in 1814, to the top of the column in June 1833.  
Some writers saw in this gesture a promise that the return was forthcoming, or at least 
some other monument that would form a worthy substitute.351  For most practitioners of 
the Napoleonic cult, however, the return of his ashes to native soil remained the sine qua 
non of reconciliation with the past, a condition that Louis-Philippe continued to evade 
over the course of his first decade in power.  But while the return of Napoleon’s ashes 
remained the proverbial elephant in the room, the new regime found its willingness to 
pursue reconciliation tested by proxy in 1831, when it was faced with demands for the 
posthumous rehabilitation of Marshal Ney.  The most conspicuous victim of the White 
Terror, Ney was convicted of treason and executed by firing squad on 7 December 1815 
for his role in the Hundred Days.  Promising Louis XVIII to return with the emperor in an 
“iron cage,” Ney set out with his division to meet and ostensibly stop Napoleon on his 
                                                
350 Colau, Napoléon au Panthéon, 3-7. 
351 Ch. Julliot, Le Revenant de Sainte-Hélène.  Couplets en honneur de NAPOLÉON, à 
l’occasion de son Rétablissement sur la Colonne, le 28 juillet 1833. (Paris: Imprimerie de 
David, 1833). 
 201 
march from Aix in March 1815.  After what appears to be much moral struggle, torn 
between his oath of fidelity to Louis XVIII and his regrets over urging Napoleon to 
abdicate in 1814, Ney ultimately capitulated to the rising tide in Napoleon’s favor and 
threw in his lot with his former master at Lons on 14 March.352  Thus, Ney was widely 
and rather unfairly regarded by royalists as the man most responsible for Napoleon’s 
unanticipated success in seizing power, and his name was placed at the very top of 
Fouché’s list of enemies of the state of 24 July 1815.  Ney went into hiding with his 
wife’s relatives in the Auvergne, where he was soon discovered by the local préfet.  
Hoping to avoid the spectacle of a show trial, Louis had the case assigned to a court-
martial, which thwarted the king’s best intentions by promptly declaring itself 
incompetent in favor of the House of Peers since Ney was a titled member of the imperial 
nobility.  Convicted almost unanimously of the crime of high treason (the duc de Broglie 
cast the sole dissenting vote), he was condemned to death.  Because Ney was a native of 
Sarrelouis, his counsel believed they could obtain his pardon according to article 12 of 
the capitulation treaty, which granted amnesty to anyone born in a district ceded to the 
Allies.  Ney sealed his own fate by vigorously protesting against any defense that 
rendered him a foreigner, declaring “I am a Frenchman, and as a Frenchman I shall 
die!”353  
The legal campaign to overturn Ney’s sentence commenced shortly after the July 
Revolution, led by the marshal’s eldest son, Joseph Napoleon Ney, who was named to the 
Chamber of Peers in 1831 but refused to take his seat while his father’s reputation 
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remained besmirched by a guilty verdict.  He was aided most energetically by the liberal 
deputy André Dupin, who had served as one of Ney’s defense counselors in the 1815 
trial, and who now lobbied the Chamber of Deputies, the king, and his cabinet tirelessly 
for a revision of Ney’s trial to.  In the years following his execution, Ney had become a 
highly polarizing figure in the politics of the past, capable of exciting passions in many 
different camps of opinion.  For those favorably disposed to the victorious legacy of 
France’s revolutionary and imperial campaigns, he was warmly remembered as one of 
Napoleon’s favorite sons, the “bravest of the brave,” hero of Elchingen, Eylau, and 
countless other battles.  Ney was also a sacred figure in the rhetorical repertoire not just 
of committed Bonapartists but the liberal opposition as a whole, who elevated him to the 
status of a martyr in much the same vein as Napoleon himself as a means of criticizing 
the Restoration regime for giving free rein to the forces of reaction and demands for 
vengeance from both the ultraroyalists and the allies.  For royalists and later the 
legitimists under the July Monarchy, he remained the most odious traitor to the king’s 
cause, held largely responsible for the debacle of the Hundred Days.  The campaign for 
his rehabilitation thus had enormous ramifications for the potential to forge national unity 
by healing the divisions imposed by a contentious national past under the July Monarchy. 
On November 12, 1831, a delegation from Ney’s native department of the 
Moselle addressed the Chamber of Deputies with a petition demanding the transfer of 
Ney’s remains from Père Lachaise cemetery to the Panthéon, “the temple consecrated by 
the patrie to all genres of glory and virtue.”354  The delegation’s rapporteur, M. 
Charpentier, commenced by noting that the petition was actually dated August 20, 1830, 
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going to great lengths to situate the request in the aftermath of the July Revolution.  The 
petition echoed the widespread hope that this event would repair “the injustices and the 
crimes committed” during the fifteen years of the Restoration, when France was “bent 
beneath the humiliating yoke of the foreigner and the anti-national party” of the 
ultraroyalists.355  Charpentier implored the deputies to render a fitting tribute to a man 
who refused to renounce his qualité de Français, even though doing so might have 
spared him his life.356 
The petition was vociferously supported by the deputies Dupin, Corcelles, 
General Lamarque, and Marshal Clauzel.  Exhorting his fellow deputies to erase the stain 
on French national honor left by Ney’s execution, Corcelles appealed directly to the 
humiliating memories of foreign occupation in 1815.  It was treason, he said, cloaked in 
the Bourbon banner of divine right, which opened the French frontiers to foreigners and 
allowed Russian, Prussian, and English troops to occupy the streets of Paris.  Corcelles 
evoked the atmosphere of suspicion and retaliation that characterized the first months of 
the Second Restoration, when “informants, provost courts, dungeons, and exile” awaited 
any citizen “who dared utter the name of the patrie!”  In sharp contrast to the Bourbons, 
pawns of the Allied powers, Ney, “raised in the barracks, accustomed from a young age 
to fight the foreigner, was motivated by no other impulse than that of a heart devoted 
without reservations to his country.” 357  Elaborating on Corcelles’ argument that the trial 
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had been compromised by foreign influence, Dupin argued that Ney was a victim of the 
Allies’ thirst for vengeance and envy of imperial glory because the prosecution was 
carried out in the name of Europe rather than France.358  The deputies demanded an act of 
reparation, motivated by “generous patriotism,” to prove that the nation “repudiates such 
an odious judgment, and renders homage to the memory of a marshal who could have 
escaped his final destiny if only he had agreed to give up his qualité de Français.”359  In 
this way, Ney’s rehabilitation was linked to the regenerative objectives of the revolution, 
for it would signal to all that the France of 1830 had broken definitively with the France 
of 1815. 
Soon after the Moselle delegation presented their petition to the Chamber of 
Deputies, Dupin began in earnest his campaign to have Ney’s sentence overturned.  In an 
ostensibly anonymous pamphlet published the same year, Dupin, after establishing legal 
precedents and justifications for reconsidering the case, recapitulated his arguments about 
foreign interference.  It was in the nation’s political interest, he said, to overturn Ney’s 
condemnation because to do so would be to finally put the real enemies of the nation on 
trial.  Ney’s exoneration would be an implicit indictment of the Allied powers, for “they 
defiled our territory!  It was in their name that the accusation was carried out and 
condemnation requested!  It was under their influence that the charges were made!”  For 
Dupin, Ney was simply a lamb sacrificed to the Allied powers, who were thirsty for 
vengeance because “there wasn’t a single power within the Holy Alliance whose troops 
and generals Ney hadn’t fought and defeated.”  Such was the fundamental principle upon 
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which revision rested, Dupin concluded; Ney’s cause was in reality the cause of the entire 
French nation.360  A formal request for a revision of the trial, signed by Ney’s widow and 
their children, was submitted to the king on November 23, 1831.361   
While the Chamber of Deputies proved receptive to the idea of revising the trial, 
the Chamber of Peers was still populated by many members who had voted for Ney’s 
death sentence in 1815.362  A decision to reconsider the trial would doubtless have met 
with stiff resistance from the Peers, and should it have ended in upholding the sentence 
against Ney, there was strong potential for popular Bonapartist agitation in response.  The 
political ramifications of Ney’s rehabilitation were made clear in another pamphlet that 
appeared in December 1831, at the very same time that public opinion was absorbed by 
the debates over the law abolishing heredity in the Chamber of Peers.  This law, 
presented to the Deputies by Casimir Périer in August and adopted on December 29, 
1831, gave the king the right to nominate an unlimited number of peers.  By compiling 
Dupin’s various speeches and petitions concerning Ney’s case along with the deputy’s 
ideas concerning the peerage, the pamphlet’s author equated Ney’s rehabilitation with the 
regeneration of the peerage as an institution that conformed to the principles of 1830.  
Laumond remarked on the singular coincidence that the peerage was in the process of 
being doubly judged by the nation, first in the matter of its constitution, and secondly for 
its condemnation of Ney.  For both the peerage and for Ney, “it is a question of honor and 
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rehabilitation!  Their causes are henceforth inseparable.”  A revision of Ney’s trial 
offered the peerage a chance to redeem itself “in the interest of French glory,” to mark its 
reconstitution as an institution of bourgeois citizenship, based on merit rather than 
heredity, by separating itself definitively from a “bloody act of reaction.”363  Laumond 
concluded with an appeal to French citizens, “children of the same cradle as the noble 
victim, to march at the head of patrie’s show of mourning, and give the signal for the 
sacred task of rehabilitation!”364 
The campaign for Ney’s posthumous rehabilitation reflected contemporary beliefs 
in the potential of memory to serve as an instrument of reconciliation.  By clearing his 
record and elevating his name to the pantheon of national heroes, Dupin and others aimed 
to reintegrate Ney into the larger national collective from which he had been unfairly 
expelled as a traitor.  Dupin’s arguments, which hinged on Ney’s patriotic services to the 
French nation, also echoed much of the same rhetoric used in the demands for 
repatriation of Napoleon’s remains that had first developed in 1821 and resurfaced in the 
aftermath of the Revolution of 1830.  The campaign, then, was something of a test of the 
July Monarchy’s attitudes towards the Napoleonic past and the king’s willingness to truly 
make reparations for the divisive legacy of the preceding regime.  The regime appeared 
to have failed that test, when in mid-February 1832, the Moniteur announced that the 
king rejected the request for a revision of Ney’s trial, justified by a lengthy report from 
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the Minister of Justice arguing that such an intervention was not within the government’s 
legitimate jurisdiction.365  Louis-Philippe responded to the problem of Marshal Ney with 
his characteristically cautious and measured approach to the Napoleonic past.  He 
appeared willing to honor Ney’s memory in a number of symbolic ways – the marshal’s 
name was restored to the Legion of Honor rolls, his bust was placed in the Panthéon, and 
Mme Ney, through the tireless efforts of Dupin, finally received a pension of 25,000 
francs.  But Louis-Philippe stopped short of any measures that were likely to threaten 
political stability, and his response to the problem of Marshal Ney was representative of 
his carefully calculated efforts to capitalize on popular memories of Napoleon by 
promoting a particular reading of the past in order to insulate the regime from potential 
challenges to its legitimacy. 
 
Conclusion 
The first decade of the July Monarchy introduced dramatic changes in the way 
that Napoleonic memories functioned in French political culture.  Criminalized and 
repressed under the Restoration, those memories were most often used as an instrument 
of political dissent against the Bourbon monarchy.  Louis-Philippe’s willingness to 
incorporate the revolutionary and Napoleonic past into the foundations of his own regime 
changed all that, and demands for the repatriation of Napoleon’s remains or the 
rehabilitation of Marshal Ney testified to an optimistic sense that France might achieve 
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national reconciliation and unity by reaching a new consensus about its history.  In order 
to contain the threat of Bonapartist political aspirations, the king promoted a particular 
reading of the Napoleonic narrative that celebrated the emperor and his veterans for their 
contributions to French national glory through their exploits on the battlefield as a means 
of neutralizing the seditious potential of the myth.  But while Louis-Philippe hoped that 
this pride in the military glories of the Napoleonic era would promote a sense of national 
unity and lend some prestige to the new regime, he also unwittingly sowed the seeds for a 
potent opposition discourse that would emerge at the end of the decade, when those same 
memories fueled bellicose reactions to diplomatic crisis and criticism of the July 
Monarchy’s cautious pacificism in foreign affairs. 
The July Monarchy’s highly publicized efforts to accept and commemorate the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic past has sometimes given a misleading impression of 
untempered enthusiasm, obscuring what was in reality an ambiguous, tentative, and 
measured approach.  Whereas critics of the July Monarchy often viewed its appropriation 
of the Napoleonic myth as a craven and reluctant acceptance of something foisted upon it 
by the popular will, Stanley Mellon argues that to the contrary, this appropriation 
reflected the regime’s optimism in itself, confident that it could assimilate Napoleon’s 
memory into the official narrative of its own origins without undermining its own 
legitimacy or stability.  Louis-Philippe’s favorable attitudes towards Napoleon’s memory, 
argues Mellon, formed part of a larger resolution to honor the French past in its entirety 
in order to avoid perpetuating the cycle of revolution and counter-revolution that had 
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punctuated the nation’s history over the past forty years.366  But in reality, Louis-
Philippe’s attitudes betrayed a great deal of concern about the potentially damaging 
consequences of appropriating Napoleon’s legacy, and he carefully chose those projects 
least likely to stir the political pot or lead to potential assaults on Orléanist legitimacy.  
This uncertainty manifested itself most clearly in the king’s reluctance to entertain 
proposals for the return of Napoleon’s ashes to France, a reluctance he stubbornly 
maintained until forced to confront the issue in 1840 by an ambitious prime minister in 
the context of perhaps the biggest diplomatic crisis faced by a French monarch since 
1815.  
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Chapter 5 – The Return of the Ashes 
 
After the first campaign to bring Napoleon’s ashes back from St. Helena proved 
unsuccessful in 1821, the cause lay dormant for the remainder of the Restoration period.  
It resurfaced shortly after the July Revolution of 1830, encouraged by the accession of a 
regime that, far from being hostile to France’s revolutionary past, actively and selectively 
appropriated that past as anchors for its own legitimacy.  On 7 October, the recently 
elected Chamber of Deputies accepted and subsequently denied a petition, backed heavily 
by General Lamarque among others, to request the return of Napoleon’s remains from the 
British government.  The question of repatriation was once again aired in the Chamber 
the following September, where, oddly enough, it met with stiff resistance from 
Lafayette, who had nine years earlier signed his name to just such a petition.  In denying 
these petitions, the deputies earned themselves a highly publicized rebuke from a fairly 
recent convert to the Napoleonic cult, Victor Hugo.  In the poem “Ode à la colonne,” 
written in October 1830, he criticized them for allowing their own political interests and 
fears of Bonapartist sedition to dissuade them from embarking on what should have been 
a noble act of unpartisan national reconnaissance.  “Sleep! we will come looking for you 
– The day may come!/Because we can have you for a god without having you for a 
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master.”367  Hugo thus perceptively went straight to the heart of the ambivalence that 
characterized the July Monarchy’s attitude towards Napoleon throughout the first decade 
of the regime.  For Hugo, it was entirely possible be a Napoleonist but not a Bonapartist, 
to commemorate the past without wanting to recreate it.  Louis-Philippe was not so sure; 
he maintained an unrelenting resistance to proposals for reclaiming the emperor’s 
remains, and nearly a decade would pass before the issue merited serious consideration.   
The king’s stubborn refusal to entertain the possibility was incomprehensible to 
some, especially given his many overtures of symbolic rapprochement towards the 
Napoleonic past.  The restoration of Napoleon’s statue to the top of the Vendôme 
Column, the completion of the Arc de Triomphe, and even the clemency shown to Louis-
Napoleon after the Strasbourg affair in 1836 all suggested that Louis-Philippe saw 
nothing to fear from the Napoleonic cult.  Perhaps, as Janet Ladner has suggested, both 
he and the Bonapartes in exile believed that repatriation was a step down a slippery slope, 
leading logically and inevitably to abrogation of the Law of Proscription for the imperial 
family.368  Whatever the king’s reasoning, a great many people in France must have been 
stunned by the announcement that came in May 1840 – the government, in an abrupt 
volte-face, had recently reached an agreement with Great Britain for the restitution of 
Napoleon’s mortal remains, which would be fetched from St. Helena posthaste and laid 
to rest in the church of Les Invalides.  While the regime presented its decision as an 
attempt to reconcile France with both England and the divisive remnants of its own past, 
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the return of the ashes quickly assumed even greater significance in the eyes of French 
public opinion as a symbolic act of defiance against the Quadruple Alliance formed by 
Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia in the summer of 1840.  Unfolding against a 
backdrop of diplomatic crisis and mounting bellicosity sparked by the Eastern Question, 
the return of the ashes proved that the Napoleonic past was still malleable enough to 
address contemporary problems, even while the July Monarchy was attempting to fully 
historicize that past in the funeral ceremonies of December 1840. 
 
“This noble act of restitution” 
On 12 May 1840, Minister of the Interior Charles de Rémusat mounted the 
tribune in the Chamber of Deputies and, with visible emotion, announced that Louis-
Philippe was dispatching his son, the Prince de Joinville, to the island of St. Helena in 
order to claim Napoleon’s body and bring it back to France.  The government, “eager to 
fulfill a national duty,” had already reached an agreement with Great Britain regarding 
the transfer of the emperor’s mortal remains, and now came to ask the deputies “for 
means of receiving them on French soil in a dignified manner.”369  The news was greeted 
with thunderous applause from the deputies, although their reputed unanimity would soon 
dissipate in debates over funding for the project and the tomb’s proposed location, 
fractured still further by the few but powerful dissenting voices of men like Lamartine 
who questioned the wisdom of the undertaking.  Journalists and pamphleteers quickly 
picked up the threads of these debates, and the return of the ashes would occupy a central 
place in public discourse until the end of the year.  In this regard, the text of Rémusat’s 
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speech is worth examining at length, for it reveals not only how the July Monarchy hoped 
to shape the public’s interpretation of the event but also the regime’s own persistently 
cautious and ambivalent attitudes towards Napoleon’s memory. 
 Although the British government had scrupulously turned a deaf ear to requests 
for Napoleon’s body made on behalf of individuals, especially members of the Bonaparte 
family, it had long signaled its willingness to return the body should the request come 
directly from France’s legitimate political authority.  Nonetheless, the agreement 
negotiated between Guizot and Palmerston in the spring of 1840 was advertised as a 
diplomatic coup of the highest order.  Quoting the official response crafted by the British 
cabinet, Rémusat explained the significance of the agreement with regard to foreign 
relations: 
‘Her Majesty’s government hopes that the promptness of its response will be 
considered in France as proof of its desire to erase every last trace of these 
national animosities, which, throughout the emperor’s lifetime, armed England 
and France against one another.  Her Majesty’s government would like to think 
that if any such sentiments still exist, they will be laid to rest along with 
Napoleon’s remains.’ 
 
England is right, Messieurs.  This noble act of restitution will strengthen again the 
bonds that unite us, and make the painful traces of the past disappear.  The time 
has come when these two nations need remember nothing but their glory.370 
 
Rémusat confidently, if somewhat naively, invested the transfer of Napoleon’s remains 
with immense symbolic importance as an event that would ameliorate the historic discord 
between the two nations.  To some extent, this kind of hackneyed diplomatic rhetoric was 
entirely predictable on such an occasion and likely given little credit, even by those who 
constructed it.  Nonetheless, it provided a striking contrast to the way that public 
discourse about the return of the ashes would develop over the next several months.  
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Rémusat’s faith in the fraternal concord between England and France soon proved to be 
totally at odds with popular responses to the announcement, characterized by a striking 
revival of anti-Anglo sentiment that expressed itself both in recrimination for past wrongs 
and vague threats of future vengeance. 
 Ever since the first demands for the repatriation of Napoleon’s remains surfaced 
in 1821, there had been very little debate about where they should be laid to rest.  
Rémusat’s audience might thus have been surprised to learn that the tomb would not be 
constructed beneath the Vendôme Column, which, as a testament to the immortal glory of 
the imperial armies erected by Napoleon himself, appeared to many to be the most 
appropriate site.  But the government had determined that, in keeping with the “majesty” 
of Napoleon’s memory, “this august sepulcher shall not remain exposed in a public place, 
amidst loud and distracted crowds.”  Rather, what was needed was a site that was both 
“silent and sacred, where those who wished to recall all his glory and genius, grandeur 
and misfortune, might visit.”371  The subtext beneath this cagey explanation was that the 
July Monarchy was not about to run the risk of building Napoleon’s tomb in a place 
where it might become a rallying point for revolt.  The Place Vendôme had already 
proven its capacity in this respect in 1831, when a group of Parisians gathered there to 
mark the anniversary of Napoleon’s death.  The threat of insurrection, heralded by cries 
of “Vive l’Empereur!” and singing of the Marseillaise, was deemed serious enough to 
warrant arming the National Guard with water hoses in order to disperse the crowds.  (In 
the nearby Hotel de Hollande on the rue de la Paix, Louis-Napoleon lay listening to the 
commotion while he recovered from the measles, as he and his mother were testing the 
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king’s magnanimity by venturing a fugitive visit to the capital.  Their presence had up 
until that point been tolerated, but shortly thereafter Périer courteously asked them to 
leave France for fear that their presence might encourage further disturbances.)  In June 
1832, an even more serious disturbance broke out when the funeral of General Lamarque, 
a victim of the 1832 cholera epidemic that killed 19,000 of the city’s inhabitants, brought 
together thousands of the regime’s opponents, from republicans to legitimists.  A popular 
liberal deputy and former imperial officer, Lamarque was widely regarded as a living 
icon of Napoleonic military glory and patriotic spirit, having refused to accept peace with 
the Allies after Waterloo, and he had also been a particularly vocal spokesman for the 
campaign to repatriate the emperor’s remains.  Some of the more militant among the 
procession diverted it towards the Place Vendôme, ostensibly in honor of Lamarque’s 
military service in the imperial armies.  Funeral orations quickly gave way to 
revolutionary rhetoric and violence, and the government ultimately resorted to martial 
law in order to deal with the crisis.  Louis-Philippe and his ministers thus had good 
reason to fear that depositing Napoleon’s actual remains beneath the Column could only 
increase the symbolic power of what was already a recognized touchstone for dissent and 
opposition. 
The church of Les Invalides was deemed the safest alternative by the government, 
although the king and his ministers were careful to present this choice as the result of a 
careful evaluation of Napoleon’s place in French history, a recognition of his singular 
role as both head of state and guerrier.  “He was emperor and king, the legitimate 
sovereign of our country.  By virtue of this title, he could be interred at Saint-Denis, but 
Napoleon deserves more than an ordinary king’s sepulcher.  He should reign and 
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command once more within those walls where the soldiers of the patrie go to rest, and 
where they will always be inspired by those called upon to defend it.”372  In reality, Les 
Invalides was chosen because it assured the government a reasonable measure of 
security.  Located in what was at the time the thinly-populated periphery of the city, it 
was far less likely to become a rallying point for insurrection than the more centrally 
located Place Vendôme or the Église de la Madeleine, which had also been proposed as a 
site for Napoleon’s final resting place.  It was, moreover, virtually impregnable, being 
fronted by the wide, open space of the Esplanade des Invalides on its northern façade and 
protected by a resident contingent of regular army soldiers.  At the same time, however, 
its great baroque dome, which rivaled those of St. Peter’s in Rome and St. Paul’s in 
London, was one of the city’s most impressive monuments and capable of furnishing a 
suitably grandiose setting for Napoleon’s tomb.  In short, the church of Les Invalides 
offered “the best balance of visibility and remove,”373 satisfying the demand for the 
sacred while also firmly delineating the decidedly military character of Napoleon’s place 
in French history. 
 Les Invalides had the additional advantage of being largely neutral politically as a 
site of memory.  This was not the case with the basilica of St. Denis, which was too 
firmly associated with the pre-revolutionary past.  Its tombs, containing the remains of 
French kings and queens stretching back to the Merovingian era, were desecrated in 
1793, a macabre manifestation of the revolutionary impulse to “regenerate” the nation, 
and whatever royal remains that still existed were removed to mass graves where they 
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were covered with quicklime.  An imperial decree of 20 February 1806 reconsecrated the 
church as the burial place of France’s kings, calling for four chapels to be built within the 
basilica, one designated for Napoleon and his descendants, and one for each of the three 
preceding dynasties of French kings.374  While some favored Saint-Denis as the site of 
Napoleon’s tomb for this reason, it was inconceivable to most of the myth-makers that he 
should be laid to rest among the vestiges of such a hostile and foreign past.  Likewise, the 
regime found objectionable the recently erected Colonne de Juillet at the Place de la 
Bastille, another of the options being aired in the press, a site too clearly allied with 
memories of revolution (and which Louis-Philippe would far rather have associated with 
himself alone).  Les Invalides, on the other hand, was a living memorial to the nation’s 
military heroes, who, ostensibly at least, fought for the glory of France rather than any 
particular regime or ruler.  Napoleon himself had tried to exploit the reconciliatory 
potential of the site in his efforts to heal the Revolution’s rifts, emphasizing the 
continuities in France’s illustrious military heritage from Louis XIV to himself.375  In 
choosing Les Invalides as the site of Napoleon’s tomb, then, the regime almost seemed to 
want to place him outside of history, to somehow unanchor the imperial epoch in 
historical time by divorcing it from clear referents to any particular point in France’s past.  
At the same time, however, Louis-Philippe found it expedient to lay definite claim to the 
Napoleonic past as a means of securing his own legitimacy as heir to 1789: 
Henceforth France and France alone will possess all that remains of Napoleon.  
His tomb, like his memory, will belong to none but his own country.  The 
monarchy of 1830 is in effect the unique and legitimate heir to all the memories in 
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which France takes pride [emphasis added].  Without doubt they rightly belong to 
that monarchy that was the first to rally all the forces and reconcile all the wishes 
of the French Revolution, to raise and respect without fear the statue and tomb of 
a popular hero.  For there is only one thing that stands up to comparison with 
glory, and that is liberty.376 
 
The return of the ashes thus offered Louis-Philippe an opportunity to reaffirm his own 
ties to France’s revolutionary tradition.377  By appropriating the Napoleonic legacy, by 
attempting to define its terms and its parameters, the regime also hoped to insulate itself 
from the potentially damaging political repercussions of its decision to construct a tomb 
for Napoleon on French soil.   
Ultimately, then, the July Monarchy constructed and marketed an official rhetoric 
that posed the reclamation of Napoleon’s body as an act of national reconciliation – 
reconciliation between France and her foreign enemies and between the past and present.  
The government, conveniently ignoring centuries of conflict and demanding a certain 
level of naïveté from the French people, presented the discord between England and 
France as nothing more than a fragile relic of the Napoleonic era, easily dispatched by 
this symbolic gesture of amity and mutual goodwill.  In doing what his Bourbon 
predecessors refused to do, Louis-Philippe was able to posture as the confident monarch, 
secure in his authority, who had nothing to fear from the past.  This rhetoric was soon put 
to the test in dramatic fashion.  In the months following Rémusat’s announcement in the 
Chamber of Deputies, a crisis in foreign relations unfolded that would reignite 
animosities between France and the other major European powers.  Heavily criticized for 
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its response to the crisis (or lack thereof), the July Monarchy would find itself challenged 
by the very past that it tried to appropriate. 
 
The Present Past: 1840 as 1815 
Louis-Philippe’s change of heart would likely never have come about had he not 
been forced to recall Adolphe Thiers, a proud disciple of the Napoleonic cult, to the 
position of prime minister in March 1840.  Born in 1797, Thiers was raised on a steady 
diet of reports on the brilliant successes of Napoleon’s armies that were standard fare for 
pupils in the imperial lycées.  For Thiers, as for so many of his contemporaries in the 
“bored generation,” the fall of the empire in 1815 put an end to his dreams of achieving 
greatness in military service.  But rather than wallow in Romantic brooding over a lost 
golden age, he found an outlet for his energies (and his unbounded admiration for 
Napoleon) in his career as both a politician and historian.  A keen sense that France must 
recover her past grandeur shaped his approach to both, and already in 1840 he was busy 
compiling material for a magisterial chronicle of the Consulate and Empire, a project that 
would occupy his time for most of the next two decades.  His firm resolve to achieve the 
return of the ashes was thus both an offering to the shrine of Napoleonic memory and a 
means of making his own dramatic stamp on French history.  But in his quest to bring the 
repatriation project to fruition, Thiers hoped to satisfy not only his personal ambitions but 
his political objectives as well, almost all of which revolved around the goal of restoring 
France to a position of prominence in international relations.  Consistently subordinating 
domestic concerns and dynastic imperatives to the prerogatives of national autonomy and 
honor, he energetically undertook to convince his reluctant sovereign of the necessity of a 
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more aggressive foreign policy.  For Thiers, the triumphant return of Napoleon’s ashes 
was part and parcel of this policy, a dramatic public gesture that would enhance the 
prestige of the regime both at home and abroad by indicating France’s determination to 
recover the remnants of a glorious past in service of an even more glorious future.  
The “Eastern Question,” which embroiled France and the other major European 
powers in the power struggle between the Ottoman Sultan and Mohammad Ali Pasha of 
Egypt, proved to be the perfect storm in which Thiers’ ambitions coalesced with the 
potency of Napoleonic memories.  Despite the fact that Ali had fought in the combined 
Ottoman-British expedition to force Napoleon out of Egypt, he was an enormously 
popular figure in France during the 1830’s, being widely regarded as a disciple of the 
emperor.  There were certainly parallels between the two men in their rise to power.  Ali 
began his career as an Albanian commander in the Ottoman army sent to expel 
Napoleon’s forces from Egypt in 1799.  Taking advantage of the power vacuum left after 
the French occupation ended in 1801, Ali seized power and forced the Sultan Selim III to 
recognize him as wāli, or governor, of Egypt in 1805.  His story doubtless struck a 
familiar chord amongst audiences of the Napoleonic myth; a military adventurer (or 
usurper, depending on one’s perspective), Ali, like Napoleon, catapulted himself to a 
position of extraordinary political power by offering an antidote to the divisive forces of 
anarchy.  Moreover, Ali’s massive industrialization and modernization projects were all 
directed towards rebuilding his army on Napoleonic principles, and were undertaken with 
the help of many retired French officers and soldiers, some of whom had converted to 
Islam and remained in Egypt after the campaign of 1798.  Thus, Ali was easily imagined 
 221 
by many as the heir to Napoleon’s frustrated orientalist ambitions to modernize Egypt for 
the benefit of France. 
Ali likewise resembled Napoleon in his territorial ambitions.  Having been denied 
his request for control of Syria as the price of his assistance rendered to the Ottomans 
during the Greek War of Independence, Ali invaded the territory in 1831.  The sultan 
conceded to his demands on the condition that he govern Syria under the nominal 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire.  Tensions escalated further when Ali made another bid 
for independence in 1839, and soundly defeated the Ottomans at the battle of Nezib.  
Whereas previous Ottoman pleas for assistance had largely fallen on deaf ears in Europe, 
with the exception of Russia, intervention on behalf of the Turks now appeared 
inevitable.  Opinions in France, however, remained divided, and by early 1840 had 
largely polarized around the positions adopted by Guizot and Thiers.  The former, then 
serving as ambassador to England, counseled against delay and sought to keep French 
policy in line with that of the other powers, while the latter saw advantages to be gained 
from helping to establish Ali as a strong independent power in Egypt, hoping that France 
would be accorded more influence in the region as a reward.  Thiers firmly believed that 
a successful military venture in support of Ali would greatly enhance the strength and 
prestige of the Orléans regime, and remained obdurate in the attempts to reach a 
consensus with the other powers concerning the Eastern Question. Invested with the 
portfolio of Foreign Affairs on 1 March, Thiers ultimately succeeded in imposing his 
point of view, and France elected to support Ali’s claims to Syria in the face of 
opposition from the other great powers. 
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Meanwhile, England, Austria, Russia and Prussia took advantage of France’s 
hesitation and formed the Quadruple Alliance, in effect excluding France from what was 
to be Europe’s answer to the Eastern Question.  The terms of the London treaty, signed 
on 15 July 1840 right under Guizot’s nose, promised Ali hereditary control of Egypt 
provided he accept their terms within ten days and renounce all other territorial claims, 
pledging military assistance to the Ottomans in the event that Ali did not surrender.  
France reacted swiftly to this blatant diplomatic snub.  While he stopped short of openly 
provoking war, Thiers had certainly done nothing to prevent it and now appeared to 
welcome the prospect.  The conscript classes of 1836-39 were called up in late July, 
yielding 480,000 men, while the Chambers voted 8,120,000 francs in war credits.  
Capitalizing on the war fever mounting in Paris throughout the late summer, Thiers was 
also successful in accelerating plans for the fortification of Paris.  The Allied occupations 
of 1814-15 had dramatically exposed the capital’s vulnerabilities, but half-hearted 
commissions for the defense of Paris under both the Restoration and July Monarchy had 
so far been plagued by inaction and disagreement.  The Belgian Revolution had briefly 
revived a sense of urgency in attending to the city’s fortifications, but it was not until 
1840 that the threat of invasion was sufficiently strong for Thiers to secure the support he 
needed.  In this, as with so many of Thiers’ ambitions, the specter of Napoleon loomed 
large; convinced of the project’s necessity by the Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, in which 
Napoleon expressed his regret at having never adequately undertaken the defense of his 
capital city, Thiers could flatter himself as executing the wishes of his idol.378 
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Unfortunately, the answer to the Eastern Question resulted in yet another 
humiliation for France and for Thiers.  Louis-Philippe, wary of going to war against 
England, refused to retaliate on behalf of Ali after the British navy bombarded Beirut in 
September 1840.  The tug-of-war between the king and his foreign minister produced a 
tepid declaration that France would oppose efforts to forcibly depose Ali, but was vague 
on territorial stipulations.  Ultimately Ali capitulated, and his French partisans were 
forced to admit they had been wrong “about his moral worth and the material worth of his 
forces.”379  Thiers resigned in late October only to be supplanted as the directing force on 
the council by Guizot, whose ideas about foreign policy, especially with regard to Great 
Britain, were far more in line with those of his prudent sovereign.   
Thiers’ outrage over the formation of the Quadruple Alliance was shared by a 
large majority of French public opinion, and this recent diplomatic betrayal vividly 
conjured up specters of past humiliations.  Inviting parallels with the enemy coalitions of 
yore that had ranged themselves against revolutionary France and especially against 
Napoleon, the Quadruple Alliance appeared to echo the spirit behind the 1814 Treaty of 
Chaumont, which had bound the same signatories to prosecute war against France 
indefinitely until they secured unequivocal victory over the emperor.  The July 
Monarchy’s efforts to distance itself from revolutionary élan throughout the 1830s 
notwithstanding, France once again saw herself in the allegorical role of Liberty leading 
the oppressed people of Europe.  The public’s reaction was evidenced in part by the flood 
of bellicose sentiments found in the political press.  Not coincidentally, some of the most 
violent reactions were to be found in those newspapers in which Thiers had a vested 
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interest – the liberal stalwart Le Constitutionnel suggested that Palmerston’s deceit was 
tantamount to a declaration of war in Europe, while the more radical Le National 
proposed lining the frontiers with troops and a campaign to incite revolution on the 
Italian peninsula.  Other papers like Le Siècle and Le Temps revived timeworn 
revolutionary rhetoric against the northern courts, bulwarks of old regime absolutism and 
aristocracy.  Parisian crowds betrayed their revolutionary fervor by singing the 
Marseillaise in the theaters and cabarets, and even the government, which up until now 
had been careful to pose as a guarantee against further revolution in Europe, threatened 
to open the floodgates of insurrection against the members of the Quadruple Alliance.380 
What might have been so much hot air had very serious consequences, provoking 
the so-called Rhine Crisis of 1840.  Thwarted in his policy with regards to the Middle 
East, Thiers redirected his frustrated ambitions into the projected reconquest of France’s 
“natural eastern boundary.”  Of all the consequences of the 1815 treaties, the loss of the 
left bank of the Rhine was the one that was most palpable still in 1840, and if France’s 
erstwhile allies proved unwilling to renegotiate the terms of those treaties through 
diplomacy, then perhaps she might still secure their revision by force.  Thiers’ rhetoric 
was violently echoed by left-leaning journalists, poets, and political writers who bellowed 
loudly and bellicosely in the direction of Germany, where they were equally matched by 
volleys of anti-French fury.  Although preparations for armed conflict on both sides 
ultimately proved in vain, the Rhine Crisis of 1840 played out in a sort of proxy “poetic 
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war.”381  The opening salvo was fired as early as 1836 by Edgar Quinet, whose early 
admiration for German philosophy had given way to violent opposition to growing 
nationalist sentiment on the other side of the Rhine.  His poem “Les bords du Rhin,” 
which appeared in the Revue des deux mondes, vehemently reasserted France’s claims to 
the contested frontier.  “It belongs to us, friends, by the blood of our ancestors,/By the 
borders of bronze torn from the frontiers,/By the solemn oath of twenty kings on their 
knees.”382  Although Quinet’s incendiary verses went unanswered at the time, the 
prospect of a renewed French offensive on the Rhine in 1840 provoked an outpouring of 
German nationalism in response.  The defiant lines of Nikolaus Becker’s “Rheinlied” – 
“They will not have it, the free German Rhine,” – prompted Alfred de Musset to 
tauntingly riposte with allusions to the era of Napoleonic conquest – “We have already 
had it, your German Rhine.”  Max Schneckenburger’s poem “Die Wacht am Rhein,” a 
powerful manifestation of pan-German sentiment that set to music would become the 
unofficial anthem of the Franco-Prussian War some thirty years later, also originated in 
this earlier crisis. 
While for some the Quadruple Alliance was simply a painful reminder of past 
defeat and humiliation, the crisis of 1840 had the effect of actually collapsing time for 
Edgar Quinet, whose pamphlet 1815 et 1840, first published in October, proved so 
popular that it warranted a second edition the following month, even after the immediate 
threat of war had largely subsided with the fall of the Thiers ministry.  For Quinet, the 
Quadruple Alliance furnished proof that the rest of Europe still considered France in the 
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position of a vanquished foe, and the nation “was plunged again in that mute solitude 
imposed by defeat.  She finds herself once again on the day after Waterloo, as if we had 
fought and lost the battle all over again.”383  In his estimation, the Quadruple Alliance 
was the product of France’s failure to avenge Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 and the 
debilitating effects of the subsequent peace settlements: “If we submit to treaties written 
with the blood of Waterloo, we are still legally in the eyes of the world only the 
vanquished of Waterloo.”384  Lulled into a false sense of security by minor victories over 
her rivals in foreign affairs, France had to confront the rude reality that England, Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia intended to redraw the world map without her.  “What will become 
of France,” he asked, “on the day when she finds herself excluded from a movement that 
rejoins the West with Asia?  What will remain of this country, deprived at the same time 
of the Rhine and the Mediterranean?”385  What was needed now was an aggressive 
foreign policy, for the civil liberties secured by the Revolution of 1830 meant nothing 
without national autonomy.  Quinet echoed the popular sentiment that a reconquest of the 
left bank of the Rhine was the only way for France to repudiate the subordinate role 
assigned to her by the other powers.  His polemic was thus a resounding denunciation of 
what he saw as Louis-Philippe’s cowardice, evidenced by the king’s refusal to answer 
Germany’s claims to the left bank of the Rhine.  The spirit of Quinet’s highly influential 
text proved infectious, and in establishing a causal link between the crises of 1815 and 
1840 he set the tone for much of the discourse in the political press.  
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Not surprisingly, public outrage over the Quadruple Alliance was directed first in 
the direction of Great Britain, supposed to be France’s ally in the diplomatic hornet’s nest 
created by the Eastern Question.  Overall, the period of the July Monarchy witnessed a 
significant thaw in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France, a thaw that 
owed much to the Whigs’ sympathetic stance with regards to France’s revolutions as well 
as Louis-Philippe’s own benevolent feelings towards a nation that had harbored him in 
exile.  Although Palmerston maintained a cautious attitude while the fate of Belgium was 
being decided in the early 1830s, relations improved after France withdrew its troops and 
the fledgling Orléans regime made it clear that it had no wish to fan the flames of 
European revolution.  The next few years brought the two even closer together, impelled 
towards a pragmatic alliance as a means of blocking Russia’s ambitions in the 
Mediterranean, an alliance that subsequently deteriorated in the latter half of the decade 
as conflicts in the Iberian peninsula and the Greek war provided fresh opportunities for 
rivalry.  Relations reached their nadir with the Egyptian crisis in 1840, but improved 
dramatically in the first half of the 1840s.  Succeeding Palmerston and Thiers, Aberdeen 
and Guizot energetically pursued an “entente cordiale,” hoping to free themselves to 
concentrate on domestic affairs by avoiding international squabbles.  But this mutual 
accord between the historic rivals was highly fragile, maintained largely through amiable 
relations between the royal families rather than formal agreements, and was greatly at 
odds with popular attitudes in both countries.  The Napoleonic Wars had conditioned the 
British to view the French as inherently and aggressively expansionist, the pacifist 
attitudes of both Louis XVIII and Louis-Philippe having done nothing to allay those 
suspicions.  The French, for their part, continued to see the British as arrogant and 
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malevolent, conclusions which appeared to be even more justifiable in the wake of 
diplomatic crisis provoked by Ali’s adventure in Egypt.386  Particularly indicative of the 
public’s mood in Paris that summer was a popular opera on the life of Charles VI, whose 
refrain – “No, no, never in France,/Never will the English reign!” – was greeted with wild 
applause and could be heard echoing throughout the streets of the capital.387 
It was in this context that the impending return of Napoleon’s remains from St. 
Helena acquired new and unforeseen significance.  A few voices continued to echo the 
tone of the official rhetoric surrounding the return of the ashes, optimistic about its 
symbolic power to fashion a new alliance between England and France.  The poet 
Théodore Villenave, whose verses and literary reviews frequently appeared in the liberal 
press, called upon the two nations to recognize that they both faced a more pernicious 
enemy in the form of Russia, whose unbridled ambitions with regard to the 
Mediterranean could only be checked if the two historic rivals agreed to bury their 
discord and animosity: 
 Your mutual interests in both war and peace 
 Command you to forget a painful past: 
 Both of you must renounce this rivalry. 
[…] Unite your forces and your glory! 
 What an unfortunate attack by this imprudent minister; 
 Would he relinquish England’s trident to the Kremlin? 
 This sacred tomb of an august victim, 
 That elicits our remorse for such a crime, 
 This coffin where a great warrior, king of kings, lies sleeping, 
 Will it really reawaken the hatreds of the past? 
 […] Napoleon himself said, with his eye to the future, 
 The world is big enough for both of you! 
Yes, the world awaits the honest alliance 
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Of Albion’s trident with France’s scepter.388 
  
But for most of the commentators in 1840, the return of the ashes became an opportunity 
to denounce Albion’s most recent perfidy by recalling England’s past transgressions 
against the emperor.  In a poem titled “France et l’ombre de Napoléon,” Louis Niémy 
suggested that the July Monarchy had been utterly foolish to place its trust in Great 
Britain as an ally in negotiations over the Eastern Question.  The return of the ashes had 
fixed France’s attention on her recent past, which furnished numerous proofs that the 
English were a nation of wily and deceitful characters.  Here Niémy alluded to the mythic 
narrative of the post-Waterloo drama in which Napoleon was cruelly duped by Captain 
Maitland, commander of the Bellerophon, into believing that he would be granted asylum 
in England.  Thus, trusting in the respect accorded to an enemy honorably vanquished on 
the field of battle, Napoleon rejected advice that he attempt an escape to America and 
instead, “like Themistocles,” threw himself at the mercy of his captors.  (Even if 
Maitland, perhaps overwhelmed by the immense responsibility of his charge and 
captivated by the charm and charisma of his illustrious prisoner, did give Napoleon and 
his entourage reason to believe that their request would be met favorably by the British 
government, he did so entirely without authority and without a realistic grasp of the 
political ramifications of such a request.  Nonetheless, this version of the story largely 
sufficed for the myth-makers, not least because it accorded well with long-standing 
French stereotypes of the English national character.)  The Quadruple Alliance was 
simply the latest example of England’s willingness to renege on promises made when its 
interests were at stake, for Niémy, among others, believed that England had destroyed the 
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pact of alliance with France and betrayed her to the other powers in order to colonize 
Egypt for its sole benefit.  The optimistic faith expressed by Rémusat, Villenave, and 
others that the transfer of Napoleon’s ashes would usher in a new era of mutual goodwill 
between England and France was for Niémy a vain hope, for the former’s apparent 
magnanimity was nothing but a thin disguise for its “perverse projects/to make France 
disappear/From the face of the universe/To paralyze the power/Of your influence.”389   
Niémy ended his poem on a rather pessimistic note, chastising his compatriots for 
their evident lack of amour-propre and patriotism.  In their failure to avenge the insults 
inflicted by the Quadruple Alliance, they had insulted the memory of a great man, and 
they ought to leave his remains in peace on St. Helena instead of bringing them back to a 
France that was undeserving of this singular honor.  The poet Louis Belmontet adopted a 
less resigned air, seeing in the act of the return itself the symbolic potential to raise 
France from her abject state and repudiate the humiliating treaties of both the past and 
present eras.  Belmontet had a long history of enthusiasm for the Napoleonic cause.  
After the second restoration of the Bourbons in 1815, he was expelled from the lycée at 
Toulouse by Louis XVIII for his violent provocations towards royalist students during the 
Hundred Days.  Although his first poetic attempt, a patriotic elegy entitled “Les Mânes de 
Waterloo” penned at the age of eighteen, was ill-received, Belmontet was undaunted and 
moved to Paris, where he collaborated with the likes of Victor Hugo, Alfred de Vigny, 
and Charles Nodier in editing the literary review La Muse française.  He participated in 
the Charbonnerie movement and became increasingly active in politics after the July 
Revolution, at one point even arrested on suspicion of Bonapartist conspiracy.  Belmontet 
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also cultivated relationships with several members of the Bonaparte family, including the 
future Napoleon III, securing himself a position as editor of Le Capitole, the Bonapartist 
newspaper financed by the pretender.  Although defeated in his first electoral attempts in 
1848, he later served as a deputy and member of the Corps législatif under the Second 
Empire. 
Napoleon’s death in 1821 had moved Belmontet to anticipate the “inexorable but 
impassive truth” of History’s judgment, and the return of the ashes nearly twenty years 
later provided him with an occasion to revisit the significance of Napoleonic memories.  
Cloaking his verses in strong religious language, Belmontet interpreted the return of the 
ashes as “a deliverance,/The closure of our woes,/The Resurrection of France’s 
pride,/And the Easter of the three colors!”  Ascribing immense symbolic power to 
Napoleon’s physical remains, he suggested that England had been able to render France 
powerless by in effect holding the body hostage for nearly two decades.  Napoleon’s 
funeral was thus rightly an occasion for joy rather than grief, for it heralded an end to 
twenty-five years of mourning for French dignity and autonomy: “The time has come for 
us to be happy, to let our hearts burst with joy/As they did long ago, when we were the 
victors.”  The ceremonies of December 1840 signaled much more than a burial for the 
emperor; they were a burial for the metaphorical shackles imposed upon France by the 
treaties of 1815 and 1840.  “The great martyr was no longer bound by the chains of 
England,” and nor, by implication, was France.390  Thus, whereas for Niémy it was of 
critical importance for France to repudiate the Quadruple Alliance in order to render itself 
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worthy of receiving Napoleon’s remains, for Belmontet, the return of the ashes would in 
itself effect that repudiation.       
The bellicose spirit dominating French public discourse in the summer of 1840 
shaped sentiments about the return of Napoleon’s ashes in predictable ways, eliciting 
fiercely nationalist pride in France’s imperial past.  As the clamor for war that was 
whipped to a fever pitch by Thiers and the left-leaning political press gave way to Louis-
Philippe’s pacificism over the course of the year, those who ached to avenge France’s 
diplomatic reversals over the Eastern Question sought solace in memories of France’s 
victorious past.  Poets and political writers chanted an endless litany of Napoleonic battle 
names – Austerlitz, Ulm, Jena, Friedland, Wagram – as a reminder to the members of the 
Quadruple Alliance of the humiliations they had once suffered at the hands of France.  
But the crisis of 1840 also reinvigorated the mythic enterprise of situating the emperor 
squarely within France’s revolutionary tradition, as writers continually labored to define 
the ideological descent of imperial politics from the principles of 1789 and to reinterpret 
the Napoleonic Wars as wars of liberation from absolutist tyranny rather than of 
conquest. 
The Quadruple Alliance’s united front against France heightened awareness of the 
nation’s unique historical role as the torchbearer of revolution throughout Europe.  For 
much of the liberal opposition, it was imperative that France resume the mission of 
spreading revolutionary principles abroad by supporting nationalist liberation movements 
emerging elsewhere in Europe in the early 1830’s.  The Belgian Revolution offered the 
July Monarchy its first opportunity to reassert French influence in continental affairs, an 
opportunity that turned out to be wasted in the eyes of the left-wing opposition after the 
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regime proved unwilling to antagonize the rest of Europe by meddling too heavily in 
Belgian affairs.  Casting their eyes around the continent in 1840, political writers 
concluded that the universal struggle for emancipation from absolutist tyranny was far 
from over, and the Orléans regime drew criticism for so quickly divesting itself of the 
revolutionary mantle that it had so eagerly adopted in July 1830.  The repeated failure to 
achieve Polish independence, a perennial cause célèbre of liberals throughout Europe, 
figured prominently in this discourse.  Many of the July Monarchy’s most ardent critics 
believed that France ought to have taken a more actively interventionist position on 
Poland’s behalf in 1830, for it was France’s successful struggle against tyranny at the end 
of the nineteenth century that had inspired the Poles to seek liberation from the predatory 
impulses of its more powerful neighbors: “Poland arose, and like a second 
France,/Quickly rose up to reconquer her rights.”  The common cause that joined the two 
revolutions made France’s refusal to aid the Poles appear unconscionable, and Louis-
Philippe disgraced himself by turning a deaf ear to their pleas for assistance when his 
own reign had been baptized by revolutionary fire: 
Shame on that deceitful authority, whose hypocritical hand 
Covered France with disgrace when, 
Irritated to find herself tied down in cowardly repose, 
She burned to plant the oriflamme on the banks of the Rhine, 
And by its noble support bring back to life that flame 
That made the Belgians a people of heroes!”391 
 
For Niémy, French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine assumed a crucial 
significance not only as the fulfillment of nature’s design for French territory, but as a 
symbol of the revolutionary march of progress across Europe against the retrograde 
forces of reaction and absolutism. 
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Napoleon, by virtue of the mythic narrative that cast him in the role as heir to the 
revolutionary principles of 1789 and a friend to the victims of absolutist tyranny, made 
for a useful foil to Louis-Philippe’s reticence.  Laced with strong overtones of Christian 
socialism, Charles Picard’s 1840 poem, “L’ombre de Napoléon, pour la France, au 
monde démocratique ou consitutionnel, contre les rois absolus de l’Europe, en guerre, 
contre Mehmet Ali,” made Napoleon a standard-bearer for constitutional democracy, “the 
only system of government that is universal, or Catholic.”  Picard offered a populist 
interpretation of the Napoleonic creed that prefigured the full-blown Bonapartist rhetoric 
of the Second Empire.  Napoleon fought for the principles of national sovereignty, 
fraternity, equality, and, curiously enough, liberty of the press.  His true interests were 
aligned not with the bourgeoisie but with the humble and the poor, to whom he stood as 
guarantee of peace and prosperity at home (but not necessarily abroad).  “I salute you, 
soldier of enslaved nations, take arms!  Go forth and fight to deliver forever nations from 
slavery, despotism, oppression, and misery.  For the day has finally come for the 
emancipation of peoples – the world is stirring, ready to rise up against despotism and the 
absolutism of kings.”  The timely return of his ashes, so close on the heels of the 
checkmate inflicted by the Quadruple Alliance, was a reminder to France of her proper 
role as “the apostle to modern nations of the Gospel of holy liberty.” 392  She need only 
give the signal and universal revolution would unleash itself from Egypt to Poland to the 
Rhine valley, spelling annihilation for England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia.  
If Napoleon was the chief protagonist of this discourse, Thiers was the 
understudy.  His shrewd appeals to French pride in the Napoleonic past paid off, earning 
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him the praise of writers who demanded revenge for the nation’s recent humiliations.  
Louis-Philippe’s pacificism, which had already come under attack earlier in his reign, 
proved to be especially unpopular in 1840, and Thiers’ belligerent stance towards the 
Quadruple Alliance contrasted sharply to his benefit with that of France’s “prudent 
monarch.”  His assumption of presidency of the council in March was translated as a 
message to the “coalition of kings” that “France is no longer that docile slave” who had 
yielded uncomplainingly to the Allies in 1815.393  Above all, he reaped the rewards of his 
assiduous efforts to consecrate the Napoleonic past with official recognition under the 
July Monarchy.   
You, ministers, raise your heads with pride. 
The voice of the people called for this coffin, 
And you listened…Thiers, with this tribute, 
In a word, wrote the finest page in his book.394 
 
By “ministers,” Villenave was quick to specify, he meant those “of 1 March,” whose 
respect for the Napoleonic past distinguished them sharply from Guizot, “the man who 
stayed in Ghent [in exile with Louis XVIII] while Napoleon was at Waterloo.”395  Thiers’ 
admirers fully recognized that his ambition to reclaim the body of Napoleon, martyred by 
the Holy Alliance, was perfectly compatible with his intentions to restore the nation to a 
position of power and influence in Europe, being an act of defiance against a coalition of 
enemies whose character and aims had changed little between 1815 and 1840. 
Thiers’ militancy in foreign affairs and his burning ambition to see Napoleon’s 
ashes returned to France were thus two sides of the same coin.  Entirely aware of the 
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political utility of the bellicose pride latent in memories of the Napoleonic past, he 
actively encouraged those memories not only out of personal inclination but also in order 
to foster widespread public support for a military endeavor in the summer of 1840, be it 
in the direction of the Mediterranean or the Rhine.396  The direction taken by French 
public opinion over the course of the year proved the shrewdness of his strategy, 
demonstrating that memories of Waterloo and the humiliating treaties of 1815 still 
loomed large in national consciousness.  Like the Revolution of 1830, the Eastern Crisis 
was seen as an occasion to revise the lingering consequences of those treaties and restore 
the nation to a position of importance vis-à-vis the rest of Europe, ultimately another 
missed opportunity.  Unable to impose its will upon the concert of Europe, frustrated in 
its ambitions to regain the left bank of the Rhine, France had to settle for a more symbolic 
way of repudiating the disasters of 1815, and in this context the return of the ashes 
assumed enormous importance.  
Thus, the hopes that the return of Napoleon’s remains might facilitate a 
reconciliation between England and France proved by summer’s end to be chimerical, as 
faith in the magnanimity of Albion’s gesture quickly evaporated in the wake of 
Palmerston’s diplomatic coup.  But the funeral ceremonies planned for December 1840 
still held out hope that the return of Napoleon’s ashes might promote reconciliation on 
the domestic front.  Much more than mere pomp and circumstance, the highly elaborate 
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and detailed plans for these ceremonies were constructed with one aim in mind – to 
demonstrate that the regime no longer had anything to fear from the Napoleonic past, that 
it had lost its power as a divisive force in French political culture.  To do so, the symbols 
and rituals involved in those ceremonies had to clearly articulate the July Monarchy’s 
narrative of the French past, and Napoleon’s place in it. 
 
Rituals of Reconciliation 
From the moment it was loaded aboard the Belle-Poule in Jamestown harbor on 
17 October, the movements of Napoleon’s coffin were carefully choreographed to furnish 
the requisite amount of public spectacle.  Joinville’s frigate put into harbor at Cherbourg 
on the morning of 30 November, where the catafalque remained until 8 December, when 
it was transferred to Le Havre and thence up the Seine by a flotilla of smaller vessels.  
Spectators swarmed the quays all along the route to witness its passage towards Paris, 
and elaborate receptions were thrown at several stops along the way.  In Rouen, for 
example, the flotilla passed beneath a triumphal arch constructed on the suspension 
bridge spanning the river, the banks of which were strewn with trophies bearing the 
names of Napoleonic victories.  A ceremony of absolution performed by the archbishop 
was followed by a hundred-gun salute, while veterans of the Grande Armée showered the 
catafalque with laurel branches from the bridge as it passed beneath.  For traditionally 
royalist Normandy, where economic hardships exacted by Napoleon’s ill-conceived 
Continental System and the demands of conscription had long fueled hostility to the 
emperor, this popular enthusiasm represented a dramatic departure from attitudes in 
1814-15, when the local population demonstrated a marked indifference to news of his 
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defeat.397  Similar scenes were repeated as the flotilla progressed up the Seine in slow 
stages – at Le Havre, Quillebeuf, Val-de-la-Haye – until it reached its final destination of 
Courbevoie.398 
Like Napoleon’s coronation day some thirty-six years earlier, 15 December 1840 
proved to be one of the coldest days on record, but the weather was no deterrent to the 
hundreds of thousands who would witness the grand spectacle of Napoleon’s funeral.  
The icy but brilliant December sunshine was taken as a favorable omen, drawing all-too-
easy comparisons with the “sun of Austerlitz.”  Departing Courbevoie at ten o’clock that 
morning, the coffin was transferred to an immense funeral car, nearly eleven meters in 
height and weighing more than thirteen tons, and concealed beneath a cenotaph supported 
by twelve sculptural figures representing victories and decorated with the symbolic 
attributes of imperial power.  Drawn by sixteen black horses, this unwieldy structure 
made its way down the Avenue de Neuilly to the Arc de Triomphe, where it was joined 
with the rest of the funeral cortège, and from there proceeded along the Champs Élysées 
to the Place de la Concorde and across the river.  At the church of Les Invalides, the 
coffin was deposited by a simple yet eloquent exchange between Joinville and the king: 
“Sire, I present you with the body of the Emperor Napoleon;” “I receive it in the name of 
France,” followed by a requiem mass performed by the Archbishop of Paris.  Over the 
next three weeks, more than 100,000 people lined up outside the church, temporarily 
opened to the public, patiently waiting in the frigid winter air for their turn to file past the 
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coffin and pay their respects to the body of France’s most illustrious hero, returned to the 
patrie after twenty-five years in exile. 
The funeral ceremonies of December 1840 shared much in common with that 
staple event in the exercise of medieval and early modern kingship, the royal entry into 
Paris, another ritual practice that had reconciliatory potential.  Examining historical 
instances of entries into Paris that followed periods of civil discord – those made by 
Charles VII following the Armagnac-Burgundy conflict, by Henri IV at the close of the 
Wars of Religion in 1594, by the Bourbons following Napoleon’s first abdication in 
1814, and by de Gaulle after the liberation of Paris in August 1944 – Michel de Waele 
argues that this event offered “its principal protagonist a unique opportunity to mobilize 
the living forces of the state and to unite them in a national communion which facilitates 
reconciliation.”399  Like the “normal” entries made at the beginning of a new reign, the 
monarch’s physical presence in his capital city in the aftermath of civil strife manifested 
an act of union between the king and his subjects, securing their loyalty to him and their 
recognition of his legitimacy.  Often more spontaneous than the elaborately planned 
entries made by new monarchs, argues de Waele, the reconciliatory entry distinguished 
itself from “normal” entries principally by emphasizing unanimity over corporate 
divisions and social hierarchies, and continuity over change.400  
Likewise, Napoleon’s funeral was intended to symbolize an act of reconciliation, 
less between warring elements within French society and more between the present 
moment and the past.  Like participants in the older royal entry ceremonies, witnesses to 
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Napoleon’s funeral attached great importance to the physical presence of Napoleon’s 
body on French soil, and in particular in that city that bore so many visible traces of his 
commitment to embellishing the capital with monuments of everlasting beauty and 
utility.  Poets, journalists, and other writers often invoked the phrase from Napoleon’s 
last will and testament in which he expressed his desire to be laid to rest “on the banks of 
the Seine, amidst the French people whom I loved so well,” words that were later 
inscribed above the stairwell leading to the crypt in the church of Les Invalides.  They 
hoped that his remains, returned to France after a long captivity at the hands of a mortal 
enemy, would become “the palladium of the patrie,” a safeguard against further 
encroachments on her honor or integrity.401  Commentators on the day’s events also took 
great care to document mass public participation in the day’s events, demonstrating both 
unity of sentiment and unity of purpose: “The streets were deserted, and the shops 
closed…One had the sense that all of Paris had spilled over to one side of the city, like 
liquid in a vase that has tipped over.”402  
Like the royal entry rites of the Renaissance period, Napoleon’s funeral was a 
means of “dramatizing political concepts.”403  In this case, it was a way for the July 
Monarchy to demonstrate reconnaissance and reconciliation by historically situating 
Napoleon in the French past.  In theory, at least, the composition of the funeral cortège 
and the decorative elements of the procession were designed to promote both the military 
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glory and civic virtues of Napoleon’s reign, since he was, after all, acknowledged in 
Rémusat’s speech of 12 May as both as a military hero and “legitimate sovereign of our 
country.”  Nonetheless, the latter was clearly subordinated to the former on the day of 
Napoleon’s funeral.  Like the processional order of participants in the old royal entry 
rites, Napoleon’s funeral cortège transmitted a series of visually encoded messages about 
the importance of each socio-legal unit therein and the abstract virtues it represented; in 
the former, it provided a crucial representation of the corporate and hierarchical order of 
late medieval and early modern French society, in the latter, an interpretation of the 
Napoleonic past and its significance in the longer narrative of French history.  The Army 
and its attendant virtues of courage and patriotic self-sacrifice dominated the procession 
that wound its way from the Place d’Étoile to the Place des Invalides, taking the various 
forms of lancers, cuirassiers, infantry battalions, artillery batteries, National Guard 
squadrons, and students from the écoles militaires, as well as the easily recognizable 
figures of such Napoleonic relics as Marshals Gérard, Molitor, and Oudinot.  Hundreds of 
veterans of the imperial armies, who were discourteously omitted by the official design 
but insisted on taking their place at the rear of the cortège nonetheless, furnished the most 
poignant spectacle in the procession, trailing along in their old threadbare uniforms.  (The 
more sentimental and naïve spectators were also deeply moved by the sight of a horse, 
tricked out in the First Consul’s old saddle and supposed to be Napoleon’s old battle 
charger but who was, in fact, borrowed from the Paris undertakers.404) 
But the State was curiously absent, or, at best, underrepresented.  Eighty-seven 
noncommissioned officers, mounted and carrying flags inscribed with the names of 
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France’s departments (and one for her newest territory, Algeria), might be said to have 
represented the Nation.  Two glaring omissions made themselves resoundingly felt, the 
first being the royal family, which, with the exception of Joinville, who was given pride 
of place in the procession along with the Belle-Poule’s sailors, proceeded directly to Les 
Invalides by an alternate route.  The other notable absence was the government itself.  
Neither the deputies nor the ministry nor any high-ranking administrators, with the 
exception of those representing the city of Paris, played any part in the procession, but 
instead massed themselves among the banks of seats that held more than 40,000 people 
on the Esplanade des Invalides, playing the role of spectators rather than participants in 
the funeral. 
The same favor shown to the military aspects of Napoleon’s legacy in the funeral 
procession was evident in its decorative aspects as well.  Designed principally by the 
architect Louis Visconti, who was also later awarded the commission to build Napoleon’s 
tomb, the entire funeral route featured a host of sculptural decoration that visually 
transmitted the regime’s official message about Napoleon’s historical significance.  The 
abstract virtues of Wisdom, Strength, Justice, and others represented by the allegorical 
figures ornamenting the Place de la Concorde were rendered all but invisible by the far 
more prominent military symbols that dominated the rest of decoration.  For example, a 
monument depicting Napoleon’s apotheosis staged on a platform beneath the Arc de 
Triomphe showed the emperor in his coronation robes, standing in front of his throne on 
a trophy composed of enemy weapons, supported by two allegorical figures representing 
Glory and the French patrie, and flanked by two renommées à cheval in the form of 
Peace and Grandeur.  The Champs-Élysées was also transformed into a pageant stage, the 
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imposing façades of its maisons particulières draped with flags of black or tricolor to 
form a suitable background for the sixty-four decorative motifs that lined the sweeping 
boulevard.  Thirty-six statues representing French victories alternated with twenty-eight 
columns topped by a globe and imperial eagle, each bearing the name and date of a 
Napoleonic battle.  Both the funeral temple constructed outside the entrance to Les 
Invalides and the pillars of the church nave inside were inscribed with the names of 
Napoleon’s marshals and the battles in which they earned their eternal fame, while 
twenty-four banners, each naming a splendid French victory in the Napoleonic Wars, 
hung below the upper windows of the dome.  The Chapel of St. Jerome, where 
Napoleon’s coffin was installed until construction of the tomb was finally completed in 
1861, was decorated with shields inscribed with Marengo, Wagram, Austerlitz, and Jena 
and the standards taken at Austerlitz.  
But perhaps the most significant clues to the July Monarchy’s reading of the 
Napoleonic past could be found on the Esplanade des Invalides, which was lined on both 
sides with thirty-two plaster statues, each five meters high, representing famous figures 
from French history from Clovis to Henri IV to Louis XIV.  From a reconciliatory 
perspective, these statues provided the requisite elements of continuity and affirmation of 
collective identity by situating the Napoleonic era squarely within the narrative of the 
nation’s past.  At first glance, the strategy behind the selection of these historical figures 
appears to have been the same that drove Louis-Philippe’s restoration project at 
Versailles, aimed at constructing a museum dedicated “to all the Glories of France” and 
encompassing the whole of her history from the Merovingians to the present era.  The 
museum was to be a testament not only to French history but also to the confident 
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magnanimity of the present regime, which was secure enough in its authority to pay equal 
homage to its ancestors, even those to which it was ideologically opposed.405  But the 
plaster pageant that unfolded on the Esplanade des Invalides also clearly prioritized 
Napoleon’s military prowess over his role as sovereign as the key to his claims to 
belonging in this illustrious lineage, for every single personage in this cast of thirty-two 
immortals was included for his (or her, Jeanne d’Arc being the lone exception) 
contribution to French national glory on the field of battle.  It was, moreover, populated 
by royals and non-royals alike; Bayard stood side-by-side with François I, while 
Charlemagne and Louis XII rubbed elbows with Napoleon’s contemporaries, self-made 
men of the revolutionary and imperial armies like Hoche, Kléber, and Ney.  Rather than 
clarifying Napoleon’s place in French history, this assortment of heroes actually 
introduced a note of doubt – was the regime, after all, recognizing the Emperor Napoleon 
or General Bonaparte?  Finally, it was perhaps a way of hinting that while on this day 
Napoleon might enjoy center stage in the affections and gratitude of the French people, 
ultimately he was taking his place amidst a pantheon of other national heroes with whom 
he would have to share posterity’s limelight. 
Thus, for all the somber grandeur of the gesture, Napoleon’s state funeral 
betrayed a certain tentativeness on the part of its sponsors.  As Victor Hugo caustically 
pointed out, the decorations hardly concealed their hasty construction and transient 
purpose – plaster substituted for marble, canvas was disguised as gold cloth, rags 
masqueraded as wallpaper – and seemed to betray the artifice of the government and its 
intentions with regard to the day’s events.  “The gold was nothing but an illusion; fir 
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wood and cardboard were the reality.  I would have liked to see a magnificence more 
sincere in the emperor’s funeral car.”  Hugo proved an unrelenting critic of the whole 
affair, uncovering the July Monarchy’s persistently ambivalent attitudes towards 
Napoleon with a characteristically perspicacious and acerbic tone: 
The whole ceremony had something of a smoke and mirrors quality about it.  The 
government seemed to fear the very phantom that it evoked, wanting to both show 
and hide Napoleon at the same time.  They left out everything that had been too 
grand or too touching.  They concealed the real and the grandiose in more or less 
splendid envelopes, hiding the imperial cortege inside the military cortege, the 
army inside the National Guard, the Chambers inside Les Invalides, and the coffin 
inside the cenotaph.406 
 
Despite its attempts to pose confident and secure in its embrace of the Napoleonic past, 
the regime still appeared fearful that its appropriation of the Napoleonic myth might 
prove a sort of suicide mission by encouraging seditious political schemes of a 
Bonapartist nature, finding it safer to appropriate certain aspects of the Napoleonic legacy 
while downplaying others.   
*** 
One person who was not in Paris to witness Napoleon’s triumphal return was his 
nephew.  Exiled from France after the Strasbourg affair in 1836, the future Napoleon III 
spent the first half of 1837 touring the United States before hurrying back across the 
Atlantic to join his mother, who was dying of cancer, at Arenenberg in August.  In 1838, 
he nearly sparked an international incident when the French government loudly protested 
his residence in Switzerland, irritating the Swiss with repeated demands for his expulsion 
according to the 1816 law of proscription against the Bonapartes.  Louis-Napoleon 
prudently removed himself, but not before taking steps to shrewdly advertise his 
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persecution at the hands of the July Monarchy all across Europe.  He settled in London, 
which proved to be an excellent base from which to orchestrate his next bid for power.  
Using the proceeds from the sale of his mother’s estate, he financed two newspapers, Le 
Capitole and Le Journal du Commerce, ensuring a consistent Bonapartist presence in the 
Parisian press.  In 1839, he published Les Idées Napoléoniennes, which was at one and 
the same time a mythic reading of the Napoleonic past and the first coherent expression 
of the Bonapartist ideology that would later define Louis-Napoleon’s carefully 
constructed image of the Second Empire.  The first Napoleon’s revolutionary heritage 
provided the sacred origins for this ideology, with its distinctive blend of Caesarian 
authoritarianism and an almost mystical, Michelet-like faith in the sovereignty of “le 
peuple.”  Following the now well-worn mythic script, Louis-Napoleon regarded his uncle 
as the “testamentary executor of the Revolution.”  The first Napoleon had “purified” the 
Revolution by rescuing the principles of 1789 and insulating them from the “passions” 
that had derailed the struggle for liberty from its essential course in 1793, while at the 
same time holding at bay the forces of counter-revolution that threatened to consume its 
“practical results.”  As the great mediator between France’s past and present, he 
succeeded in reviving “ancient forms” (e.g., the principle of hereditary rule) but adapting 
them to new interests in accordance “with the sentiments and ideas of the majority.”407  
Napoleon was thus the “messiah of new ideas,” namely, the “reconciliation of Order and 
Liberty, the rights of the people and the principles of authority.”408   
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Less than one month after the Belle-Poule set sail for St. Helena, Louis-Napoleon 
embarked on his own surreptitious journey from England to France in the hopes of 
effecting the second coming.  Having learned little, it seemed, from the Strasbourg affair 
four years earlier, the Bonapartist pretender was still convinced that a successful military 
putsch would spark a popular uprising against the July Monarchy.  Chartering a small 
steamer to make the Channel crossing, Louis-Napoleon departed London on 4 August 
1840 along with some fifty-odd co-conspirators, nine horses, two carriages, weapons, a 
good supply of food and drink, and a tame eagle to serve as Napoleonic mascot.  Their 
target was Boulogne, whose garrison was deemed ripe for the plucking.  (As with nearly 
everything Louis-Napoleon did, history furnished a requisite symbolic precedent.  
Boulogne was the staging ground for the first Napoleon’s planned but unexecuted 
invasion of England, marked since 1831 by the triumphal Colonne de la Grande Armée, 
and figured among the Napoleonic cult’s most important sites of pilgrimage.)  In the 
early morning hours of the 6th, they disembarked on the beach at Wimereux, and, 
disguised as soldiers of the 40th Regiment stationed at Calais, set out for the garrison at 
Boulogne some three miles to the south.  Arriving at the barracks shortly after dawn, they 
were met by a defiant captain of the 42nd Regiment, who had been forewarned of their 
arrival.  Forced to beat a hasty retreat, the conspirators made a run for the beach, where 
the plot met its ignominious end.  Pursued into the shallow water by the regiment’s 
soldiers and the local National Guard company, Louis-Napoleon was taken prisoner 
along with each of his fellow conspirators.  The punishment for his second transgression 
against the Orléans regime was not nearly so lenient as the first.  Unwilling to brave the 
risk of acquittal by a jury trial in the local courts, the government charged him with an 
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attack on the security of the state in order to ensure the case was sent to the Chamber of 
Peers, which sentenced him to life imprisonment (unanimously save for one peer, who 
voted for a death sentence).  Louis-Napoleon was sent to the medieval fortress of Ham, 
near the Belgian border, where he remained until his escape in 1846.  
Thus, Louis-Napoleon’s second attempt to seize power, ill-conceived and 
hampered by his own lukewarm resolve, was even more hopelessly botched than the first.  
Nonetheless, despite the almost comically disastrous nature of the fiasco, the plan was 
not so harebrained as it seemed, considering the circumstances in which France found 
itself in 1840.  The Eastern Crisis and Louis-Philippe’s hesitant response to the gauntlet 
thrown down in the form of the Quadruple Alliance had brought the July Monarchy to the 
nadir of its popularity, which had been steadily declining over the past several years.  To 
many, the king’s reluctance to avenge this affront to French honor confirmed the weak 
character of the regime, which had also shied away from supporting revolution in Poland, 
refused to turn the Belgian bid for independence to its own advantage, and was appearing 
to waver in its commitment to the conquest of Algeria.  The July Monarchy was plagued 
also by the persistent threat of social unrest, born of slow economic progress and the 
miserable conditions of France’s growing industrial working class.  Already Fieschi’s 
attempt to assassinate the king in July 1835 had inspired Louis-Napoleon with the 
confidence to attempt his first coup at Strasbourg, and subsequent plots on the king’s life 
suggested a continued desire to see him replaced.  Finally, the impending return of 
Napoleon’s remains and the publicity surrounding the event created an atmosphere of 
feverish excitement and nostalgia for past imperial splendors, which Louis-Napoleon 
fully intended to capitalize on and translate it into his own political gain, timing his attack 
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so that he might be in Louis-Philippe’s place to receive the ashes when they were brought 
to rest at Les Invalides.   
In fact, it seems that Louis-Napoleon, tired of waiting for another opportunity for 
a coup to present itself, took matters into his hands, attempting to force the issue of 
reclaiming Napoleon’s ashes in order to profit from the event.  At the very same time that 
Thiers was trying to bring the project to fruition in France, Louis-Napoleon was covertly 
pursuing the very same goal on the other side of the Channel.  In the spring of 1840, he 
goaded his uncle Joseph into contacting Palmerston to sound out the British 
government’s willingness to relinquish custody of Napoleon’s remains.  Palmerston 
replied that neither he nor the other ministers would offer any objection should an official 
request from the July Monarchy be forthcoming, slyly suggesting that England might 
even forestall France by offering to make restitution without waiting for Louis-Philippe 
to make up his mind.  Not content with these measures, Louis-Napoleon added some fuel 
to the fire by inducing Daniel O’Connell, an Irish M.P. with whom he had some contact, 
to threaten Palmerston with bringing the question before the House of Commons.  
Wishing to preserve diplomatic accord between England and France for the time being, 
Palmerston then informed Thiers of the potential démarche, giving the latter the 
ammunition he needed to overcome Louis-Philippe’s reluctance.409  For England to take 
the initiative on this matter would have compromised French national honor, an 
embarrassment that the July Monarchy could ill afford, especially while embroiled in the 
negotiations over the Eastern Crisis. 
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Having perhaps played an integral role in precipitating the return of the ashes, 
Louis-Napoleon was also quick to make use of the intense anticipation leading up to the 
return of the ashes in his efforts to garner popular support for his bid for power.  
Schooled in the art of propaganda perfected by the first Napoleon, he had three 
proclamations printed ahead of his arrival in Boulogne, one addressed to the citizens of 
Pas-de-Calais, another to the army, and the third intended for the nation at large.  In the 
last, he not-so-subtly hinted that Louis-Philippe’s regime was unworthy to reign over a 
nation whose prestige would shortly be elevated by the very presence of Napoleon’s 
mortal remains.  “The ashes of the emperor shall not return except to a France 
regenerated…Glory and Liberty must stand by the side of Napoleon’s coffin.”410  In 
failing to adequately defend France’s autonomy and dignity against its foreign rivals, by 
proving to be an unworthy heir to the revolutionary principles by which his reign had 
been consecrated, Louis-Napoleon suggested, the king had unwittingly created a vacuum 
that only another Bonaparte could fill. 
Louis-Napoleon’s failure in 1840 suggests that by and large, the July Monarchy 
appears to have profited from the return of the ashes.  The regime succeeded in safely 
paying a highly theatrical homage to the Napoleonic past, which failed to set off any 
significant tremors in the French political landscape.  True, Bonapartists and other 
opponents of the regime caused minor disturbances on the day of the funeral, using the 
highly public nature of the event as an occasion to manifest their discontent.  When the 
sarcophagus disembarked at Courbevoie, for example, several thousand students in the 
law and medical faculties who had been denied a place in the funeral cortège flocked to 
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the quays singing a seditious version of the Marseillaise banned by the government.411  
Cries of  “à bas Guizot!” and “à bas les traitres!” were heard echoing throughout Paris 
along with the familiar refrain of the Marseillaise, and the National Guard became 
especially restless as night settled on the city.412  Prudently, the government ordered the 
police to ignore these pockets of unrest, which quickly lost their momentum as the 
emotional drama of the day subsided.  Whatever his private fears about the potentially 
seditious power of Napoleonic memories, and the ambiguities in the funeral ceremonies 
notwithstanding, Louis-Philippe ultimately convinced many that “the Man of the Three 
[Glorious] Days, greater than Diogenes,/Henceforth no longer has reason to fear that 
Glory will obscure/His brilliant sun of July.”413 
 
Conclusion 
While it is perhaps something of an exaggeration to say that the return of the 
ashes saved the July Monarchy,414 the discourse surrounding the event certainly suggests 
that it offered a much-needed sop to French pride in the wake of her most recent 
humiliation at the hands of the Quadruple Alliance.  Contemporaries actively invited 
memories of the Napoleonic past as conscious act of recall in order to deal with the 
painful present.  “When we see France, once so powerful/Tremble before kings, like a 
suppliant/Begging each day for alms of peace;/When we see France held captive by 
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limits/Imposed by foreigners…We want to reawaken our memories of the emperor.”415  
The practice of active remembrance was central to the process of France’s rebirth, for “if 
the memories of a people are life itself,/they will find themselves more alive than 
ever.”416  In fact, suggested one poet, oubli was the problem – France found herself in her 
present state of subordination and disgrace because in 1815, all it had taken was one 
single defeat to erase the memory of so much grandeur and to treacherously turn 
Napoleon over to their mutual enemy.  Thus, remembering provided the solution; France 
must “Resurrect his memory/If we want to resurrect ourselves.”417   
The return of the ashes and its attendant celebrations of the Napoleonic past 
furnished participants and witnesses to the ceremonies an opportunity to atone for their 
collective sins of betrayal, abandon, and oubli: 
Oh, the lessons of time!  expiatory returns! 
Who can help but feel remorse? 
Such is the fate of a great man, after so many victories, 
To conquer again even in death. 
 
Even his greatest enemies, eloquent phenomenon, 
Do him the honor of a pantheon, 
And from the ends of the earth it was a Bourbon  
Who piloted the funeral procession of Napoleon.418 
 
The poet Belmontet found it highly significant that the king’s own son, a prince of the 
house of Bourbon and “a citizen of new France,” was charged with the mission to recover 
Napoleon’s remains from St. Helena.  For Joinville, the journey constituted a “rebaptism” 
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of sorts, cleansing him, and by extension the Orléans regime, of their original sin.419  Like 
the expiatory rites and monuments of the Restoration period, ostensibly designed to 
cleanse the French nation of the collective sin of regicide in order to pursue the policy of 
union et oubli, the goal was atonement and pardon for misdeeds as a necessary 
precondition for reconciliation. 
A strong sense of active remembrance as a collective devoir on the part of the 
French nation was reinforced by the editorial commentary that followed the text of 
Rémusat’s speech in the Journal des débats.  In response to Lamartine and others who 
opposed the return of the ashes, fearing that it amounted to a tacit nod to the legitimacy of 
Bonapartist claims, they argued that such fears were groundless because “Napoleon’s 
ideas are no longer those of our time.  That forceful and unrestrained authority, the 
absolute will of a single man, the despotism occasionally blinded by genius, have all 
disappeared forever.  The glory of our guns that he raised so high is no longer something 
that France aspires to.”  Reactions to the announcement, they suggested, were proof 
positive that these ideas were no longer relevant, and that Napoleon’s memory no longer 
had the power to excite strong political passions or exacerbate divisions.  For hardly had 
the announcement been made than opposing interests “laid their quarrels to rest, and all 
parties, merged together by a single sentiment, instantly turned towards those glorious 
memories that his name recalled.”  The commentary also revealed that a profound shift 
was taking place in attitudes towards the past, which seemed to be losing its importance 
as a prototype for the present.  The profound turmoil of the period 1789-1815 had shaken 
collective faith in the revolutionary enterprise, which had posited a radical break with the 
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French past in an effort to regenerate the nation.  This shaken faith manifested itself in 
the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic era by a marked impulse to take refuge in the 
past, whether seeking consolation for present trauma, or explanation, or both, an impulse 
that was made all the more pressing by the sense that France was embarking on yet 
another radically new stage in its political evolution.  The Débats article of 13 May 1840 
suggested that a transformation was taking place in this relationship between past and 
present; France, having suffered the growing pains of her constitutional development and 
now enjoying a sort of post-revolutionary political and social maturity, looked 
optimistically to her future.  Nonetheless, France would not fail to honor the memory of a 
man who was not only a great warrior, but who had also rescued France from the perils of 
anarchy, avenged her humiliation, restored the lawful worship of the Christian faith, and 
created institutions and legislation that allowed France to survive so much turmoil and 
instability.  For “the cult of memory is the primary duty of nations, the most sure sign of 
their grandeur, the most efficacious encouragement that they can possible accord to great 
political virtues.”420  
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Conclusion 
  
“It is difficult to disengage ourselves entirely from the past; generations, like 
individuals, are controlled by their antecedents.”421  No one could say this more truthfully 
than Louis-Napoleon, who throughout his political career found himself, through no 
small fault of his own, obscured by the long shadow cast by memories of the first 
Napoleon.  His critics then and now have credited his success entirely to the influence of 
the Napoleonic myth, dismissing him as a poorly drawn copy of his uncle who catapulted 
himself to power on the strength of popular affection for the original.  Louis-Napoleon, 
for his part, wasted few opportunities to pander to that nostalgia, first to win electoral 
support for his candidacy for President of the Republic in 1848, and later to secure an air 
of consent, ex post facto, for the reestablishment of the empire.  From the coup d’état of 2 
December 1851, carried out on the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz, to French 
intervention in the Italian Risorgimento, he consistently patterned his actions on the 
precedents set by his uncle and cloaked his authority in symbols reminiscent of the First 
Empire.  Thus encouraged, comparisons between the two men were inevitable, and the 
nephew, dubbed “Napoleon the Little” by Victor Hugo, invariably came out the loser, 
despite the fact that France arguably enjoyed greater domestic prosperity and stability 
under the Second Empire than the First.  But what the Second Empire lacked was prestige 
on the battlefield, and in this more than anything else, Napoleon III proved unable to live 
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up to the impossible expectations created by his “antecedents.”  Seen as an exceptional 
blot on an otherwise spotless record, the first Napoleon’s reputation survived, and was 
even enhanced by, the debacle at Waterloo, whereas Napoleon III had nothing to offer in 
compensation for the humiliating defeat at Sedan.   
 Such is the conventional view of the Second Empire.  But the real nature of the 
relationship between Napoleon III and the myth is somewhat more complicated.  Ever 
since Napoleon I’s first abdication in April 1814, the ruling classes who succeeded him 
feared the potential of memory to ignite political opposition and seditious activity, 
especially in the form of a Bonapartist challenge to the throne.  Thus, both the Bourbon 
and Orléans regimes tried to contain that threat in their own ways, the first by repressing 
memory and enforcing collective amnesia about the recent past, and the second by 
selectively appropriating those memories and integrating them into an official narrative 
of the nation’s history.  Whether those efforts were successful in curbing the threat of 
Bonapartism, or whether the movement suffered more from its own inertia, the fact 
remains that it failed to constitute a plausible political alternative between 1814 and 1848.  
While Bonapartism exercised considerable appeal in winning over participants in the 
various conspiracies of the Restoration period, especially among the army, partisans of 
Napoleon II had to cooperate with liberals and republicans under the broader rubric of the 
political opposition, who were not likely to seriously back an imperial restoration in the 
event of a successful revolution against the Bourbons.  When that revolution finally came 
in July 1830, Bonapartists failed to capitalize on the brief window of opportunity 
furnished by the power vacuum, despite the conspicuous presence of Napoleonic 
memories in the revolutionary discourse.  Perhaps it was indeed “both too soon and too 
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late for another Bonaparte,” but whatever the reason, Napoleon II was quickly displaced 
by Louis-Philippe as the most viable candidate to assume the throne.422  Even when the 
Orléans regime had reached the nadir of its popularity in the summer of 1840, and the 
feverish anticipation of the return of the ashes notwithstanding, Louis-Napoleon’s second 
attempt to seize power ended in disaster.   
In other words, the Napoleonic myth did not inevitably translate into a 
Bonapartist political triumph, even during the period when the myth enjoyed its greatest 
dynamism and relevance in French political culture, and Louis-Napoleon was not able to 
achieve his goals until 1848.  Why?  Whereas historical opinion has long seen Louis-
Napoleon as profiting from the power of Napoleonic memories, one might argue that he 
achieved his goal only when he was able to free himself of the burden of those memories.  
The attempted coups of 1836 and 1840 failed, not only because of the clumsy ineptitude 
with which they were executed, but because the first Napoleon’s past still constituted a 
vibrant milieu de mémoire in French political culture.  It was only with Napoleon’s 
interment in Les Invalides, when the myth began to assume the aspect of a lieu de 
mémoire, the narrative becoming static and politically inert, that Louis-Napoleon could 
hope to establish himself as a viable political option in France.  By 1848, the name 
Napoleon no longer referred to the past alone, but to the present and possibly the future.   
 Nonetheless, Louis-Napoleon was indisputably indebted to the Napoleonic myth, 
to which he heavily contributed.  The myth-makers’ efforts to impose order on competing 
memories and make sense of the Napoleonic past provided him with the raw material 
with which to fashion the Bonapartist ideology of the Second Empire: “The name 
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Napoleon is a complete program in itself.  It stands for order, authority, religion, national 
prosperity within, and national dignity without.”423  While his idea of the First Empire as 
one grounded in liberal institutions and popular suffrage may have indeed made, in the 
words of one historian, “bad history” but “good propaganda,” Louis-Napoleon did not 
fashion his reading of the past out of his own fancy.424  Rather, it was shaped and 
informed by the little known and often anonymous political writers of the Restoration and 
July Monarchy periods, who constructed a highly plastic meta-narrative of Napoleonic 
history that could be told in different ways in order to address contemporary political 
concerns. 
 This dissertation has argued that the myth was a more or less conscious effort to 
keep the past present as a means of addressing contemporary political concerns during 
the Restoration and the July Monarchy, the most pressing of which throughout both 
regimes was the elusive quest for post-revolutionary national unity.  Political discourse 
on both sides of the spectrum was characterized by a strong, almost anti-Romantic belief 
that emotions were dangerous because they produced esprit de parti, revealing a 
profound sense discomfort with one of the most stinging realities of constitutional 
government – the emergence of factional politics.  Reconstituting national unity figured 
high on their list of rhetorical priorities, and memories of the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic past played a crucial role in either fracturing or forging that unity, depending 
on one’s perspective.  For moderate royalists during the Restoration, union depended 
upon selective oubli of a past whose legacy of revolutionary upheaval and violence 
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proved an obstacle to national unity.  For the liberal opposition, who remembered the 
Empire as a period in which France enjoyed a “harmony of interests” and unanimity 
forged through “felicitous patriotism,” remembering the past provided an antidote to the 
fractures imposed by the Second Restoration’s reactionary policies, from popular 
violence under the Terror to the proscription of France’s war veterans.  Recognizing 
memory’s potential to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, Louis-Philippe jettisoned 
the Restoration’s policy of attempting to ignore the revolutionary and Napoleonic past, 
while maintaining a vigilant eye over how that past was narrated and commemorated in 
order to promote consensus about the past. 
Narrating the Napoleonic past was also a way of criticizing what were seen as the 
most glaring failures of the Restoration and July Monarchy, which for both regimes came 
in the sphere of French foreign policy and their inability or unwillingness to restore 
France to the position of importance in European affairs she lost in 1815.  Vilified for the 
sacrifice of France’s “natural frontiers” and her subordinate role in the Concert of 
Europe, the Bourbons were confronted with a version of the Napoleonic narrative that 
emphasized his nearly faultless record of victory on the battlefield and his selfless 
devotion to the welfare of the patrie, absolving him of guilt for France’s humiliation by 
displacing responsibility to the heads of “traitors.”  Time and again, acts of remembering 
the Napoleonic past were offered as a way of repudiating the treaties of 1815, most 
dramatically with the return of the ashes in 1840, which was reinterpreted as an act of 
defiance against France’s past and present enemies.  Critical of the pronounced 
pacificism of the Bourbon and Orléans monarchs, the political opposition under both 
regimes shaped and molded Napoleon into the role of the Revolution’s favorite son and a 
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victim of reactionary tyranny in order to make him a mouthpiece for their foreign policy 
objectives, which sought opportunities to reassert France’s importance in international 
affairs and demanded that France reassert her revolutionary character by supporting 
liberal and nationalist movements throughout Europe. 
For over a century, historians have studied the creation of the Napoleonic myth, 
often committing themselves, wittingly or not, to one side or the other in Peter Geyl’s 
classic dichotomy of “Napoleon: for and against.”  Questions about the internal logic and 
dynamics of the myth continue to generate fruitful lines of inquiry and debate about its 
origins and methods of creation.  But the Napoleonic myth also merits reevaluation 
because of what it reveals about how memory and history functioned in post-
revolutionary French political culture in the first half of the nineteenth century.  The past 
was highly present in public discourse during the Restoration for a number of reasons, 
not least of which was the sense of temporal disruption caused by the momentous 
upheavals of the period 1789-1815.  The presence of the past was also magnified because 
of the effects that the Empire’s collapse in 1814-15 had on people’s perception of 
historical time, which appeared to have been unanchored by the return of the Bourbons.  
While the ultraroyalists may have wanted to undo the Revolution, what they really 
accomplished in the minds of their opponents was to unfinish it.  The past continued to 
haunt the political culture of the July Monarchy, although generally in less subversive 
ways owing to Louis-Philippe’s attitudes towards the Revolution and First Empire.  
Incorporated into the official memory of the state, made a lieu de mémoire with the 
construction of Napoleon’s final resting place at Les Invalides, the myth was stripped of 
much of its malleability and plasticity and thus lost much of its immediate relevance in 
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French political culture.  But the myth also owed its waning influence to changes in the 
relationship between the nation and its past that occurred towards the middle of the 
century.  The relative stability and prosperity of the July Monarchy left many feeling that 
France had survived the experiment in constitutional government.  Gaining confidence in 
their ability to solve the riddles posed by the post-revolutionary order, they no longer 
needed a present past.   
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